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ABSTRACT
A Critique of the
Integrated Arts Experience: Its
Relation to Learning Theory and Its
Pedagogical Value
May, 1977
Frank John Messina, B.S., M.S., State University
of New York College at Potsdam, Ed.D.,
University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Prof. Judithe Speidel
The study focuses on the question Should the Integrated
Arts Experience ( IAE) be used to facilitate conceptual learn-
ing and development? The IAE is defined as an activity which
induces in the learner an emotional and/or kinestnetic state
which is in some way analogous to the concept being taught,
and which occurs through heightened sensory awareness on the
part of the learner. The term integrated is used to imply
the integration of the arts experience into the learning pro-
cess. Precedents for the use of the arts in this fashion
are
identified in the works of Read (1958), Lowenfeld and
Brittain (1947), R. A. Smith (1971a), Eisner (1972) and
other
Part I of the study addresses the issue of
whether it is
theoretically possible for arts activities to
facilitate con-
ceptual learning and development. Three
questions form the
basis of Part I: 1) How is it that any
concept is learned?;
VI
(2) What are the characteristics of the IAE that might allow
it to facilitate the learning of concepts?; and (3) What is
the process by which the IAE might facilitate the learning
of concepts? Although there are differing views concerning
concept formation, conceptual growth and development are
described in terms of the construct proposed by David Ausubel.
He identifies two criteria by which learning can be said to
be meaningful, nonarbitrariness and substantiveness. Non-
arbitrariness "... implies some plausible or reasonable basis
for establishing the relationship between new material and
the relevant ideas in question (1966, p. 60). Substantive
implies, "... the same concept or proposition expressed in
synonomous language would induce substantially the same
meaning (1966, p. 60).
The IAE is defined and described in its curricular func-
tion is examined. Three characteristics that might allow the
IAE to facilitate conceptual learning are identified. The IAE
provides opportunities for the following processes to occur:
(1) perceptual cognition; (2) metaphorical modes of thinking;
(3) use of alternative forms of communication.
A model is presented which identifies the degree to which
the IAE might theoretically be able to facilitate conceptual
growth and development. Wherever possible, the three charac-
teristics of the IAE that might allow it to facilitate concep-
tual learning are connected to the two criteria for
meaningful
learning as identified by Ausubel. It is shown
that allowing
for perceptual cognition to occur is related
to both
vii
nonarbitrary and substantive learning. It is shown further*
allowing for metaphorical modes of thinking to occur is
related to nonarbitrary learning, but not necessarily to sub-
stantive learning. Finally, it is shown that allowing for
the use of alternative forms of communication is related to
substantive learning but it is unclear as to whether or not
it is related to nonarbitrary learning. Therefore, the answer
to the question Is it theoretically possible for the IAE to
facilitate conceptual learning is, yes.
In Part II of the study, the focus is on the question
Should the IAE be used to facilitate conceptual learning and
development? The critique is based on three works from the
reform movement of the late 1960’s and early ’70s: Educat ion
and Ecstacy (1968) by George Leonard, Fantasy and Feeling in
Education (1969) by Richard Jones, and Crisis in The Classroom
(1968) by Charles Silberman. In each instance criteria are
selected by which the author identifies positive attributes
of education. The extent to which the use of the IAE meets
these criteria is then examined.
In summary, the IAE is seen as a pedagogical technique
which has a sound theoretical base and which is likely to
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The arts and public education have both existed as
integral parts of western civilization for many years.
Attempts to combine the two, in one form or another, date
back almost as far as the practices themselves. In his
Republic
,
Plato devoted an entire section to the role the
arts might play in educational development.
The perceived relationship between the arts and educa-
tion has varied greatly. At certain times each has stood
alongside the other with a common goal: to be a more "human"
human being, a person needs to be both educated and somewhat
skilled in the use of the arts. At other times, one stood
within the other as a component: to be an educated person,
one must be trained in the production and interpretation of
the arts. At still other times, critics like Herbert Read
(1958) have proposed that the arts exist as a vehicle through
which people can be educated, and/or that people are educated
when they have gained the insights that are only available
through the arts.
In recent years there has been a resurgence of
this
latter view, as evidenced by certain Federal programs
and
like the JDR 3rd Fund's, "Arts in Education
Program"
programs
2(K. Bloom, 1971). Although there is no clear agreement on the
role of the arts in education and the justification for their
inclusion in the educative process, Elliot Eisner (1972, p. 2)
points out that at least one view, ”... emphasizes the conse-
quences of arts in work and utilizes the particular needs of
the students or the society as a major basis for forming its
objectives." Eisner refers to this view as the contextualist
justification. He describes it as the counter-part to the
essentialist justification which, ”... emphasizes the kinds
of contributions to human experience and understanding that
only art can provide."
Although Eisner supports the essentialist view, he ex-
plains that proponents of the contextualist justification
argue that art activities can play an important role in
developing a student’s understanding of academic subject
areas. The implication, then, is that arts activities con
tribute to concept formation and therefore, should be used as
an important resource in teaching.
The literature on aesthetic education contains many
other references to this notion of arts activities
enhancing
cognitive devr lopment and learning. R. A. Smith
(1971a) has
identified different types of aesthetics and
their relation-
ship to the teaching of arts. In his article
entitled, "Aes-
thetic Foundations of Education,
' he also indicates
vance of aesthetics to the teaching of
other subjects as well,
and to the generic process of teaching
and learnine .
3Lowenfeld and Brittain include emotional, intellectual, per-
ceptual and aesthetic experiences as the elements of an
"integrated" creative experience and indicate the importance
of that experience in having the student identify with certain
ideas personally.
Statement of the Problem
We see, then, that writers such as Eisner, Lowenfeld
and Brittain, Smith and others have identified the fact that
there is at least some intuitive support for the notion of
arts activities enhancing cognitive development and learning.
The problem is that the use of arts activities in this way has
not been examined within the context of a systematic analysis
of the processes involved in conceptual learning and develop-
ment, nor has it been critiqued on the basis of criteria from
outside the realm of arts education.
Purpose and Organization of the Study
It is the purpose of this study, therefore, to ask the
question: Should the Integrated Arts Experience be used to
facilitate conceptual learning and development?; and to
attempt
to answer it within the contexts referred to above.
According-
ly, the study will be divided into two major sections.
In
Part I, I will address the issue of whether
it is theoretical
ly possible for arts activities to facilitate
conceptual learn-
ing and development. Within the context
of the relationship
4between the arts and learning, and using the learning of
concepts as an example area to investigate, in Part I I will
deal with the following three questions: (1) How is it that
any concept is learned?; (2) What are the characteristics of
the Integrated Arts Experience ( IAE ) that might allow it to
facilitate the learning of concepts?; and (3) What is the
process by which the IAE might facilitate the learning of
concepts?
Each of the three questions will be the focal point of
one chapter. In Chapter 2, the question. How is it that any
concept is learned?, will be asked. In answering the question
I will attempt to define concepts in their purest form, dis-
cuss the essential process upon which conceptual behavior is
based, and then look at two more complex views of what the
concepts we teach in school are like. The focus of the dis-
cussion will then shift to examining the dynamics involved in
learning the concept. Finally, I will put that conglomerate
view into the context of a more pedagogical view of the proces
of learning, one that will supply criteria upon which we can
judge the effectiveness of any approach to facilitating the
learning of concepts.
Chapter 3 will deal with the second question, What are
the characteristics of the Integrated Arts Experience (IAE)
that might allow it to facilitate the learning of
concepts?
The first step in answering the question will be
to _-f
the IAE and indicate, to some degree, how it
grows out or the
5literature and thought which deals with the impact of arts
activities on learning. The second step in answering the
question will be to describe the IAE . Three examples will
be given and then discussed. The third step will be to indi-
cate the curricular function of the IAE. In the fourth step,
each of the three characteristics that might allow the IAE
to facilitate the learning of concepts will be discussed.
The processes involved in these characteristics will also be
examined
.
Finally, in Chapter IV, the relationships between the
criteria which must be fulfilled for the learning of concepts
to occur and the characteristics of the IAE that might allow
for the meeting of those criteria will be examined. After
those relations are discussed, they will be incorporated into
a model.
Part II of the study will address itself more directly
to the question, Should the Integrated Arts Experience be used
tofacilitate conceptual learning and development? It will be
a critique, based on criteria which are applicable to the
educative process in general, of the use of arts activities
to facilitate conceptual learning and development. In order
to reflect those educational views that are recent, yet have
stood the test of time at least long enough not to be
regarded
as a passing vogue, I have chosen works written during
the
educational reform movement of the late 1960's and
early vri
as the basis of the critique.
6The critique will be broken down into three sub-sections.
In Chapter V, George Leonard's Education and Ecstacy
,
will be
used as the basis of a discussion of the role society plays
in setting the expectations that educational systems attempt
to meet. The changing expectations society has, and will
have today and in the future, and the role that the IAE can
play in meeting those new expectations will then be discussed.
Chapter VI will deal with the new importance that is
being given to the role of feelings and emotions in education
in general and in conceptual learning in particular. Fantasy
and Feeling in Education by Richard Jones will be used as the
major reference in this sub-section. Jones' arguments con-
cerning the role of emotions in conceptual learning, combined
with a discussion of how the IAE can help a student deal with
emotional material, will allow for an opportunity to evaluate
one of the most important arguments which support the use of
arts activities in facilitating conceptual learning and
development -
Charles Silberman's Crisis in the Classroom will be the
major point of reference for Chapter VII. This work, acLually
the chairman's report of the Carnegie Study of the Education
of Educators, discussed pedagogical methodology as well
as
the effects of the educational system and structure
on indi-
vidual learners. The focal point of the discussion
will oe
the role of the IAE in that pedagogical methodology,
and its
ability to ameliorate the effects of the
educational system
7and structure on the learner. The final chapter of the study
will contain a section on the implications of what has been
discussed and identification of some further steps that might
be taken in order to foster the use of the Integrated Arts
Experience as a pedagogical technique.
Delimitations of the Study
This study will deal with the Integrated Arts Experience
as it is defined here. The theoretical feasibility of its
facilitating the learning of concepts will be examined as will
the relative value of its use. The study will not include
other uses of the arts in education, such as using the arts
to promote psychological growth per se or adopting an essen-
tialist approach to teaching arts. Nor will I attempt to
explain or systematically identify in the study other approach-
es that might or might not facilitate the learning of concepts.
Significance of the Study
Many educators have proposed the use of arts activities
to facilitate conceptual learning and development.
Generally,
these recommendations have been made without a systematic
understanding of the relationship arts activities have
to the
processes by which this learning and development
takes place.
Also, the use of arts activities as a means
of promoting
ceptual learning has not been evaluated in
terms of criteria
that reflect a more global view of the
educative process and
8which come from outside the realm of art education. The
significance of this study lies in the fact that it attempts
to fill, to some degree, the gap in our understanding of the
role arts activities can play in facilitating conceptual
learning and development. It should enable educators to
make more logical and informed decisions as to the value of
and most efficient procedures for using arts activities in
this way.
Additional Note
The following model (see Fig. 1) is presented here as
a guide for the reader. The model is a diagramatic represen-
tation of the theoretical configuration by which I will con-
nect the Integrated Arts Experience (IAE) to conceptual learn-
ing. In the model, conceptual learning, as viewed through
Ausubel ’ s theory of meaningful learning, is connected to the
Integrated Arts Experience to the degree that the two criteria
for meaningful learning can be shown to be in accordance with
the three characteristics of the IAE that are applicable to
this process. The ensuing discussion will describe the theo-
retical foundations which support this model. The model is
offered here so that it may be used by the reader as a
point






Figure 1; A Model of How The







THEORIES OF CONCEPTUAL LEARNING AS
THEY RELATE TO THE INTEGRATED ARTS EXPERIENCE
If it is the purpose of this study to evaluate the value
of the use of arts activities to facilitate conceptual learn-
ing and development, then, of necessity, I must first come to
grips with a major question that is subsumed within this
problem. Namely, I must answer the question, Is it theoreti-
cally possible for arts activities to facilitate conceptual
learning and development? This question can itself be broken
down into three sub-questions: (1) How is it that any concept
is learned?; (2) What are the characteristics of the Integrated
Arts Experience (IAE) that might allow it to facilitate the
Teaming of concepts?; and (3) What is the process by which
the IAE might be able to facilitate the learning of concepts?
This chapter addresses itself to the first of these sub-
questions, How is it that any concept is learned? It seems
most logical to me that the chapter be organized around the
major theoretical positions which both address themselves to
the above question and are also of some use in
describing Lhe
role that arts activities might play in facilitating
this con
ceptual learning. Therefore, after a preliminary
section which
deals with the question, "What is a concept? ,
the ch^pt^r
will then consist of sections on classif
icatory and
11
categorization behavior, Vygotsky and Gagne's views of con-
cept formation, Piaget's argument against a stimulus-response
paradigm for conceptual learning and Piaget's processes of
assimilation and accommodation and Ausubel's theory of mean-
ingful versus reception learning.
What Is A Concept?
There are certain words that are used so many times in
our daily vocabulary that a person who was unfamiliar with our
language system would surmise that' these words have developed,
by necessity, distinct and commonly accepted meanings. How
else could they be used so often without creating complete
confusion between speaker and listener? And yet, if we
examine some of these words carefully we find a wide range of
meanings which different people attach to them. Some of these




are abstract, e.g., freedom , democracy , love . But even some
words which we commonly would agree have concrete meanings
fall into this same category of words which mean something
different to almost everyone who uses them.
This is the case with the term concept . What is a con-
cept? Ask a number of psychologists, philosophers or educa-
tors and you are sure to get a number of different answers.
Why this is true is not known for certain; however,
Klausmeier





formal definitions of the word concept vary so
widely that communication across and even within disciplines
is difficult . According to Klausmeier and his associates
,
(Note 1) definitions vary apparently for three reasons. First,
the number of entities called concepts is very large. Second-
ly, there are real differences in the nature of concepts both
across and within disciplines. And finally, they point out
that an individual’s concept of the thing or classes of things
changes markedly with increasing maturation and learning.
Some of those who define the term concept strive to
capture the essence of the term in a simple statement. Rom
Harre (1966) states, "What are concepts? Concepts are the
vehicles of thought" (p. 3). Others strive for slightly more
clarity with the addition of a key word or two. In 1896
Titchner defined a concept as a "... symbol which holds a
large number of particular ideas together" (Sills, 1968,
p. 206). However, with the addition of key words and a move
toward clarity comes more discrepancy from others’ definitions.
For Archer (1966 , p. 37) the term symbol is not precise enough.
He substitutes the term labe
1
,
and defines a concept as
"... the label- of a set of things that have something in
common.
"
Of course, other theorists believe that it is impossible
to completely define so complex an entity as a concept
in a
simple statement. For Walter Brugger and Kenneth
Baker (1S72,
p. 67), "The concept is the simplest form of
thought in contrast
13
"to judgment and influence which are thought patterns composed
of a number of concepts. While a judgment expresses a cer-
tain reality as existing, the concept is a thoughtful or
abstract-spiritual expression of 'whatness; ' for it grasps an
object, represents ’what' it is without making a statement
about it." In addition, as the Klausmeier statement indicat-
ed, it may seem most logical to any theorist to define the
term concept in the language of his or her own discipline.
Accordingly, for P. L. Heath (1967), author of The Encyclope-
dia of Philosophy
,
"To have a concept x is
,
we may say (with
some exceptions), (a) to know the meaning of the word x;
(b) to be able to pick out or recognize a presented x (distin-
guish non-x ’ s
,
etc.), or again to be able to think of (have
images or ideas of) x (or x's) when they are not present;
(c) to know the nature of x , to have grasped or apprehended
the properties (universlas, essences, etc.) which characterize
x's and make them what they are" (p. 177).
In order to understand the term concept , however, we are
better served if we look to the utilitarian, rather than pure
based definitions. Indicative of this view is Bruner, Goodnow
and Austin's (1956) approach to defining conceptual behavior.
They did not seek explanation in terms of learning theory, in-
formation theory, or personality theory. Instead, they sought
to describe and in some small measure to explain what happens
when people seek to sort the environment into significant
classes of events and end up treating "discriminably
different
14
things as equivalents" (p. viii.). With this definition as
a starting point, Bruner, et. al
,
went on to do an extensive
study of conceptual behavior and to eventually describe that
behavior in terms of class.ificatory or categorization beha-
vior.
Since classificatory behavior is viewed as a process by
which the learner learns to identify significant aspects of
an object or event and then identify those same aspects in
other objects or events, the definition of the term concept
that theorists of this inclination use, reflects that general
process. Accordingly, Bruner and his associates state, "We...
regard a concept as a network of significant inferences by
which one goes beyond a set of observed criterial properties
exhibited by an object or event to the class identity of the
object or event in question, and then to additional inferences
about other unobserved properties of the object or event" (p.
244 )
.
Many theorists who support the "classificatory behavior"
view of concepts and concept formation are advocates, concur-
rently, of stimulus -response theory. This, of course, is a
logical situation, since stimulus-response theory can readily
be seen as the basis of classif icatory behavior.
Stimulus-
response "purists," however, describe concept formation
more
narrowly. Perhaps the clearest statement of
this view, one
that is persistently encountered in any research
in the con-
cept formation literature, is that of T.
S. Kendler. She
15
states that "Concept formation is taken to imply the acqui-
sition of utilization, or both, of a common response to
dissimilar stimuli..." (H. Kendler, 1964, p. 218). There
are significant problems in using such a narrow view, how-
ever. Howard Kendler indicates that, although T. S. Kendler's
definition seems intuitively obvious, if one shifts his
frame of reference to that of Piaget's work with concepts
(1953), it becomes evident that a definition that emphasizes
"a common response to dissimilar stimuli" (p. 219) seems
hardly relevant. This view will be examined more closely in
a later section of this chapter.
There are, however, other views of conceptual behavior.
One of these other views is identified by Bobby L. Rowe.
While Rowe (1974) describes the classificatory approach to
describing conceptual behavior as the behaviorist view, he
also identifies a view he calls the perceptual view. Stud-
ies which adopt this perspective base the meaning of concept
on assumptions of an affectively oriented process with less
precision in measurement on an interval scale or by quantify-
ing comparisons. Rowe terms these studies "perceptual. He
indicates that perceptually-oriented psychologists might des-
cribe a concept as "a combination of meaning, feeling and
symbols which involves internal processing of information
obtained through our senses." Finally, he states, "The per-
ceptual process does not involve learning to make a
specific




1970 ), it is more like giving a reaction"
(p. 19).
This differentiation between behaviorist and perceptual
views of conceptual behavior is very important to my own posi-
tion concerning conceptual learning and development. Whereas
my own view does not characterize one type of behavior as do-
minating or even necessarily being distinct from the other,
it does call for the existence of both classificatory and
perceptual concept formation. Support for the existence of
concept formation during perception comes from the work of
Rudolph Arnheim. In his work entitled Visual Thinking ( 1969 ),
he states, "Strictly speaking, no percept ever refers to a
unique, individual shape but rather to the kind of pattern of
which the .percept consists... There is, therefore, no differ-
ence in principle between percept and concept, quite in keep-
ing with the biological function of perception." Arnheim’
s
view of conceptual behavior as being composed of perceptual
imagery is supported by Rom Harre’s ( 1966 ) view that two main
kinds of conceptual analysis exist. The first answer is
arrived at by connecting concepts with images, the second by
connecting concepts with language.
What then is the definition of the term concept that will
be most useful in this study? Whatever it is, it must
allow
for conceptual behavior to be viewed as a part of
perceptual
behavior. It must also be in agreement with viewing
concept
formation as classif icatory behavior. Therefore,
it must allow
17
for enough flexibility to encompass a number of different
types of concepts, and yet still indicate a particular type
of relationship between its component parts. Accordingly, I
have chosen to use a definition formulated by Klausmeier and
his associates on the grounds that it does, in fact, fulfill
those criteria which I have just described. It states that
a concept is "... ordered information about the properties
of one or more things -- objects, events, or processes --
that enables any particular thing or class of things to be
differentiated from, and also related to, other things or
classes of things" (Note 2).
Classificatory and Categorization Behavior
The human body is a truly wonderous machine. Through
its five major modes of sensory perception, hearing, seeing,
feeling, tasting and smelling, it collects an incredible
amount of information about the world around it. It is cap-
able of making, almost simultaneously, large numbers of dis-
criminations of amazing subtlty. In fact, if its powers of
discrimination were used to their full potential, it would
supply the mind it serves with such a wealth of information
that it would literally prohibit that mind from doing any
work other than simply receiving messages from the senses.
Therefore a paradox exists in that the very ability
which supplies us with the information we need to
adapt to
18
and negotiate our environment is itself capable of destroy-
ing our ability to function in that environment. How is this
paradox resolved? Bruner attributes the resolution of this
seeming paradox—the existence of discrimination capabilities
which, if fully used, would make us slaves to the particular,
to man's capacity to categorize. It is obvious that this
capacity and process is of no small importance. In speaking
of concepts as categories and of their function as such, John
Flavell (1970) states that, "First and foremost, concepts
have the absolutely essential function of reducing the com-
plexity of sensory input to manageable proportions.... This
simplification function has important consequences. For one
thing, it allows the organism a viable economy of time and
effort in dealing with the world.... For another, it leads
to the possibility of a highly adaptive anticipation of future
events from present events" (p. 985).
In summarizing the achievements which categorization
makes possible, Bruner et al
.
(1956) make the following
points: (1) categorization reduces the complexity of the
environment ; (2) it is a means by which objects arc identi
fied; (3) it reduces the necessity of constant learning;
(4) it provides direction for instrumental activity; (5)
it
allows for ordering and relating classes of events; and
(b ) it
offers a way of going beyond the realm of the events
and
d into the realm of the possible.objects we encounter an
19
What, then, do psychologists mean when they use the
terms categorization or classificatory behavior? As Bruner
puts it, "To categorize is to render discriminably different
things equivalent, to group the objects and events and people
around us into classes, and to respond to them in terms of
their class membership rather than their uniqueness" (p. 1).
In other words it is a process by abstraction: first in the
sense of abstracting from the particular instance those as-
pects which identify to what class this given object, event
or process belongs; and secondly in the sense of abstractly
applying a model of those aspects to other objects, events
or processes in order to discern the relationship between
the particular instance and other instances in general.
But are all concepts, or classes, of the same nature-?
Apparently not. Many different psychologists have useu
different criteria to divide concepts or classes into types.
One basic division was made by Osgood in 1953 . He suggested
that there are two kinds of classificatory behavior. "One
kind occurs when an organism responds to a common specific
element in different stimulus patterns The other kind of
classif icatory behavior, the ’true' conceptual type occurs
when varying stimulus patterns, not necessarily containing
any features in common, elicit a common mediating
abstract
response that serves as a cue for conceptual behavior"
(Sill-,
1968, p. 208). Osgood's differentiation between
the two types
highlights the importance and power of the ability
to form
20
classes or categories of objects, events or processes, that
are not discriminably similar.
Robert Clascr and William Cooley (1973) divide concepts
into three different types. According to them, the first type
of concept is "...defined by presence or absence of certain
properties and the joint presence of certain properties and
absence of others" (p. 844). This is the simplest type of
format around which concepts, or categories, are formed. A
shape fits the category of rectangles because its sides are
formed by four right angles. Or, a shape fits the category
of squares because its sides are formed by four right angles
and they are all of equal length.
A second type of concept that Glaser and Cooley identify
is based on a more complex format. This second type of con-
cept, "... involves relational propositions, such as the con-
cepts of 'many,’ 'few,' and 'average;' this requires the learn-
er to think in terms of relationships between a base quantity
and a reference quantity in order to understand the rule or
abstraction that defines the concept" (p. 844).
The third type of concept identified by Glaser and
Cooley involves the process of abstraction. Of this type of
concept they write: "... as new instances are encountered by
the learner, the concepts constantly undergo revision" (p.
844). Examples of this type of concept are the concepts of
justice and gravity .
21
Of course, Glaser and Cooley's use of the term abstract-
i°n this way highlights one of the problems any reader
faces in examining the work of different psychologists in
this field. According to some authors, abstraction is an
integral part of any classificatory behavior. But for Glaser
and Cooley it identifies only one type. In other words, it
is the particular frame of reference that any author uses
which determines the shape his or her definition assumes
. It
is incumbent upon the student interested in concepts and con-
cept formation to familiarize him or herself with enough
different views of this process to begin to get a conglomer-
ate view of all the different aspects involved.
Returning to Bruner and his associates, we see that they,
too, identify different types of concepts; the principle dis-
tinction they make is between conjunctive, disjunctive and
relational concepts, each involving a different mode of com-
bining attributes. We see that this division is similar to,
although not exactly the same as, Glaser and Cooley's diver-
sion. For Bruner and his associates, a conjunctive category
is defined by the joint presence of the appropriate value of
several attributes, while a disjunctive category meets one
set of appropriate values or another. Sometimes we find that
there is an arbitrariness about the combination of the two
sets of attributes which identify the disjunctive category.
An example of this disjunctive type of concept is the New York
City taxpayer. He or she lives in New York City
or work s m
New York City, or both.
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Obviously those two categories are sub-divisions of
the first category identified by Glaser and Cooley. We see,
3.1sOj that the third category identified by Bruner and his
associates is exactly the same as Glaser and Cooley’s second
type. Named the relational category by Bruner et al., it is
defined by a specifiable relationship between defining attri-
butes. The fact that Bruner, et al.
,
do not isolate the
function of abstraction, at least in their 1956 publication,
only reminds us once again of the effects of the frame of
reference that is brought to bear in the work of any psycho-
logist .
In moving beyond the topic of dividing categories into
types, we come to a system of classes which cuts across all
the types of categories. Identified by Bruner, et al . , these
are referred to as classes of equivalence categories, and
are distinguished by the kind of response each calls for.
The three categories of equivalence are called affective ,
functional and formal.
Often we say to ourselves that something "reminds me
of . ..," or "makes me think of ...” something else. This type
of affective response is a dimension upon which we commonly
designate things as equivalent or as being of the same class.
This category or equivalence is learned early in our lives.
In fact, it is learned so early that it pre-dates the
full de-
velopment of language in the individual and may,
therefore,
resist conscious verbal insight. Categorizing
activity at
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the preverbal stage "... appears to be predominantly non-
representat ional
,
depending not so much on the common external
properties of objects as on the relation of things encountered
to intern al needs, to fol low Piaget * s argument (1951), or, to
follow Schactel's, on idiosyncratic and highly personalized
impressions" (p. 41).
Secondly, there is the category of equivalence that is
based on function. This is also one of the earliest categor-
ies we learn, consisting during infancy of such simple and
constantly changing categories as, "things that make noise,"
and "things that are fun to chew on." In short, the objects
of a functional category fulfill some sort of concrete and
specific task requirement.
In contrast to functional equivalence is formal equiva-
lence. Formal categories are constructed by the act of
specifying the attribute properties that are intrinsically re-
quired by the members of a class. It is this form of equival-
ence that allows us to operate in this world in other than a
strictly utilitarian and functional context.
In discussing the different categories of concepts and
of equivalence, I have alluded to the "things" we examine when
we make decisions about the class membership of any object,
event or process. The usual terminology used by psychologists
to designate these "things" is the term attributes . A full
discussion of attributes and the categories within which
they
fall is not the most productive course for me to
follow m
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this study. It will suffice for us to identify the fact that
an attribute is clarified by Bruner, et al. as ”... any dis-
criminate variation from event to event" (p. 26); and that,
"Any attribute which when changed in value alters the likeli-
hood of an object being categorized in a certain way is ... a
cntenal attribute for the person doing the categorizing"
(Italics added) (p. 31).
There is, however, one important distinction that needs
to be made concerning attributes. That distinction, one that
will prove important later in the study, is the difference
between a criterial attribute and a defining attribute. A de-
fining attribute is one that comes down to us from "official"
sources. One of those "official" sources is often society.
Host of our behavior is defined as being in the class of
acceptable behavior because it meets the criteria set by
society. There may, however, be a more immediately pragmatic
reason for using "official" criteria for classifying objects.
If people insisted on making their own decisions about which
foods were edible or not, they could easily designate their
own criterial attributes: those foods which do not induce ill-
ness or cause death fit the category e dible foods . Unfortun-
ately, those people might pay a dear price for finding out
that a given substance was a non-exemplar of the category
edible foods . "In sum, one specifies definingness in the
same
terms as one specified criteriality of an attribute,
the cri-
tical difference being that the former case one
refers
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official cat egori za.1i ion and in the latter to the categori-




The Processes Underlying Classificatory
And Categorization Behavior
Having looked at what classificatory behavior is like
and into what categories concepts and conceptual behavior
fall, we need now to know about the underlying processes in-
volved in this behavior. Following a discussion of those
processes, we will look at what use this view of conceptual
behavior will be for us in understanding the role the arts
might play in facilitating conceptual learning.
There are three processes which are both essential to
classificatory behavior and of interest to us in understand-
ing the role of arts activities in learning. The first two
of these, the two that combine to formulate the major dynamic
of classificatory behavior, are discrimination and generaliza-
tion. "Discrimination learning is the process by which par-
ticular situations set the occasion for the occurance of par-
ticular behaviors in that situation. A learner is said to
have learned to discriminate between stimulus situations when
he responds differently in different situations and does so
reliably" (Glaser and Cooley, 1973, p. 843). Conversely,
"Generalization refers to making the same kind of responses
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to different stimuli or performing similar behavior in sim-
ilar situations; it involves learning common elements and
disregarding differences so that the behavior occurs in new
situations which are in some ways similar to the situations
in which previous learning occurred" (p. 843).
Therefore, in looking at the basic processes involved
in classificatory behavior, we see a constant pattern of
testing and examining. We see the learner trying, not always
successfully, to identify those objects, events, or processes
that are similar to each other and those that are dissimilar.
More importantly, for our purposes in this study, is the
fact that the learner is constantly struggling to know on
what grounds an object, event or process should be classified
as similar to another object, event or process. The problem
derives from the fact that at any given moment the object,
event or process in question holds class membership in a
number of different, often unrelated, classes. Therefore,
when Glaser and Cooley state, "Concept learning involves gen-
eralizing within classes and discriminating between classes,"
(p. 844 ) they may be only partially correct. They may be
omitting the part of the problem that is often most difficult
for the learner to solve.
This brings us to the third process involved m classi-




"Science and common-sense inquiry alike do not
c^_o£o_ver
ways in which events are grouped in the world;
they inven^
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ways of grouping. The test of the invention is the predict-
ive benefits that result from the use of the invented categor-
ies" (Italics added) (p. 7). It is this process of invention
that is so often over-looked in studies of classificatory
behavior. The realization that this process is a part of
classificatory behavior allows us to see more clearly the role
that the arts activities might play in facilitating concep-
tual learning and development. Because the subject will be
examined in more depth in a later chapter, let it suffice here
to say that the more levels at which a learner examines any
object, event or process, the more likely he or she will be
to see as many of the inherent connections it has to other
objects, events, or processes as possible. It is the fact that
arts activities allows the student an opportunity to examine
subjects through many different modes of perception and with
a less constrained frame of reference that increases the like-
lihood that arts activities can facilitate exactly this kind
of connection making.
We have now defined a concept as ordered information
about the properties of one or more things objects, events
or processes- -that enables any particular thing or class of
things to be differentiated from, and also related to, o«_her
things or classes of things. We have now seen that it is
through the process called classificatory behavior that
we
give order to the objects, events and processes m our lives
and through which we compare and contrast these
things in
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order to form new combinations of them which help us to bet-
ter accomplish our daily goals. We have not yet, however,
adequately answered the question, how is any concept learned?
To do that we must look at a number of other views
.
Gagne’s and Vygotsky's Views
Of Conceptual Learning
In dealing with the nature of concepts it has been my
hope to sift through a number of different notions concerning
the definition of the term concept, and to eventually decide
upon one definition that would describe, accurately and com-
pletely, what a concept is in its purest form. It was essen-
tial that we deal with concepts at that level first because
that is the level of definition from which most of the stud-
ies of classificatory behavior operate. Had we developed a
more complex view of the nature of concepts it might easily
have stood in the way of our viewing the classificatory behav-
ior studies within the same frame of reference used by the
authors of those studies.
At this point we should take a second look at the nature
of concepts j this time with an eve toward questions like,
"What kinds of concepts are taught in the schools?", or "Are
all levels of conceptual learning the same?" In looking at
the world around us, and in recognizing the innumerable
amount
of things we learn in a lifetime, it is hard to imagine
that
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the most efficient and accurate way of describing the manner
in which that learning takes place is to characterize it in
terms of one simple process. Perhaps there is an underlying
process which can be traced throughout the various kinds of
learning situations in which we find ourselves. Perhaps, buf
it is not necessarily true that viewing all learning as a
direct result of that process gives us an accurate account
of the way, or ways, in which we learn.
Many theorists hold that there is not one way in which
we learn, but several. According to Robert Gagne (1965),
"There are as many different varieties of learning as there
are distinguishable conditions for learning. These varieties
may be differentiated by means of descriptions of the factors
that comprise the learning conditions in each case"(p. 22).
He believes that in order to identify these varieties we must
look at both the capabilities internal to the learner, and
the stimulus situation outside the learner.
Based on these two conditions, the internal state of
the learner and the external state of the stimulus situation,
Gagne has identified eight distinct types of learning. The
typology is hierarchial in nature because the conditions that
define any given type of learning become, in turn, the pre-
conditions for the consequent type of learning. A cursory
view of the stages preceding and immediately following Gagne
s
type of learning, called concept learning , may help us to
better understand his view of concepts and their nature
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The simplest form of learning identified by Gagne is
signal learning. As indicated above, Gagne defines signal
learning, and every other type of learning, by describing
the internal state of the learner and the external stimulus
situation that comprise the conditions under which the learn-
ing takes place. He states: "The conditions for the estab-
lishment of ... signal learning seem fairly clear. There
must be nearly simultaneous presentation of two forms of
stimulation: (1) the stimulus producing a generalized react-
ion of the sort one is interested in establishing; and (2)
the stimulus providing the signal" (p. 34). Gagne emphasizes
that the responses that are typical of this type of learning
are usually general, diffuse and emotional, and that this
learning has an involuntary character.
Very similar to signal learning is the type of learning
identified by many theorists as the basis of all learning,
namely, stimulus-response learning . Gagne, however, different-
iates clearly between signal learning and stimulus-response
learning . He states: "Obviously, this kind of learning is
distinguishable from signal learning in terms of its outcome.
The response acquired by this means is a fairly precise, cir
cumscribed, skeletal muscular act, far different from the
generalized emotional responding that characterized the
Pavlovian kind of signal responding" (p. 55). The
four con-
ditions that Gagne indicates are the defining
conditions for
stimulus-response learning are: (1) there is a
gradualness
31
of learning; (2) the learner’s response becomes gradually
more precise; (3) the controlling stimulus becomes slowly
more precise; and (4) the learning is based on reward.
A third type of learning identified by Gagne is called
chaining . He describes this form as "extremely simple and
widely occurring," (p. 39) and states, "In brief terms, it is
a matter of connecting together in a sequence two (or more)
previously learned Ss--R’s" (p. 59). This type of learning
is clearly, then, based on preceding forms of learning. The
conditions which define chaining are as follows: (1) the in-
dividual links in the chain must have been previously estab-
lished; (2) there must be a continuity of each link with the
next following one; and (3) when the two previous conditions
are fully met, it appears that the acquisition of a chain is
not a gradual process, but one which occurs on a single occa-
sion .
The fourth type of learning identified by Gagne is
verbal association . The conditions essential to this type of
learning are more easily seen if we refer to Gagne’s example
of how a person learns the French word for match, alumette.
The conditions are as follows: (1) there must be a Ss—R for
match and an internal response or visual image of a match;
(2) there must be a Ss— R for that response or image and the
word fragment ”lum" (in other words, response differentiation
must have previously occurred); (3) a "coding connection"
must
also be available (the selection of this code by the
individual
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depends on his or her own previous experiences); and (4) the
chain must be "reeled off" in a sequence so that each Ss R
is contiguous in time with the next.
Multiple discrimination
,
the fifth type of learning
identified by Gagne is of a slightly different nature. As
Gagne puts it, "... the prominent characteristic of multiple
discrimination is not the acquisition of new entities... (it)
is the interference that must be overcome if retention is to
be assumed" (p. 47). The conditions involved in multiple dis-
crimination are as follows: (1) individual chains connecting
each distinctive stimulus with each identifying response must
be learned. This, of course, implies that the individual
Ss--R’s that differentiate the stimuli must have been pre-
viously learned, as well as the response names themselves:
(2) In order to ensure retention, measures must be taken to
reduce interference.
This brings us at last to the type of learning called
concept learning
,
which Gagne describes as, "... a kind of
learning that appears to be critically dependent on internal
neural processes of representation for its very existence"
(p. 47). While, admitting that the process of forming concepts
is so complex that it causes any attempt to describe it to be
tentative and susceptible to refute, he states: Whatever
the process may be, there can be little doubt that a concept
like cube is learned, and that its possession enables the in-
dividual to classify objects of widely differing physical
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being described by Gagne, a stimulus pattern, discriminated
from others and chained to a label, that is presented a num-
ber of times in different situations? Certainly some of them
are. Children do go to school and learn what a parallelogram
is. They are told about, or discover for themselves
,
what
the criterial attributes of parallelograms are, and they
usually do attach this idea to a verbal label. In fact, they
probably do accomplish this by encountering parallelograms in
a number of different situations from which they are able to
discriminate what those criterial attributes of parallelo-
grams are. In addition, this process is aided by the teacher
giving them the proper definition of parallelograms.
But do all concepts fit this description? Do we spend
most of our time in school learning about things of which we
have no prior knowledge at all? When we study democracy or
supply and demand , does the process fit the single model that
Gagne would have us use? Probably not! The concepts we learn
in school are much more complex than Gagne's simple model
would lead us to believe. We learn that a silo full of grain
can erupt into flame as a result of spontaneou s combustion.
But we already know what spontaneous means and we know
what
combustion is. If we grew up on a farm we might even know,
and possibly have even seen, the results of spontaneous
com^
bustion in this context. This is no simple matter
of identi-
fying criterial attributes. No, this is a complex
process of
overlaying one "set of ordered information about
the
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properties of an object, event or process that enables that
particular thing or class of things to be differentiated from,
and related to, other things or classes of things,” over ano-
ther set of ordered information, etc. This is a process of
combining two "knowns" to arrive at a third "known" within a
"newly realized" context.
To this point Gagne's formulation has left us short of
our goal of describing the process by which real people learn
real concepts. However, examine carefully Gagne's next type
of learning. He describes it as, "... a chain of two or more
concepts" (p. 53). The conditions which define it are:
(1) the individual must already understand the concepts to
be chained; (2) it requires only a statement of the major re-
lationship involved; (3) the learning occurs on a single occa-
sion. Now this model seems to coincide fairly closely with
the way in which we learn about spontaneous combustion. It
seems to take into account the tremendous amount of previous
learning that we brought to bear in learning the concept. It
also allows for the overlaying of sets of ordered information,
etc. within newly realized contexts. Gagne refers to this
type of learning as principle learning .
We see, then that terminology has caused confusion.
In
effect, what we commonly refer to as concepts,
Gagne refers
to as principles. What is more important,
however, is that
whatever we call them, principles or concepts
or anything
else, these things that we teach children
in school are much
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more complex and are members of much more complicated inter-
relationships than our view of conceptual behavior as class-
ificatory behavior would have led us to believe. Flavell, in
discussing the viability of thinking of concepts as equivalence
responses states; "There is one further property which surely
characterizes all ’higher-order' equivalence responses -- at
least, that is, all responses everyone would be comfortable
in calling 'concepts;' the contents of the individual's con-
ceptual repertoire are complexly inter-related to form
conceptual systems" (1970, p. 986). He goes on to say; "The
argument was made earlier that an equivalence-response charac-
terization of concepts fails to convey all that we sense to
be important about them. . . One thing it fails to convey is
this extraordinary inter-dependence among concepts" (p. 986).
If, according to Gagne, conceptual learning and principle
learning are the result of development through a hierarchial
model, what of the learner? Is he or she born with the capa-
city to function at any of the levels of learning if the
stimulus situation and his or her prior history meets the re-
quired conditions of that type of learning? This question
brings us to another view of concepts and conceptual behavior
which I believe is important to this discussion, the view of
L. S. Vygotsky. It is developmental in nature and has great
relevance to any discussion of how children learn concepts.
An appropriate point of departure for our look at
Vygotsky's work is the statement he made after concluding
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extensive studies of concept formation in children from infarcy
to adolescence (1962). "The principal findings of our study
may be summarized as follows: The development of the pro-
cesses which eventually result in concept formation begins
in earliest childhood, but the intellectual functions that in
a specific combination form the psychological basis of the
process of concept formation ripen, take shape and develop
only at puberty" (p. 53). He attributes this phenomenon to
the fact that it is not until adolescence that children learn
to use words as a tool for concept formation: "The new sign-
ificative use of the word, its use as a means of concept
formation is the immediate psychological cause of the radical
change in the intellectual process that occurs on the thresh-
old of adolescence" (p. 59).
Assuming this to be an accurate account, the question
that must interest us is, what is the nature of conceptual
behavior before the onset of puberty? Vygotsky characterizes
conceptual behavior during this period as consisting of three
discrete phases, two of which combine to result in true con-
cept formation. It will serve us well to take a brief look
at the developmental stages he proposes, on the grounds that,
if they are correct, they prescribe both the kinds of learn-
ing that are possible and the kinds of teaching that are
appropriate during those stages.
The first stage identified by Vygotsky is the stage
of
f three sub-stages. Duringsyncretic images , and consists o
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this stage, the young child takes the first step toward con-
cept formation when he or she puts together a number of
objects in an unorganized congries
,
or "heap,” in order to
solve a problem that adults might normally solve by forming
a new concept. Words are used by the child to denote classes
of objects but not in the same way adults use them. "At that
stage, word meaning denotes nothing more to the child than a
vague syncretic conglomeration of individual objects that have
somehow or other coalesced into an image in his mind" (pp. 59-
GO). Also, words reflect objective characteristics of objects
only to the degree that they coincide with the more subject-
ive percepts and impressions the child has of those objects.
Therefore, many words have, in part
,
the same meaning to the
child and. the adult, especially words referring to concrete
objects
.
The three sub-stages identified by Vygotsky are termed,
trial and error, organization of the child's visual field ,
and elements taken from different groups or heaps that have
already been formed by the child. In trial and error , any
group of objects is created at random, and each object that
is added is a mere guess or trial. In organization of the
child’s visual field , "The syncretic image or group is formed
as a result of the single elements’ contiguity in space or
time, or of their being brought into some other more complex
relationship by the child's immediate perception" (p. 60).
The final sub-stage is described aptly by its title.
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the child takes elements from groups he or she has already
formed by using one or the other of the above mentioned pro-
cesses. The importance of this sub-stage is that the child
now goes through a two-step operation, but this more elabor-
ate operation remains syncretic and results in an order that
is no more sophisticated than the simple assembling of heaps.
The second stage of conceptual behavior identified by
Vygotsky is the stage of using complexes . Perhaps it is
easiest to describe the child’s thought during this stage by
indicating the typical behavior of the child during this
stage as he or she takes part in a sorting task
exercise.
The task is to sort variously colored geometric
shapes into
categories. The behavior will fall into five
sub-categories.
As the child functions on the level of
associative complexes
the child may add one block to the nuclear
object because it
is similar to the nuclear object in shape, or
color or size,
or any other dimension that happens to
strike him or her.
Later the child forms collections. In
this stage, objects
are placed together on the basis of
some trait in which they
differ and therefore they complement
one another
Another form of grouping the child
will evince will
involve chain complexes. These
are a consecutive joining of
• individual links into a consecutive
chain with meanings car-
ried over from one link to the
next. An example pattern
from
this category might be: yellow
triangle, red triangle, green
triangle, blue triangle, blue
square, yellow square, etc.
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the child’s thinking reflects the use of diffuse complexes
they are marked by the fluidity of the attribute that unites
the single elements of the group. An example of this would
be trapezoids being grouped with triangles because they
remind the child of triangles with their tops cut off.
The final type of complex identified by Vygotsky is
the pseudo-complex
. In this instance, "... the generaliza-
tion formed in the child’s mind, although phenotypical ly
resembling the adult concept, is psychologically very diff-
erent from the concept proper; in its essence, it is still a
complex" (p. 66). In other words, while the categorization
the child makes is identical to the one made by an adult,
it is made for reasons other than the ones used by adults;
it is often based on the processes involved in one of the
other types of complexes previously mentioned.
The third stage of conceptual development, as identi-
fied by Vygotsky, does not occur after the second stage, but
rather, it occurs concurrently with the second stage. As the
child moves through the stage of thinking in complexes he or
she also moves through the stage of developing abstraction .
The importance of abstraction is indicated by Vygotsky when
he states, "... the advanced concept presupposes more than
unification. To form such a concept it is also necessary to
abstract, to single out elements, and to view any abstracted
elements apart from ^he totality of the concrete experience
in which they are imbedded" (p. 76).
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The stage of abstraction is also divided into sub-
stages. The first of these is the stage of maximally-similar
groupings. In these, "The attributes which, added up, make
an object maximally similar to the sample become the focus
of attention and are thereby, in a sense, abstracted from
the attributes to which the child attends less" (p. 77).
Although these relationships are vague, Vygotsky reminds us
that, "... the global character of the child's perception
has been breached. An object's attributes have been divided
into two parts unequally attended to -- a beginning of posi-
tive and negative abstraction" (p. 77).
The second and final sub-stage of the abstraction stage
is the use of potential concepts . During this period, group-
ing is done on the basis of a single attribute. Potential con-
cepts are very similar to pseudo- concepts in that they also
phenotypically resemble true conceptual groupings while being
formulated on abstractions other than those used in true con-
cepts. The importance attached to this sub-stage by Vygotsky
is reflected in this statement: "In potential concepts proper,
a trait once abstracted is not easily lost again among other
traits. The concrete totality of traits has been destroyed
through its abstraction, and the possibility of unifying the
traits on a different basis opens up" (p. 78). Vygotsky sum-
marizes with the statement: "Only the mastery of abstraction,
combined with advanced complex thinking, enables the child
to
to the formulation of genuine concepts.progress He
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continues: "The decisive role in this process... is played by
the word, deliberately used to direct all the past processes
of advanced concept formation” (p. 78 ).
What then is the picture of pre-conceptual behavior
that we derive from examining Vygotsky's work? We see that
the earliest thought is both syncretic and egocentric.
Things are grouped together on the basis of fluid rules
which derive more from a child's subjective experience with
objects than from their actual attributes. As this charac-
teristic fades it is replaced by grouping based on objective
attributes, but the procedures used for grouping are still
fluid and lack stability. It is not until this basis for
grouping begins to stabalize and the child simultaneously
learns to. abstract relevant from irrelevant attributes does
the child begin to take part in true conceptual behavior.
Vygotsky's view of language as the key process in con-
cept formation is challenged by theories that will be examined
later in this study. As we will see, the issue will be an
important factor in determining the potential the arts have
for facilitating conceptual learning and development.
As we conclude this discussion of the work of Gagne and
Vygotsky, we must remember why their ideas have been discussed.
We have seen that a concept is ordered information about the
properties of an object, event, or process, that enables any
particular thing or class of things to be differentiated from,
and also related to, other things or classes of things.
We
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have seen that conceptual behavior relies on the basic func-
tion of categorization. But now, we have also seen that
concepts are complex and exist within complicated systems of
inter-relationships. And, we have also examined an argument
which proposes that conceptual growth is governed by a devel-
opmental progression. This brings us to our next step in
answering the question, How is any concept learned?
Piaget’s View of Conceptual Behavior
In the section on classif icatory and categorization
behavior, I mentioned briefly the stimulus-response paradigm
for conceptual learning and more specifically, T. S. Kendler's
definition, ’’Concept formation is taken to imply the acquisi-
tion or utilization, or both, of a common response to dissi-
milar stimuli ” (H. Kendler, 1964, p. 218). In the sub-
sequent section we saw that Gagne described a type of learning
he called stimulus-response learning , and that, based on the
hierarchial nature of his typology, he viewed this type of
learning as the basis for all the consequent forms of learning
he described. On the other hand, I have also referred to
Howard Kendler's comment on the T. S. Kendler definition.
In
that comment, he indicated that although the
stimulus-response
paradigm seemed adequate for describing conceptual
b„h
at first glance, on further inspection it was
found to be
lacking, especially if contrasted with the work
Piaget had
In order to fully appreciate thedone in this field.
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importance of this distinction we must carefully examine
Piaget’s view of conceptual behavior. In examining it I
hope we will come to both recognize the dynamics of learning
that Piaget considers are the underlying basis of the process
itself, and, also, to see more clearly the validity, or lack
thereof, of using the stimulus-response paradigm to explain
conceptual behavior.
In the 1970 formulation of his views
,
Piaget begins
his discussion of conceptual behavior by explaining his view
of the relationship between subject and object in the process
of learning. Initially he states that the external world is
commonly viewed as entirely separate from the subject. There-
fore, any objective knowledge appears to be simply the result
of a set of perceptive recordings, motor associations, verbal
descriptions and the like which all participate in producing
a sort of figurative copy of objects and the connections be-
tween them. Later he continues: "In such an empiricist pros-
pect, the content of intelligence comes from outside, and the
coordinations that organize it are only the consequences of
language and symbolic instruments" (p. 703).
But Piaget disagrees with this view of knowledge exist-
ing independently of the learner. He believes that knowledge
is the product of an interaction between the subject and the
object of knowledge. "Actually," he states, "in order to
know objects the subject must act upon them and therefore
transform them..." (p. 704). He explains. "From the most
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elementary sensorimotor actions (such as pulling and pushing)
to the most sophisticated intellectual operations, which are
interorganized actions, carried out mentally (e.g., joining
together, putting in order, putting into one-to-one corres-
pondence), knowledge is constantly linked with actions or
operations, that is, with transformations " (p. 704).
But what is it that Piaget means when he says that
learning is linked with transformation? Is he trying to
indicate that the actual object itself is transformed? In
order to understand Piaget’s use of the term transformation
in this context, we must take the time to understand the
three processes upon which he bases conceptual learning.




In describing the process by which we learn any concept,
Piaget indicates that the fundamental connections that occur
as a result of development cannot be considered attributable
to association; rather they must, be considered as biological
and intellectual assimilations . But what is the process of
assimilation? He continues: "From a biological point of
view, assimilation is the integration of external elements
into evolving or completed structures of an organism . .
•
(p. 707). He goes on to say that it is also appropriate to
view this general process as applying to behavior, including
conceptual behavior, as well as morphological structure.
In fact, Piaget goes on to point out how essential it
is to view behavior in general, and learning in
particular,
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as a product of this process of assimilation. He indicates
that no behavior, even if it is new to the individual, con-
stitutes an absolute beginning. It is always grafted onto
previous behaviors and experiences and therefore amounts to
assimilating new elements into already constructed structures.
Logically, then, to lose sight of the fact that new behavior
is not adopted without being attached to, or taken into by,
previous forms of behavior, in some way, is to lose sight of
one of the most important dynamics underlying the processes
involved in learning.
It is upon this idea that Piaget bases his refutation
of the use of the stimulus-response paradigm to explain con-
ceptual behavior. He believes that the stimulus-response
theory is .inadequate as general formulation of behavior
when taken in this context. He states, "When we say an or-
ganism or a subject is sensitized to a stimulus and able to
make a response to it, we imply it already possesses a scheme
or a structure to which this stimulus is assimilated. . .
.
This scheme consists precisely of a capacity to respond"
(p. 707). What does this imply about the stimulus-response
paradigm? "Hence, the original stimulus-response scheme should
not have been written in the unilateral S--.R form, but in
the
form: S4-> R or S-*(AT)~>R where AT is the assimilation of
the stimulus S to the structure T" (p. 707).
If I may digress from Piaget's ideas for a
moment, it
seems appropriate, here, for me to point out
briefly an
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argument made by Flavell concerning the view of concepts as
equivalence responses, since it also refutes the use of the
stimulus-response paradigm to explain conceptual behavior.
The view of concepts as equivalence responses is usually
based on the stimulus-response paradigm, and as one view
stands or falls, so, often, does the other. Flavell points
out that "... it is uncertain whether all concepts literally
entail equivalence responses, and more generally, whether a
description in terms of ’equivalence’ and ’response’ always
gets to the heart of what is really involved in concept mak-
ing and concept using" (1970, p. 984).
In stating his arguments against the "equivalence res-
ponse" view of concepts, Flavell begins with the following
statements which seem to be true of at least some prima
facie concepts: "(1) the concept need not be acquired at
all; (2) if acquired, it need not be acquired through a pro-
cess of successive common responding to the different relevant
objects; (3.) there may in fact be only one such object to
which the concept can apply, and hence the 'equivalence'
part of the characterization is not literally applicable."
Flavell strengthens his argument by directing his attention
to those entities which are most definitely equivalence res-
ponses. "... It is similarly questionable whether all reac-
tions which are indisputably equivalence responses are
equally
indisputably concepts." He explains: "I respond to
all mem-
lass of stimuli by sneezing; anybers of one diverse c
48
member of another group of inputs makes me drowsy
. . . These
and many other humble reactions appear to fit the definition
of equivalence response, but most people would be loathe to
apply the designation ’concept’ to them” (p. 984).
Piaget and Flavell both give us strong arguments for
not viewing conceptual behavior in the simplistic stimulus-
response, or equivalence response scheme. It is important
to remember however, that these arguments in no way negate
the role of classificatory behavior in concept formation.
What they do imply, along with the ideas of Gagne and
Vygotsky, is that classes are formed in a more dynamic and
complex manner than the stimulus-response paradigm might
lead us to believe.
In .regard to Piaget's work the question arises, does
the process of assimilation alone describe what occurs in
learning? The answer, as I have indicated previously, is
no. Along with the process of assimilation, Piaget proposes
two other processes , accommodation and adaptation . Piaget
describes accommodation in the following manner. ... in the
field of behavior we shall call accommodation any modification
of an assimilatory scheme or structure by the elements it
assimilates” (p. 708). In other words, when any structure,
morphological or behavioral, assimilates any new element,
it
transforms that element while that element becomes
part of
the structure itself. Therefore, not only
is the element
transformed, so, also, is the structure itself.
The process
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can be characterized as one of mutual transformation.
This notion of mutual transformation is the basis of
the process Piaget refers to as adaptation
. He describes
adaptation in the following manner: "Hence, cognitive adapt-
ation, like its biological counterpart, consists of an equi-
librium between assimilation and accommodat ion • • • There is
no assimilation without accommodation
.
But we must strongly
emphasize the fact that accommodation does not exist without
simultaneous assimilation either" (p. 708).
In examining the work of Piaget we get a view of learn-
ing through interaction, a picture of interplay between the
learner and the learned. A view of knowledge neither aris-
ing from objects nor from the subject, but rather, from
interactions between the subject and the object. And what
does this view imply to us concerning the facilitation of the
learning of concepts? We are reminded of Bruner's statement
which I referred to before, "Science and common sense inquiry
alike do not discover the ways in which events are grouped
in the world; they invent ways of grouping" (Bruner, et al
.
,
1956, p. 7). Piaget extends the notion with the statement:
"The problem we must solve in order to explain cognitive de-
velopment, is that of invent ion and not of mere copying . .
.
the concepts of assimilation and accommodation • are oriented
toward this inventive construction which characterizes all
living thought" (p. 714). And to me, at least, all of this
implies that if we are to facilitate the learning of a con-
cept, we must allow the student an opportunity to manipul
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the psychological referents of the concept in a way that
maximizes the opportunity for the concept to be transformed
and thereby assimilated into the cognitive structure that
already exists within him or her. This, in turn, will
facilitate the accommodation of that cognitive structure
to the concept. In later chapters I hope to show that it
is possible that arts activities might allow that very type
of manipulation to occur. For now, let us examine a theory
of learning that grows very directly out of the theoretical
position Piaget has established.
Ausubel’s Theory of Meaningful Learning
We have travelled a long, sometimes circuitious, route
in attempting to answer the question, How is any concept
learned? Our final leg of the journey will entail a dis-
cussion of a more pedogogically oriented theory, one that is
very similar in nature and content to Piaget’s. This theory
is David Ausubel’s theory of meaningful learning .
Ausubel (1966) divides learning into types along two
dimensions. The first dimension consists of reception and
discovery learning. The second dimension consists of mean-
ingful and rote learning. The two dimensions intersect to
theoretically form four combinations: meaningf ul reception
learning; meaningful discovery learning; rote reception
learn
mg; and rote discovery learning.
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Although the differentiation between meaningful and
rote learning is the aspect of this theory which is most
germane to our discussion, it will be useful if we take a
brief look at the difference between reception and discovery
learning
.
Perhaps the most common form of learning that takes
place as a result of traditional schooling practices is
reception learning. Ausubel describes reception learning
in the following manner: "In reception learning the prin-
cipal content of what is learned is presented to the learner
in more or less final form. . . He is only required to inter-
nalize or incorporate the material... that is presented to
him so that it is available for reproduction, or other use
at some future date" (p. 158). Memorizing formulas, defini-
tions and rules of punctuation, etc., are all prime examples
of reception learning (although it is important to remember
it is not the formulas, definitions, or rules themselves
that define this as reception learning; it is the process of
memorization)
.
Antithetical to the process of reception learning is
the process of. discovery learning. Ausubel states. The
essential feature of discovery learning, on the other hand,
is that the principal content of what is to be learned is
not given but must be discovered by the learner before he
can internalize it" (p. 158). In other words, an activity
through which the learner identifies a concept as a
result
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of having abstracted its criterial attributes on his or her
own would be characterized as a discovery learning activity.
The terminology, reception and discovery learning, has
enjoyed fairly common use by educators over the last several
years. This is especially true of the term discovery learn-
ing . For a while, discovery learning was the hottest educa-
tional approach around, and authors produced tremendous
amounts of material singing the praises of the approach in
general or of a specific "discovery method" in particular.
As this material proliferated, however, there grew up with
it a misconception. People began to associate meaningful
learning with discovery learning, and rote learning with
reception learning.
Ausubel is very adamant about clearing up this miscon-
ception. For him, in no way does reception learning necess-
arily result in rote learning nor discovery learning
necessarily result in meaningful learning. He believes that
in both instances , meaningful learning takes place if the
learning task is related in a nonarbitrary and nonverbatim
fashion to the existing cognitive structure of the learner.
In further discussing this issue, he says, of meaningful
learning: "This presupposes (a) that the learner manifests
a meaningful learning set , that is, a set to relate the new
learning task nonarbitrarily and substantively to what he
already knows and (b) that the learning task itself is poten
-
tially meaningful to him, namely, relatable to his structure
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of knowledge on a non-arbitrary and nonverbatim basis” (p.
158). Thus, no matter how much potential there is for some
material to be meaningful for the learner, he or she has tc
bring the proper intent to the learning situation if meaning-
ful learning is to occur. Conversely, no matter what the
learner's intent is, the material has to be potentially
meaningful if meaningful learning is to take place.
Ausubel defines meaningful learning in terms of its
meeting two criteria. First, meaningful learning must be
nonarbitrary as evidenced by its concepts being related to
existing ideas in a particular subject's cognitive structure
as examples, derivatives, subcategories, special classes,
extensions or qualifications, or as combinations of the new
material and existing ideas. Nonarbitrariness "... implies
some plausible or reasonable basis for establishing the
relationship between the new material and the relevant ideas
in question" (p. 160). Secondly, meaningful learning must
be substantive as evidenced by the fact that an equivalent
symbol or group of symbols could be similarly related to the
same relevant ideas without resulting in any change in
meaning
.
An example will help us to clarify this lengthy defini-
tion. The meaningful learning of the concept run-on sentence
will serve nicely. According to this definition, a student
has meaningfully learned this concept when: (1) he or she
comes to view it as a derivative of the combination of two
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previously held concepts -- sentence and to over-flow ; and
(2) that relationship is not stated only as a verbatim verbal
proposition. The conditions of Ausubel’ s definition are met
because if a particular subject already holds the concepts
sentence and to over-flow, then the combination of those two
concepts to form a third is a logical and relatively simple
step. Therefore, there is some reasonable relation between
the new material and the subject’s existing cognitive struc-
ture.
I have discussed previously Ausubel ’ s belief that for
meaningful learning to take place two conditions must be
met: the learner must assume a meaningful learning set, and
the material must be potentially meaningful. Now that we
have examined more closely exactly what it is that Ausubel
means by meaningful learning
,
it is not difficult for us to
understand what a meaningful learning set is. But what about
potential meaning ? Do we have enough information about what
it is that Ausubel means when he uses this term for us to
really understand it? It will serve us well to examine this
topic more closely.
Within the larger context of meaningful learning,
Ausubel also differentiates between psychological and logical
meaning. He states: "Psychological meaning is the actual or
phenomenological product of a meaningful learning process.
It refers to the idiosyncratic cognitive content that
results
when a particular learner, employing a meaningful learning
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set, relates potentially meaningful material to relevant ideas
in his cognitive structure." He continues: "Logical mean-
ill6> Ocher hand, refers only to the potential meaning
inherent in symbolic material, that is, whether it is relat—
able on a nonarbitrary and substantive basis to the relevant
ideas in any appropriately mature hypothetical cognitive
structure" (p. 161). Logical meaning resides in the object
to be learned. It is evidenced by a potential to be related
to a given learner's existing cognitive structure. The com-
bination of logical meaning with a meaningful learning set
facilitates meaningful learning, the product of which is
psychological meaning.
Having made our way through this sometimes confusing
maze of definitions, I would like to pose three questions
that might enable us to bring this discussion into perspect-
ive. They are: (1) What is the significance of meaningful
learning as Ausubel sees it?*, (2) What is the relevance of
this formulation to our discussion?; and (3) If this formula-
tion of meaningful learning is both significant and relevant,
how do we go about facilitating meaningful learning?
It appears that the most logical way of answering the
first question is to allow Ausubel to speak for himself. He
states
:
Hence, the tremendous efficiency of meaningful learn-
ing as an information-processing and storing mechanism
can be largely attributed to the two properties that
make learning material potentially meaningful. First,
by nonarbitrarily relating potentially meaningful
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to established ideas in his cognitive
structure, the learner can effectively exploit his
existing knowledge as an ideational and organiza-
tional matrix for the incorporation of new know-
ledge. Nonarbitrary incorporation of a learning
task into relevant portions of cognitive structure
so that new meanings are acquired, implies that
the new learning material becomes an organic part
of an existing, hierarchially organized ideational
system. Thus, as a result of this type of anchor-
age to cognitive structure, the newly learned
material is no longer dependent for its incorpora-
tion and retention on the frail human capacity for
assimilating and retaining arbitrary associations.
This anchoring process also protects the newly
incorporated information from the interferring
effects of previously learned and subsequently
encountered similar materials that are so damag-
ing in rote learning. The temporal span of reten-
tion is, therefore, greatly extended. Second, the
substantive or non-verbatim nature of thus relat-
ing new material to and incorporating it within
cognitive structure, circumvents the drastic limi-
tations imposed by the short item and time spans
of verbatim learning on the processing of informa-
tion. Much more can obviously be apprehended and
retained if the learner is required to assimilate
only the substance of ideas rather than the verbatim
language used in expressing them (p. 161-162).
If we accept Ausubel’s view as accurate, that leads us
to our second, and more important question, what is the rele-
vance of this information to our discussion? In answering
this question, I would say, first, this formulation is_ most
definitely relevant to our larger discussion. For all of our
growing understanding of the nature of concepts and concept
formation, we have not, until now, dealt with a theoretical
position which afforded us insights into effective ways of
teaching the kind of complex and interrelated concepts that
we have discovered make up the majority of conceptual teaching
Ausubel’s formulation allows us to seewe do in the schools.
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s processes of assimilation end accommodation
might look like when they are applied to the problem of
teaching concepts like spontaneous combustion . It describes
assimilation in terms of an existing cognitive structure
which, already holding the concepts of spontaneous and com-
bustion, assimilates the concept spontaneous combustion as a
derivative of the combination of both previously held con-
cepts. The accommodation of that existing cognitive struc-
ture is implied in the fact that
,
where it once contained
only two concepts with the potential of being combined to
form a new concept, it now, in fact, contains that new
concept
.
For all of this formulation's relevance to our discus-
sion, however, it is still important for us to take one step
further if we are to conclude this chapter more able to
answer the question How is any concept learned? than we
were when we started. I must answer our third question, how
do we go about facilitating meaningful learning? Fortunately,
Ausubel is well prepared to help with the task.
The way that Ausubel answers the question, How do we
facilitate meaningful learning?, is by asking the question,
what makes a learner more ready to learn a concept meaning-
fully? This, of course, is a logical perspective for him to
take since meaningful learning is viewed by him m terms of
a new concept, usually a given in the equation (e.g.,
spon-
taneous combustion), and a cognitive structure, the part
of
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the equation upon which he feels we can make impact. There-
fore, since we cannot change the concept to fit the cognitive
structure, we win have to make the cognitive structure more
ready to accept the concept. Gagne shared this view and
attributed this "readiness" to the presence of prerequisite
subordinate capabilities that form the foundation for the
learning of more complex superordinate abilities (Hunt and
Sullivan, 1974, p. 149).
Before we go on, I should point out that although it
is possible to conceive of readiness as being determined by
maturation, this is not the stance that Ausubel takes. Readi-
ness, as Ausubel conceives of it, presupposes appropriate
maturation
.
Readiness, according to Ausubel, refers to the
adequacy of existing cognitive capacity or level of
cognitive functioning ... On the other hand, matura-
tion has a different and much more restricted mean-
ing that includes those increments in a capacity
that take place in the demonstrable absense of spe-
cific practice experience, that is, those increments
that are attributable to genic influences and/or
incidental experience. Maturation, therefore, is
not the same as readiness but is merely one of the
two principle factors (the other being learning)
that contribute to or determine the organism’s
developmental readiness for coping with new learn-
ing tasks. Readiness, therefore, does not necessar-
ily depend on maturation alone but may result irom
cumulative prior learning experience (Hunt and
Sullivan, 1974, p. 188).
Given the appropriate level of maturation, how do we
accomplish readiness? Ausubel proposes that the use of an
advance organizer , which can be described in the following
"An advance organizer is introductory materialmanner
:
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presented in advance of, and at a higher level of generality,
inclusiveness, and abstraction than the learning task itself
mat is designed to provide a cognitive anchor for the learn-
ing task" (Hunt and Sullivan, 1974, p. 195). Later he states:
"An advance organizer is also intended to increase the dis-
criminability between the new ideas and related ideas in a
cognitive structure" (p. 195).
What does this discussion of meaningful learning and
advance organizers imply for us? One of the things it implies
is that if arts activities can function as advance organizers
or facilitate meaningful learning in some other way, then
they could be of great use in facilitating the learning of
concepts. What would they have to do to function in this
capacity?. They could be considered advance organizers if
they could make clear to the learner, in some way, the super-
ordinate-subordinate relation between the concept they are
learning and concepts they already hold. They could also be
considered advance organizers if they could increase the dis-
criminability between similar concepts. They could facilitate
meaningful learning in general if they could contribute to
learning being nonarbitrary and substantive. Do arts activi-
ties have the power to do these things? That is a question
which will be the focal point of the next chapter.
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Summary
How is it that any concept is learned? This is an
essential question in that no approach to conceptual learning
and development can be evaluated without first being put into
the context of the process by which any concept is learned.
In answering the question, our view of what a concept is has
moved from a simple "pure" definition, through the essential
process upon which conceptual behavior is based, to a more
complex view of what the concepts we teach in school are
like. We then came to grips with clarifying the dynamics
involved in learning a concept, and finally have put the
conglomerate view into the context of a pedagogical approach
to the process of learning concepts.
As a result of the examination of so many views, we
hope to be more able to answer the question, is it theore-
tically possible for arts activities to facilitate conceptual
learning and development? I believe that by using Ausubel’s
theory we will now have configuration that adequately des-
cribes how that learning takes place. I have chosen to use
Ausubel's configuration because it adequately encompasses the
major dynamics upon which other appropriate configurations
were based and because it is nicely suited to serve as a
point of reference as we examine the Integrated Arts Experi-
ence ( IAE ) and its relation to conceptual learning.
We have seen that classificatory or categorization be-
havior, as it is described by Bruner and others, plays an
61
important part in conceptual learning. We have also seen
from the work of Robert Gagne, however, that that theoreti-
cal formulation does not adequately describe the real
concepts that real children learn in school. It has also
been shown that while Gagne's formulation of principle learn-
ing, does give us a more accurate view of the kind of learning
that goes on in schools, it does not speak to the issue of
the interaction between the learner and the learned as it
is described by Piaget. It is Ausubel's theory of meaning-
ful learning which combines all of these views and then applies
them in a form that addresses pedagogical concerns. As such,
when we use Ausubel's configuration as our operational repre-
sentation of the process by which conceptual learning takes
place, we. use a formation which both maintains the integrity
of and goes beyond each of the above-mentioned positions.
The other major advantage of using Ausubel's configura-
tion is that it gives us two well-defined criteria to meet if
we are to assume that meaningful conceptual learning will take
place. These two criteria are that learning is non-arbitrary
and substantive. Therefore, in Chapter IV we will be able to
theoretically evaluate the ability of the IAE to facilitate
conceptual learning by determining the degree to which it
can facilitate learning being nonarbitrary and substantive.
To do that, however, we must first examine IAE in terms of
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WHAT ARE THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE IAE THAT
ENABLE IT TO FACILITATE THE LEARNING OF CONCEPTS?
In beginning this discussion of whether or not the
Integrated Arts Experience (IAE) should be used to facili-
tate conceptual learning and development, I indicated that
we must first answer the question, Is it theoretically
possible for arts experiences to facilitate the learning of
concepts? The first step in answering that question, was
to attempt to understand the processes by which any concept
is learned. Hopefully, the previous chapter has given us
enough insight into those processes that we are able to
evaluate, within a reasonable context, the ability of given
approaches to facilitate the learning of concepts. It is
now time to move from the general to the more particular,
and ask the question, What are the characteristics of the IAE
that might allow it to facilitate the learning of concepts?
Since we must recognize exactly what the IAE is before
we can identify the characteristics it possesses that might
allow it to facilitate the learning of concepts, I will have
to follow a four-step plan to adequately answer the question.
The first three steps will be brief, the fourth more lengthy,
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since it, itself, will, contain four sub-steps. In the first
three sub-sections of the chapter, I will define, describe
and indicate the curricular function of, the IAE. The fourth
sub-section will identify the actual characteristics of the
IAE that might allow it to facilitate conceptual learning
and development.
The IAE Defined
The idea of the IAE is an outgrowth of the literature
and thought which deals with the impact of arts activities
on learning. It is usually based either on the notion of the
similarity of the learning process to the artistic process,
or on the interrelatedness of the two processes.
One of the major proponents of the general view that
arts activities can facilitate learning in some manner- is
Herbert Read. The title of his major thesis on education,
Education Through Art (1958), indicates that, to Read, art
is not necessarily something we educate about, but rather,
it is also something that can be used as a vehicle through
which to educate. He states: "Education may therefore be
defined as the cultivation of modes of expression -- it is
teaching children and adults how to make sounds, images, move
ments
,
tools and utensils..." (p. 11). He indicates, further
that all faculties of thought, logic, memory, sensibility
and intellect are involved in those processes that cultivate
modes of expression. Therefore, all aspects of education
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are included in such processes. Read views art as a form of
communication, and education as the process by which people
become skilled in the vehicles of, and use of, communica-
tion. He states of the above mentioned processes: "... they
are all processes which involve art, for art is nothing but
the good making of sounds, images, etc. The aim of educa-
tion is, therefore, the creation of artists -- of people
efficient in the various modes of expression" (p. 11).
Another major author who viewed the processes of artis-
tic production and learning as related was Viktor Lowenfeld.
In his work Creative and Mental Growth (1964), written in
association with W. Lambert Brittain, Lowenfeld speaks of
the "integrated experience," and the integration of arts and
society. The term integrated has been used in this context
to denote many different things in the past, most commonly
the relating of the ideas and techniques found in one artistic
medium to those found in another. But integrated denoted
something entirely different for Lowenfeld and Brittain. By
the use of this term they implied a relation between the arts
and the learning process. However, they were very specific
as to what type of relationship they were implying. In a
section entitled "Integration and Learning," they state that
integration does not mean correlation with, nor the interpre-
tation of, other subjects. They go on to explain that the
integration they imply is the integration that occurs as a
result of the self-identification that the learner makes with
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the new material that has been learned. Therefore, it is not
the phrase, "... outside of the realm of art" that is most
crucial to their formulation, it is the kind of learning that
occurs inside or outside of the realm of art. It is the fact
the learner identifies personally with the new concepts
that are being taught that is the key to their formulation.
That they see arts activities as having the potential to
facilitate this kind of integrated learning is clear from
the following explanation:
Such integration cannot take place when the
teacher says, ’Children, let's draw the landing
of the settlers.' It can only take place if the
child identifies with the experience. 'How would
you feel if you were in the group that landed; if
you were the child of a settler, who would lower
you from the big sailboat down into the rowboat,
in a set cold atmosphere of a dawning day.'
'How would you feel being rocked in your boat
up and down by the waves.' The wave may become
the line, and the line, the wave; so intensely
integrated that one can no longer be separated
from the other. Such motivation of self-identi-
fication is necessary to create the urge for
expression, which ultimately may result in an
integrated art experience (p. 50).
More recently Elliot Eisner has taken up the issue of
arts activities and the learning process in his book
Educating Artistic Vision (1972). In that work, Eisner
differentiates between two types of justifications for the
use of the arts in education: the first type emphasizes the
instrumental consequences of art in work and bases its objec-
tives upon the particular needs of the students or the society.
He refers to this type of justification as a contextualist
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justification. In the second type of justification, the
kinds of contributions to human experience and understanding
That only art can provide are emphasized. It bases its
objectives on what is indigenous and unique to art. Eisner
refers to this type of justification as an essentialist justi-
fication.
Eisner favors an essentialist view as is indicated in
this statement: "The prime value of the arts in education
lies, from my point of view, in the unique contributions it
makes to the individual’s experience with and understanding
of the world" (p. 9). He does, however, explain very care-
fully the contextualist position. One of the justifications
used by contextualists that is identified by Eisner is very
germane to our own discussion. "A fourth justification
argues that art activities develop the students’ understand-
ing of the academic subject areas, especially the social
studies, and hence should be used as an important resource
in teaching those subject areas. In such a view art is con-
sidered a hand-maiden to concept formation" (pp. 8-9).
The importance of the differing views of the role of
the arts in education cannot be underestimated. These basic
views are the molds within which strategies and decisions
concerning arts in education are formulated. Eisner under-
scores this when he states
:
The implications of different views about the goals
and content of art go even further if one stays with
the premise that schools should concern themselves
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with the development of intellect, and if one views
art as a product of the emotions, it will be diffi-
cult to make a strong case for the arts in educa-
tion. But if one embraces Langer’s view, that art
is a . cognitive activity as well as one based on
feeling, then the problem turns on the task of ex-
panding the usually held conception of cognition, a
conception that unduly restricts it to discursive
mediation (pp. 7-8).
Eisner’s notion of "expanding the usually held concept-
ion of cognition" is vital to my own views of the role the
arts can play in facilitating the learning of concepts. One
of the basic characteristics of the IAE that might allow it
to facilitate conceptual learning and development is that
it allows an opportunity for other types of cognition to
occur. Two of those other forms of cognition that are a
part of this position are perceptual cognition and metaphori-
cal modes of thinking.
Read believed there was a relationship between arts
experiences and learning, and that the relationship revolved
around the notion of education being a means of increasing
the efficiency with which people used systems of communica-
tion, one of those systems of communication, of course, being
the arts. Lowenfela and Brittain held views that allowed for
a relationship existing between arts activities and learning.
The particular view revolved around the ability of the arts
to act as a vehicle through which students identified person-
ally with new material that was being learned. Eisner
identified the possibility of arts activities facilitating
concept formation, and also the fact that this possible
ability
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is based on the existence of alternative forms of cognition.
Perhaps the time has come now for me to operationally
define the term, Integrated Arts Experience ( IAE) as it is
used here, to explain the critical features of the defini-
tion, and identify the degree to which those features have
evolved from the thinking of Read, Eisner, Lowenfeld and
others. I have chosen to define the IAE as follows: an
activity which induces in the learner an emotional and/or
kinesthetic state which is in some way analogous to the
concept being taught and which occurs through heightened
sensory awareness on the part of the learner . The term
integrated is used here to imply the integration of the
arts experience into the learning process.
As I have defined it here, an emotional and/or kines-
thetic state is analogous to a concept when it has salient
characteristics which are the same as, or parallel to, some
or all of the salient characteristics of the concept. As an
example, the emotional state induced in a learner when he or
she is asked to continue drawing visual figures in a given
space after having already indicated that he or she has filled
that space to the extent that is comfortable for him or her-
self, is analogous to the concept to over-flow . In what way
are the feelings and the concept analogous? They are ana-
logous because the salient characteristic of both the concept
and the emotional state is one of being filled to the point
at which something is forced to exceed its boundaries.
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A question that might arise concerning this definition
has to do with the arts. Nowhere in the definition is it
stated that the activity must be arListic! This is true.
However, what was important to me in formulating the defi-
nition was not that the learner take part in an activity
that would normally be considered part of a traditional art
form. What was important was that the learner be made able
to avail him or herself of alternative forms of cognition
and experience. These forms of cognition and experience
usually, but not always, occur as a result of activities we
would normally refer to as artistic. The real determining
factor in whether these forms of cognition and experience
occur is the level of sensory awareness that the learner
exhibits during the activity. Therefore, the clause "and
which occurs through heightened sensory awareness on the
part of the learner,' is more useful and accurate than any
phrase built on the narrower and more constrained notion of
an "artistic" activity.
Do all Integrated Arts Experiences have to do with
learning? Since the term integrated is used here to imply
the integration of the arts experience into the learning
process, it is appropriate that this definition is stated in
terms of an educative function. Whereas the analogous rela-
tionship of an emotional and/or kinesthetic state to a
particular concept may be part of many, if not all, artistic
experiences, the experience does not necessarily become
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integrated in the sense that I am using it here until it
takes on an educative function.
Whenever someone proposes his or her own operational
definition of a term it is
,
usually to a large degree
,
a
unique formulation. But whereas there is value in the
uniqueness of a formulation, our perception of the viability
of that formulation is often enhanced if we can trace its
component ideas back to other theories or formulations which
have proven useful in the past. The question then arises,
"To what degree is it possible to trace back to the writings
of others, the component parts of my own operational defini-
tion of the term, Integrated Arts Experience. It does not
appear useful for me to make an elaborate exposition of the
relationships that exist between previous writings and the
component parts of this definition; however, a very cursory
examination of those relations may, in fact, help to identify
the ideas that stand as the basis for this particular formu-
lation. Therefore, I will mention them briefly.
We can begin by breaking the definition down into its
component parts thusly: An activity which induces in
(1) the learner an (2) emotional and/or kinesthetic state
which is in some way (3) analogous to the (4) concept being
taught and which (5) occurs through heightened sensory aware-
ness on the part of the learner . The first and fourth compo-
nents of the definition are related to the general notion of
arts activities being able, in some way, to have impact on
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the learning process. We have seen that Read, Eisner, and
Lowenfeld and Brittain, just to mention a few, have all
supported this view. Eisner’s description of the context
-
ualist justification for arts in education documents the
degree to which this notion has been accepted.
The second component of the definition, an emotional
and/or kinesthetic state
, is an outgrowth of the work done
by Lowenfeld and Brittain. We have already examined their
views concerning the role of the learner’s personal identi-
fication, on an emotional as well as conceptual level, with
new material being learned. A much more complete treatment
of the role of emotional material in conceptual learning is
available to us in Fantasy and Feeling in Education by
Richard Jones. This view will be examined more closely later
in this study. Also, the relationship between kinesthetic
and emotional states is discussed clearly and thoroughly by
Alexander Lowen in The Betrayal of the Body (1967).
The third component of the definition, the analogousness
of emotional and kinesthetic states to concepts does not grow
out of the literature dealing with the arts and aesthetics.
Instead, it is explained for us in the writings of W. J. J.
Gordon (1961) and Robert Ornstein (1969). The ideas of these
men will be examined more closely later in this chapter.
And finally we come to the fifth component, occurs
through heightened sensory awareness on the part of the learn-
er
.
I have already explained how I chose the notion of
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sensory awareness over the notion of artistic because of its
relation to the idea of alternative forms of cognition.
These ideas derive from the work of many authors. In a
later section of this chapter I will speak directly about
the work of Maddenfort and Arnheim, each of whom has contri-
buted greatly to the body of knowledge that now exists con-
cerning these forms of cognition.
The IAE is defined in this study as an activity which
induces in the learner an emotional and/or kinesthetic state
which is in some way analogous to the concept being taught
and which occurs through heightened sensory awareness on the
part of the learner. The component parts of the definition
are obviously an outgrowth of the ideas of Read, Eisner,
Lowenfeld,. Brittain, Maddenfort, Arnheim and others. The
description of some activities that meet the definition of
an IAE will help us to better understand in practical terms,
exactly what an IAE is.
A Description of Sample Integrated Arts Activities
Description is different from definition, according to
Webster, whereas to define means "to determine or identify
the essential qualities or meaning of . . . , " to describe
means, "to represent or give an account of ..." Each has
its function. For example, whereas defining allows us to
know what critical features an activity or experience must
possess if it is to be called an IAE, describing certain
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activities may actually help us to understand more generally
what an IAE is like. Since I have already defined the IAE,
I will now attempt to describe some integrated arts activi-
ties so that, by the combination of the two processes, defi-
ning and describing, the nature of the IAE may become clear.
Since an IAE may draw on one or more of a number of different
media and may also take place at many different points in
the learning process, three different IAEs will be des-
cribed.
One example of an IAE is an exercise created for use
with high school social studies students (Note 1). The acti-
vity draws upon the medium of creative dramatics and is used
prior to the teacher’s introducing the concept that is to be
learned. .In the activity the teacher begins by discussing
some of the daily routines followed by people. As an example
he or she mentions the way in which people make their beds.
The teacher asks if there are any students who make their
beds in the same fashion every morning. The teacher then
asks if one student would be willing to pantomine the process
in front of the rest of the group. After the student has done
this once, he or she is asked to repeat the pantomine. This
time, however, as each step in the process is identified
another student is asked to take the responsibility for doing
that particular step. Eventually the entire process is broken
down into individual steps, each one done by a different stu-
dent, and due to the nature of the task, each one done one
75
after the other. The class is then asked to imagine a row
of 100 beds in front of itself and is also asked to extend
the procedures it has developed for making one bed so that
iu can make all the beds as simultaneously as possible. As
the students go through this final phase of the exercise
they are asked to identify their feelings. They reply:
"I get bored doing step number five a hundred times in a
row," or "I don’t get any feeling of having made a bed at
all," or "I felt proud that we could work so efficiently
together." At the conclusion of the exercise the teacher
begins a discussion of the industrial revolution and the
effects of mass production on individual workers.
As simple as the above exercise might seem, it meets
the defining criteria of an IAE. During this creative drama-
tics activity the learners actually experience some of the
emotions that are felt by workers on an assembly line. The
level at which those experiences are felt is probably much
lower, but they are some of the same emotions nonetheless.
The activity induces in the learner an emotional state which
is virtually synonomous with the emotional state that is
derived from the concept itself, and this is a result of
heightened sensory awareness on the part of the learner. Ihe
emotions are felt, not deduced, by the learner.
A second example is taken from a workshop done with
in-service teachers who were trying to understand how concepts
could be taught through arts activities (Note 2). They had
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completed three days of workshops on sensory perception,
sound and music and movement, and had developed a small but
vocabulary of movements and composition tech-
niques. The teachers were asked to travel through a large
space using any type of movement they liked. They were
then asked to evolve into pairs of people moving in ways
that were similar, if not the same. Next, they were asked
to "mirror” each other's movements, that is, to move to-
gether in a way that made it appear that one person was the
reflection of the other. After repeating this first phase
of the exercise the teachers were asked to move through
space a third time. This time, however, they were to walk
at a steady pace while they created a vocal sound of their
own choosing. Once again they were asked to pair-off and
evolve into a mirror image. That time, it was not movements
they were reflecting; it was sounds.
At this point the group was asked to identify, based
on the first half of the exercise, what it was that they did
when they "mirrored" or "reflected" someone's movements or
sounds. Or, in other words, what ideas are subsumed in the
notion of reflection . The group answered: "The same as,
"Same but opposite," "Coming back to you," "No beginning, no
end," "Thinking back upon," "Infinity (reflection of reflec-
tion of reflection etc.)."
The teachers were then asked to divide themselves into
groups of fours. Each group then had to choose one of the
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ment ioned above and find a way to reflect each
other s sounds and movements according to that notion. The
teachers were asked to regroup four times. Each time the new
group picked a notion or "type" of reflection and tried to
discover ways to reflect each other. As this activity pro-
gressed, the group as a whole developed a repertoire of
different ways of reflecting each other’s sounds and move-
ments .
As a conclusion to the exercise, the teachers were
asked to spread out around the perimiter of the large space
within which they had been working. Each one was asked to
conceive of himself as a movable object that was totally
"reflective" in nature. They were then asked to improvise a
movement / sound piece. The piece began when the facilitator
threw an object into the large space and all the "objects"
"reflected" the new object and each other. The teachers were
asked to keep in mind the different notions subsumed under
the concept of reflection and to operate accordingly. The
piece ended when all the sounds and movements had evolved to
a natural point of rest.
Although this exercise was both more lengthy and much
more ambiguous than the previous exercise, it was still very
powerful as an IAE. The teachers involved in this exercise
all reported that their personal views of the concept reflect
tion, a concept they already held, had grown and clarified
tremendously. It seems clear that this growth and
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c -*-ar^fica’ti°n had taken place as a result of the partici-
pants "taking on" the quality of reflectiveness after having
explored the possibilities inherent in that action. I be-
lieve that this "taking on" of the quality of reflective-
ness constituted assuming an emotional and kinesthetic state
analogous to the concept reflection
. It is also clear that
this was accomplished through heightened sensory awareness
on the part of the teachers.
The final example I would like to use in describing
the IAE, one I have alluded to before, was developed by an
elementary school teacher during a six-day integrated arts
workshop (Note 3). It is an excellent example, not only
because it is an effective exercise which clearly meets the
criteria of an IAE, but also because it is an example of
the kind of viable and exciting exercise that can be devel-
oped by a classroom teacher with no previous experience in
the arts. The woman who developed the exercise was a fourth-
grade teacher. The workshop was her first real experience
with the integrated arts. When, on the fifth day of the work-
shop, she was asked to choose a concept she normally taught
and to attempt to develop an IAE through which she could
teach the concept, she chose the concept run-on sentence .
The woman’s first attempt at formulating the exercise
was, in fact, rather shaky. Since, as part of the previous
assignment, the participants in the workshop had taken a
number of photographs, she decided to try using one of the
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photographs as the basis of the exercise. She chose a slide
which included a diminishing line of perspective which was
unbroken. She explained that she would show the students
the photograph and talk with them about how the line went
on and on. She would then relate this line' to the concept
of a run-on sentence
.
Although what the teacher had in mind is clear, I am
not so sure that her students would have been able to connect
that image to their existing cognitive structure in such a
way that an understanding of the concept run-on sentence
would have resulted. In discussing the activity with others,
the teacher came to the realization that she would not be sure
that the activity would induce any sort of new emotional and/
or kinesthetic state for the students. She realized that the
use of an artistic medium, the photograph, did not ensure an
IAE. She decided to reformulate the activity.
The second formulation of the activity was a great
improvement upon the first and captured, in a very real sense,
the essence of the concept run-on sentence . In this second
formulation of the activity she began with a movement activity.
The essential part of the movement activity was not so much
what the students did, but rather, when the students had moved
to the point at which they felt the need to come to rest, she
forced them to go on, to exceed that natural limit. When she
finally did allow them to stop, the children were asked to
immediately begin a visual exercise. The essential feature
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of this part of the activity was the same as in the move-
exercise
. When the children reached their natural
limits, they were forced to go on, to be over-filled. Through
this combination of activities the teacher hoped to induce in
the students both an emotional and kinesthetic state that was
analogous to the concept run-on sentence
. In both their
experiences and the concept itself something was forced to
exceed its boundaries. She would then conclude the activity
with a verbal discussion that moved on to a study of run-on
sentences
.
This activity is almost a prototypical example of an
IAE. The analogous relationship between the concept and the
emotional/kinesthetic state is clear; the reliance on sensory
awareness . obvious . Also, the activity is a good example of
the fact that the use of the IAE is not restricted to arts
specialists. It is a technique that is potentially available
to all teachers.
The Curricular Function of the IAE
Explaining the curricular function of the IAE may help
to dispell some misconceptions about it. Although this can
be done very quickly, the rewards are great, in that this is
an area concerning the IAE which causes great confusion, and
ultimately lack of success, for many teachers who attempt to
use an IAE (Note 4).
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We begin to examine the curricular function of the IAE
by reviewing the route a teacher follows in planning any
lesson. A common model for curricular planning includes the
following: (1) general objectives; (2) specific objectives;
(3) learning opportunities, and (4) evaluation. This model
is used in the classroom by most teachers whether implicitly
or explicitly. For example, a teacher never teaches the re-
lationship between numerators and denominators in a void.
He or she starts with the general objective of comprehending
fractions, moves to the more specific objective of under-
standing the relationship between numerators and denominators,
chooses a learning opportunity (a teaching vehicle such as a
workbook, lecture, film, etc.) which seems to suit the situa-
tion, and. decides upon an appropriate method of evaluation .
When a teacher chooses an arts activity as the teaching
vehicle, it is essential that he or she understands how the
activity fits into the above model. I believe it is useful
to view the IAE as fitting into the model at the level of the
learning opportunity . Learning opportunities usually function
in one of three ways: they (1) motivate the student; (2) allow
for the initial apprehension of a concept; and (3) reinforce
previous learning. An IAE can function in any one of these
ways
,
and therefore stands as a viable learning opportunity
when used in the proper setting. If an IAE arouses the stu-
dent’s interest in a subject area, it is functioning as a
motivator. When an IAE provides an opportunity for the
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student to discover knowledge that is new to him or her,
conceptual apprehension is taking place. When skills are
pracTiced and/or conceptual knowledge is strengthened, the
IAE is functioning as a reinforcer
. Also, any given learn-
ing opportunity can be made to function in more than one of
these ways, depending on the context in which it is used.
The example IAEs I have discussed exemplify the
different curricular modes of functioning of the IAE. The
first activity, the lesson on the effects of mass production
on individual learners, could function as either a motivator
or reinforcer, depending upon whether the concepts involved
are "taught" before or after the use of the activity. If
the activity is used prior to any discussion of the effects
of mass production on individual workers, it could be said to
be motivating the students to discuss and explore this area.
If the concepts involved have already been grasped by the
students, then the activity functions as a reinforcer, making
clearer the connections between the new material and the
concepts already held by the learners.
In the same vein of thought, the activity on reflect ion
could be considered both a reinforcer or an activity which
allowed for conceptual apprehension. If we assume that all
the different notions subsumed by the concept reflect ion were
held by the adult participants before the activity, then it
clearly functioned as a reinforcer. However, if we assume
that the realization of the idea that the concept reflect io_n
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does, in fact, subsume so many different notions is new to
the learners, then we can say that conceptual apprehension
occurea
.
The third activity operated as a vehicle for concep-
apprehension or as a reinforcer. The difference, again,
depends on whether the teacher dealt with the concept in
another fashion before or after the use of the activity it-
self. One way or the other, the activity was powerful in
its ability to allow for new learning or strengthen previous
learning
.
In conclusion, the importance of understanding the
curricular function of the IAE derives from the fact that
arts experiences are often used improperly. This happens
because the activities themselves are often attractive and
offer a change in fare for both the teacher and the students.
Unfortunately, if an arts activity is used without proper
attention to its curricular function, the result is usually
one of two things: the activity may turn out flat or life-
less, going according to plan, but not generating excitement;
or, it may be enjoyable and exciting but lack a sense of
purpose. Either way, the activity fails to operate as an
effective teaching vehicle.
The Characteristics of the IAE That
Might Allow it to Facilitate The Learning of Concepts
The description of the nature of the IAE serves mostly
for understanding its role inas background information
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facilitating conceptual learning, but it is important infor-
mation nonetheless. To isolate salient characteristics of
any process or technique without first understanding its
basic nature is to run the risk of knowing the fact and
missing the point. Working in a void always increases our
chances of misunderstanding.
Although any number of minor characteristics of the IAE
might be said to have a positive effect on conceptual learn-
ing, I believe that if we are to decide that the IAE can
facilitate this kind of learning that decision must be based
on the existence of major characteristics that are very
directly tied to conceptual learning. Within this context,
three appear worthy of discussion. These three characteris-
tics of the IAE are: (1) it allows an opportunity for per-
ceptual cognition; (2) it allows an opportunity for metaphori-
cal modes of thinking; and (3) it allows the learner to make
use of presentational forms of communication. An examination
of each of these characteristics, and the processes they
include, is necessary in evaluating the IAE as a vehicle which
might facilitate conceptual learning. First, however, since
each of these characteristics has to do with alternative
forms of cognition and knowing, we must take a look at the
case for the acceptance of other forms of cognition.
Alternative Forms of Cognition
According to Jerome Hausman of New York University,
art forms involve differing forms of sense modality and
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therefore, offer many possibilities for understanding and
insight. He believes that it is important to note that
differing forms of expression and realization may be used
to inform each other. He concludes, "Seen as a means to
inform and train one’s perceptions as well as to develop
knowledge and insight, the arts should be viewed as an
integral part of general education” (pp. 49-50).
Hausman’s ideas outline the basic arguments involved
in accepting artistic experiences as vehicles for alternative
forms of cognition. These arguments are supported by a
wealth of material found in the literature of aesthetic
theory. In a chapter entitled "The Nature of Aesthetic
Education," for example, Gerard Knieter describes six charac-
teristics, of the aesthetic experience, two of which are
germane to our discussion. Knieter states that the aesthetic
experience involves focus, perception, affect, cognition and
the cultural matrix. It is the second and fourth of these
characteristics, perception and cognition, that are impor-
tant to our discussiop.
In dissing perception and the aesthetic experience,
Knieter describes a percept thusly:
A percept is that which is known of an object, a
quality, or a relationship as a result of sensory
experience. It is a state of awareness rathei "than
an image or a memory. Percepts tend to be organ-
ized around a series of related sensations that
are actuated from either internal or external
stimuli. When a pattern of percepts becomes or-
ganized it may give rise to the development of a
concept . (p . 4 )
.
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He goes on to say of a concept that it is a generalization
based upon a class of ideas, a stable percept, or associated
data. He states that it is usually organized as a result
of a group of related sensations, percepts and images. We
know from our earlier discussions of concepts that this is
a narrow view of what a concept is. It is significant, how-
ever, to note that Knieter clearly implies that concept
formation can be the result of purely perceptual function-
ing, and does not necessarily involve other forms of cogni-
tive operation. In addition, he believes that this form of
conceptual behavior leads, in the end, to the types of
behavior we normally associate with "higher forms of think-
ing." He states: "This intellectual awareness is usually
manifested in one or more of the typical cognitive processes:
analysis, synthesis, abstraction, generalization, evaluation"
(p. 5). I will expand upon this view later.
It is true that other forms of cognition exist? If so,
is not our world geared to function in accord with the more
commonly accepted form of cognition? R. Neal Appleby states:
But in this world where such emphasis is placed on
analytical and discursive thinking, how can there
be an alternative to this approach in education? Is
it not the purpose of our schools to prepare people
to live in this world? Perhaps so, but the number
of people who claim to be dissatisfied with their
lives and the fact that alienation and anomie are
problems of contemporary society indicate that a
strictly empirical approach is not sufficient for
the ’good life* (1974, p. 22).
Merle Flannery expands upon Appleby’s views: "It is clear
that man’s ability to conceptualize cannot answer all his
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needs. Answers to these most plaguing questions do not come
in words and numbers. They come in concrete images. Only
our aesthetic consciousness thinks in images" (1974, p. 4 ).
What about this aesthetic consciousness? What are its
characteristics? One of its most important characteristics
is that it deals with the particular. As Flannery says,
"In aesthetic consciousness, we do not attend to the quali-
ties of the object compared to those of other objects, nor
do we attempt to identify or categorize the object by its
color, shape, function, chemical or physical properties ....
We consider only this apple, experienced by ourself at this
time of day in this place" (p. 4).
One of the theorists who has been most thorough in
explaining this ability to deal with the particular is
Wellington Madenfort. Much of his work is a restatement,
clarification, and extension of the work of Maurice Merleau-
Ponty. In his article "Aesthetic Education: An Education
for Immediacy of Sensuous Experience," Maddenfort indicates
that aesthetic experiences are those kinds of experiences
in which phenomena are apprehended in the immediacy of their
sensuousness, and, therefore, distinguished from those ex-
periences in which phenomena are apprehended conceptually.
The latter is the normal state of affairs in everyday living.
He concludes, therefore, that the primary purpose of an
aesthetic education is to promote the student’s ability to
experience the world as it is given in all the immediacy




Appleby (1974) speaks also of functioning on the basis
of information derived purely from the senses. In describ-
ing synaesthesia
,
he says that children all have the ability
to perceive the world as a simultaneous, multidimensional
experience, emotionally and physically as well as cognitive-
ly. He believes, however, that somewhere along the road to
maturity, this ability is lost. He says of the subject:
Another way of describing the child's view of
his environment is by the term synaesthesia, re-
ferring to the interassociation of the different
senses. As the child perceives syncretist ically
his sensory impressions are also global, undiffer-
entiated, and simultaneous. Sight, hearing, taste,
smell and feeling are not seperate senses for the
young child, and in effect, the stimulation of one
sense will elicit responses from the other senses.
Synaesthesia means specifically this phenomenon of
cross-sensory perception (p. 24).
In describing synaesthesia, Appleby compares it with
what he calls "cognitive learning." He believes that cogni-
tive learning which is based on analytic and deductive
principles of logic is concerned primarily with the acculu-
lation of pieces of substantive information and the inter-
connection with those pieces. Due to this characteristic
of interrelating bits of information, "cognitive learning,"
he feels is limited to a linear one-at-a-time approach. Con-
versely, according to Appleby, sensory learning is not
limited in that way. In sensory learning, experience is
assimilated through synaesthesia as a unified, multi-dimen-
sional totality and its meaning is incorporated into all
89
levels of the individual’s being and consciousness.
Appleby does not believe that we maintain our ability
to operate synaesthetically
. He indicates that for the pre-
school child, experience and learning are based on a fusion
of sensations, and no single sense dominates during the pro-
cess. However, the developing child is under a constant
subtle pressure to abandon his or her multi-sensory rela-
tionship with the environment. This relationship is replaced
by a conceptual approach to employing fragmented and discon-
tinuous single-sensory perceptions. He believes that this
process begins as soon as the child first learns to identify
him or herself as a separate entity from his or her surround-
ings.
Maddenfort describes this same phenomenon. He uses,
however, a perspective of "conceptual” versus "immediately
sensous" experience. He states:
The very idea of growing up, of maturation as
it functions in our society, principally means mas-
tering our language, acquiring a control over various
modes of communication as techniques and increasing
the conceptual furniture in our minds. Concepts,
thus naturally take over when we ’reflect' on our
experiences, and tend to block response to the imme-
diately sensuous (p. 10).
Maddenfort goes on to further explain the role of
"concepts," as he uses the term. He says that concepts are
the intermediaries of experience. In other words, when we
see the world symbolically and conceptually we see a world
of objects. These objects have meaning for us through the




determines our behavior toward the objects. As an
example, "The object chair is given an absolute reality
through the symbol ’chair,’ and it is as though the ’chair’
came with the 'creation of the world.' The origin of 'chair'
as a cultural artifact is lost, and with it the reality of
the symbolic and conceptual processes" (p. 10).
Given a shift in terminology, we find that Merle
Flannery supports Maddenfort’s position. Flannery states:
In other words, the concept of a thing is
- based on a sensory awareness of it. It is extremely
difficult to understand what a horse is really like
if a child has never had sensory contact (however
remote) with a horse. Conceptual subjects which
are taught in purely abstract form (in words and
numbers), which are not sandwiched with a sensory
base, are extremely difficult to get a hold of.
Children, especially, become confused when they are
confronted with the need to learn an idea that has
been cut off from its sensory base. Tragic are the
adjustments they make to the absolute requirement
that they learn castrated concepts (p. 7).
If we accept the fact that objects and events can be
perceived in terms of either the general or the particular,
what are the advantages of perceiving the particular?
Haven't we already seen the advantages of classif icatory be-
havior? The advantage is that the world is not made up of
generalities, it is made up of particular instances. And if
we look at a particular instance and see only the character-
istics which quality it as a member of a certain category,
then we miss what is unique in it. We miss its unique ability
to solve problems, stimulate reactions, guide us in our
We operate a step removed from the real world.efforts
.
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What are the educational implications of all this?
Maddenfort believes that we rarely consider educating the
human being to grasp the world in its immediate sensuous-
ness. All too often, rather, the assumed goal is the devel-
opment of the student’s ability to deal with the world through
abstract concepts. Appleby adds: "If we are to overcome the
sterile methods of conceptual and empirical learning, we must
nurture the dormant subconscious capacity to perceive simul-
taneously and syncret ist ically the total sensory impact of
experience and thereby through a more complete individual
involvement, be capable of dealing more effectively with the
complexities of our electric environment" (p. 24 ).
Based on those views, Appleby states that the synaesthe-
tic approach to education tries to use personally meaningful
experiences to enhance substantive learning. The approach
is developmental rather than instructional in nature, and
provides a more personal modality of experience by emphasiz-
ing the essential sensory involvement of the student.
Now that we have reviewed some views which seem to accept
the existence of alternative forms of cognition, we can exa-
mine those forms of cognition which might both facilitate
conceptual learning and are connected with the IAE.
Perceptual Cognition
I have stated that one characteristic of the IAE that
might allow it to facilitate the learning of concepts is that
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it allows an opportunity for perceptual cognition to occur.
It appears to me that in discussing this characteristic the
problem that arises is not one of showing that the IAE does
allow for perceptual cognition to occur, but rather, one of
describing and supporting the existence of perceptual cor-
—
tion itself
- If we accept that perceptual cognition exists,
there does not seem to be much problem in going a step
further to accepting the fact that activities that induce a
particular state as a result of heightened sensory awareness
on the part of the learner are likely to allow that percep-
tual cognition to occur. I turn now to the work of Rudolph
Arnheim, for it most clearly and thoroughly describes and
supports the existence of perceptual cognition.
In his major work on perceptual cognition Visua l Think-
ing Arnheim begins with the notion of reasoning being
feminine in nature. This is true because it can give only
after it receives. The brain cannot function unless it is
constantly supplied with information concerning what is going
on in time and space. He believes further, however, that
sensory reflections of the world in their raw state would
not be very useful. It is not until we find generality in
the particular that anything we learn about an individual
thing can be of use to us. Therefore, Arnheim suggests that
it is only because perception gathers concepts, or types of
things, that perceptual material can be used for thought.
He believes, also, that unless the senses present material
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to the mind, it has nothing to think with.
With that series of ideas as a starting point, Arnheim
begins a. careful examination of the process of perceptual
cognition
. First, he points out how we have come, histori-
cally, to mistrust our senses. He indicates that even when
theorists have been forced to conclude that sensory percep-
tions play a part in thinking, they usually relegated that
role to the lowest status possible. He points out that al-
though the sensualist philosophers remind us that nothing
is in the intellect without first being in the senses, they
still considered the gathering of perceptual data to be,
"unskilled labor, indispensible but inferior" (p. 2). In
contrast, he states:
My contention is that the cognitive opera-
tions called thinking are not the privilege of men-
tal processes above and beyond perception but the
essential ingredients of perception itself. I am
referring to such operations as active exploration,
selection, grasping of essentials, simplification,
abstraction, analysis and synthesis, completion,
correction, comparison, problem solving, as well
as combining, separating, putting in context. These
operations are not the perogative of any one mental
function; they are the manner in which the minds of
both man and animal treat cognitive material at any
level. There is no basic difference in this respect
between what happens when a person looks at the
world directly and when he sits with his eyes closed
and ’thinks’ (p. 13).
How does Arnheim attempt to support the existence of
perceptual cognition? First he speaks of perceptual cogni-
tion as exhibiting the characteristics of "active intelli-
gence." He points out that in vision we do not just see, we
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see selectively. Of vision he states: "Through that world
roams the glace, directed by attention, focusing the narrow
range of the sharpest vision now on this, now on that spot
This eminantely active performance is what is truly meant
by visual perception" (p. 14). He concludes, therefore, that
sensory responsiveness can be said to be intelligent.
Arnheim then discusses the different media of sensory
perception and their relative abilities to facilitate intel-
ligent behavior. He believes that this ability is dependent
on the degree of articulateness that data in that medium
achieve. In smell and taste we get a lot of subtle informa-
tion, but that information is only of a "primitive order."
In vision and hearing, we find that shapes, colors, movements
and sounds are susceptible to definite and highly complex
organization in space and time. Therefore, these two senses
are the most highly acceptable media for the exercise of
intelligence
.
While Arnheim indicates that both vision and hearing
have great potential for the exercise of intelligence, he
does differentiate between the two. He points out that in
music, each tone can be given a definite place and function,
and that this is applicable within several dimensions in the
total system. He believes, therefore, that music is one of
the most potent outlets of human intelligence. He points
out, however, that while the thinking that takes place in
music is of the highest level, it is thinking about and
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within the musical universe. In contrast, he points out that
the great virtue of vision as a medium is that it is not only
highly articulate, it also offers inexhaustibly rich informa-
tion about the objects and events that exist in the outer
world. He therefore concludes that the primary medium of
thought is vision.
After having theoretically established vision as the
primary medium of thought, Arnheim returns to the process of
visual selectivity . Demanded by the physiological fact that
acute vision is limited to a narrow area, points out that
visual selectivity allows for the intelligent practice of
concentrating on one point of interest and neglecting all
that is beside the point of attention. He points out also,
that through the accommodation of the eye lenses, visual
selectivity also functions through the process of depth per-
ception. This process contributes to cognition by making the
size of objects variable and therefore adaptable to the needs
of the observer. The size of the object in the visual field
determines how much of the contextual environment is appre-
hended along with the object itself. The importance of this
process is indicated by the following statement
.
How much detail is relevant? What distance is
needed to bring out the larger structural features,
otherwise hidden by too much detail? How much of
the context is pertinent to the understanding or
the matter under scrutiny? Here again the correct
selection at the elementary perceptual level is an
important part, and reflection of, a broader cog
nitive stragegy (pp. 25-26).
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Hext, Arnheim moves on to a discussion of visual con-
cepts. He clearly believes that the beginnings of concept
formation lie in the perception of shape. Why is this true?
Arnheim reminds us that whereas the optical image projected
upon the retina is an exact and complete recording of the
object or event it represents, the corresponding visual per-
cept is not. In other words, the perception of shape indi-
cates the grasping of the structural features that are found
in, or imposed upon, any stimulus material. It is seldom
that the material conforms exactly to the shape it acquires
in perception.
Arnheim considers this "grasping of structural fea-
tures," indicative of conceptual behavior. He describes
perception as consisting of fitting stimulus material with
templates of relatively simple shape. He refers to these
templates as visual concepts or categories. He believes
that an object is only perceived to the degree that it is
matched with one of these organized shapes. For Arnheim, the
shape of patterns perceived in this fashion have two proper-
ties which enable them to serve the function of visual con-
cepts; they have generality and they are easily identified.
He states, "Strictly speaking, no percept ever refers to a
unique, individual shape but rather to the kind of pattern
of which the percept consists . . . There is, therefore, no
difference in principle between percept and concept... (d.
28 ) .
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Another point that Arnheim makes is that visual imagery
and visual concepts are both tied to memory. He states:
A perceptual act is never isolated, it is only the
most recent phase of a stream of innumerable simi-
lar acts, performed in the past and surviving in
memory. Similarly, the experiences of the present,
stored and amalgamated with the yield of the past,
precondition the percepts of the future. There-
fore, perception in the broader sense must include
mental imagery and its relation to direct sensory
observation (p. 80).
Arnheim identifies two forces that operate in visual
imagery and memory. Once force is a tendency toward simplest
structure. This leads to tension reduction. The other force
is a counter-tendency to move toward sharpened and more dis-
tinctive features of a given pattern. Of these two processes
Arnheim says, "Antagonistic though the tendencies of leveling
and sharpening are, they work together. They clarify and
intensify the visual concept. They streamline and character-
ize the memory image" (p. 83).
One of the issues I mentioned in our discussion of alter-
native forms of cognition in general was the issue of knowing
the particular instance versus knowing the generality. Arnheim
addresses himself to this issue quite clearly. He begins:
A concept from which everything is subtracted but
its invariants leaves us with the untouched figment
of high generality. Such a concept is most useful
because it facilitates definition, classification,
learning, and the use of learning. The object looks
the same, every time it is met. Ironically, however,
this eminently practical attitude leaves the person
without the support of any one tangible experience
since the ’true' size, shape, color he perceives . are
never strictly supported by what his eyes show him.
Also the ridgidity of such constancy may make the
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observer blind to revelations offered by a particu-lar context and prevent him from reacting in a man-
ner appropriate to the particular occasion. A most
common form of unintelligent behavior consists pre-
cisely in the misuse of constancy, that is, in the
assumption that what was true before must be true
this time (p . 45 )
.
But there is another approach to knowing a concept.
According to Arnheim, this approach appreciates the infinite
and often puzzling change the object undergoes as it moves
from one situation to another. According to Arnheim this
approach is well suited to productive thinking. Such a con-
cept does not suppress the differences among the various in-
stances over which it presides, but rather, it keeps them
present in total comprehension. Not only does it supply an
enjoyable richness to life, it also assures artists as well
as scientists continuing contact with "the concrete manifes-
tations of the phenomena in which they are interested" (p. 45).
Arnheim concludes that a thinker or perceiver who is limited
to concepts of the kind forseen by traditional logic is likely
to end up performing in a world of paralyzed and empty con-
structs .
There are two more major points about perceptual cog-
nition that Arnheim makes and that I believe are germane to
our discussion. The first of these is the ability we have to
"draw" concepts. In speaking of some experiments in which





future, or good marriage , bad marriage ,
Arnheim states that although these experiments were informal,
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they show that young educated adults are relatively able to
represent abstract concepts through non-mimetic drawings.
He states of these drawings
:
The principal reason why these disembodied shapes
can be so helpful is that thinking is not con-
cerned with the sheer matter or substratum of thingskut only with their structure. The elementary qual-ities of a particular red color or a particular
sound are supplied by the senses but are neither
represented in thinking nor conveyable by it ...
The perceptual feature accessible to thought are
purely structural, e.g., the' expansiveness of that
sound, or the centric and compact nature of some-
thing round. Thinking treats space and time,
which are containers for being, as the structural
categories of coexistence and sequence. Both of
these categories can be represented in the spatial
medium of visual patterns (p . 129).
But concepts are not only represented in visual images,
they are apprehended through work with visual images. Arnheim
comments: "What we need to acknowledge is that perceptual and
pictorial shapes are not only translations of thought- products
but the very flesh and blood of thinking itself and that an
unbroken range of visual interpretation leads from the humble
gestures of daily communication to the statements of great
art" (p. 134 )
.
The final major point made by Arnheim, and in my opinion
germane to our discussion, deals with the process of abstrac-
tion. Arnheim begins his discussion of abstraction thusly:
I have tried to show that perception consists in the
grasping of relevant generic features of the object.
Inversely, thinking, in order to have something to.
think about, must be based on images of the world in
which we live. The thought elements in perception
and the perceptual elements in thought are complemen-
tary. They make human cognition a unitary process,
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which leads without break from the elementary acqui-
sition of sensory information to the most generic
theoretical ideas. The essential trait of this uni-tary cognitive process is that at every level itinvolves abstraction (p. 179).
To help us better understand the process of abstraction
as it relates to perceptual cognition, Arnheim breaks concepts
down into two types, static and dynamic . He points out that
there is a conflict in the human mind between the need to
comprehend the total range of a phenomenon and the need to
simplify it to a static concept, in which one characteristic
state of an object or movement is chosen and stands for the
whole. He also indicates that this' type of concept may be
sufficient for the purpose of definition or classification.
In this case the concept is reduced to the minimum of traits
needed to determine what genus it belongs to and by what’ pro-
perty or properties it is distinguished from other members of
the group. However, in productive thinking as much informa-
tion as possible must be conveyed. It is to dynamic concepts
that Arnheim attributes this latter type of thinking.
In further explaining the process of abstraction,
Arnheim points out that there are two antogonistic ways of
describing the process. The first, and more commonly accep-
ted view, describes abstraction as a withdrawal from direct
experience. He comments: "This view assumes a dichotomy
between perceiving and thinking. One perceives only particu-
lars, but one thinks in generalities, and therefore, to think
the mind clear of perceptual material (p. 188).one must sweep
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According to this view, abstraction performs this clearing
function. The second view, Arnheim's, holds that abstraction
IS an indispensible link between, and common trait of, both
thinking and perceiving. He points out that the danger of
accepting the first view is that it suggests that a person
is capable of truly abstract thinking only if he or she can
ignore, defy, or even contradict the life situation in which
h.e or she must function.
Arnheim gives us many examples of the danger of viewing
abstraction as a withdrawal from experience. One of the most
cogent is taken from the process by- which young children are
taught to match cardinal sets in mathematics. The children
are hold that a "set" is a well-defined collection of objects
which are not necessarily alike. In each example there are
three objects. Since the objects can be matched one—to—one
from one set to another, the sets are said to have the same
cardinal set.
Unfortunately the objects chosen do not represent pure
qualities. Instead, the children are faced with objects,
e.g., a square, a triangle, a circle, in which practical
daily-life relations are not absent but, "absurdly offended."
Arnheim points out:
Here again we run into the tendency to define abstrac-
tion as the ability to violate the natural order of
things. Are the consequences harmless educationally?
The child is told, on the authority of the teacher,
that the natural bonds and meanings of life are not




"the first school years may prepare some ofthe children for the spirit of higher mathematics,
to be met, perhaps, in the distant future; it will
not necessarily help them to reconcile school withlife outside (p. 210).
In summary, while there is much to be gained by the use of
static, defining concepts, to view abstraction as a withdraw-
3.1 from experience is to value through! processes stripped of
their sensorial base, and therefore lacking in authenticity.
Before concluding this section I would like to mention
very briefly two aspects of perceptual cognition which I
have not discussed but which reflect directly on our discus-
sion. The first of these is experiencing the whole .
Throughout the literature on aesthetic theory, there
are many references to the notion of experiencing the whole.
John Dewey (1958 ) describes it as an experience in which',
"The whole is then experienced as an expansion of ourselves"
(p. 195). Bennett Reimer (1971) adds: "That such experience
is so richly available in the arts is what makes the arts so
important to life" (p. 86). I believe that it is through the
process of perceptual cognition that experiencing the whole
is made possible.
Finally I would like to re-emphasize the importance of
the need for flexible perception. Arnheim mentions numerous
examples of this process. He points out that Copernicus
succeeded in seeing the intricate gyrations of the planets
as simple orbital movements overlaid by the effects of an
equally simple movement performed by the observer’s base.
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The erratic back-and-forth motion of an observed planet
could only be seen as circular and steady if the observer
couia visualize himself on a base that was also rotating.
In order to restructure the problem situation in this way,
Copernicus had to have a remarkable visual imagination. His
perception, although actually in line with reality, seemed
so only if tremendous flexibility of perception prevailed.
It is this flexible perception that is so important in fos-
tering productive thinking.
In summary, Arnheim proposes that thinking takes place
during perception. To support this- notion he points out the
active intelligence of visual selectivity, both in terms of
attention and contextual inclusion. He also believes that
while many senses supply us with data of varying degrees' of
articulateness, visual imagery is the prime medium of- thought
because of the "inexhaustibly rich information" it supplies
for us. Arnheim proposes the existence of visual concepts,
and describes their inclination towards both simplicity and
completeness. And finally, he suggests that whereas some
theorists represent abstraction as a withdrawal from direct
experience, he finds this position untenable. In his view,
abstraction is the indispensible link between thinking and
perceiving
.
In Chapter IV I will attempt to connect perceptual cog-
nition to the criteria for facilitating conceptual learning
that I identified in Chapter II. First, however, I will
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examine the processes, involved in the other two character-
istics of the IAE that I hope to link with conceptual learn-
ing.
Metaphorical Modes of Thinking
The second characteristic of the IAE that might allow
it to facilitate the learning of concepts is that it allows
an opportunity for metaphorical modes of thinking to occur.
As in our examination of perceptual cognition, the major
problem in understanding the role of this characteristic is
understanding the processes involved, i.e., metaphorical
modes of thinking. Therefore I will begin this part of our
discussion with an examination of those ideas that support
the existence of metaphorical modes of thought, and then’
move to a description of the modes themselves. This time,
however, I will conclude by spending some time indicating
exactly how it is that the IAE does, in fact, allow an oppor-
tunity for these modes of thinking to occur.
Metaphorical or intuitive forms of knowing have been
practiced by people for thousands of years. The "intuitive
leap" the scientist makes toward solving a problem, a
"woman's intuition," and "knowing one thing in your mind and
another in your heart" are all common examples of this pheno-
menon. It was not until recently, however, that neuropsycho-
logists came up with fairly well-tested physiological expla-
nation. In The Psychology of Consciousness, Robert Ornstein
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has pulled together the work of many theorists and psycho-
surgeons and articulated for us a theory which proposes the
existence of two minds in our brain. One of these minds is
ional — 1inear and logical in function, and the other is
metaphoric-intuitive and analogic in function. The two
"minds” are actually conceived of as the differentiated
functioning of the two cerebral hemispheres of the brain.
Ornstein indicates 'that the right cerebral hemisphere is the
metaphoric-intuitive hemisphere and that it performs analogic
functions. It examines tremendous amounts of data simultan-
eously. On the other hand, the left cerebral hemisphere is
far more constrained. It sifts through inputs and transforms
functions to a logical-rational form, thereby acting more
like a digital computer."
.
The effects of the two cerebral hemispheres are said to
manifest themselves on different sides of the body. The
effects of the right hemisphere are tied to one side of the
body, the effects of the left to the other. Moreover, since
the cerebral hemispheres are ’wired’ to opposite sides of the
body, the right hemisphere is linked with the left hand and
the left hemisphere is linked with the right.
There has been subjective support for this linking of
the sides of the body to different types of behavior for many
years. In " On Knowing: Essays for the Left Hand ," Jerome
Bruner summarized the feelings held by many concerning the
two modes of operation.
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Since childhood, I have been enchanted by thefact and the symbolism of the right hand and theleff--the one the doer, and the other the dreamer.Ihe right is order and lawfulness, le droit. Itsbeauties are those of geometry and taut implica-
tion.
.
Reaching for knowledge with the right handis science. Yet to say only that much of science
is to overlook one of its excitements, for the
great hypotheses of science are gifts carried in
the left.
Of the left hand we say that it is awkward
and, while it has been proposed that art students
can seduce their proper hand to more expressiveness
by drawing first with the left, we nonetheless sus-
pect this function. The French speak of the illegi-
timate descent as being a main gauche
,
and, though
the heart is virtually at the center of the thoracic
cavity, we listen for it on the left. Sentiment,
intuition, bastardy. And should we say that reach-
ing for knowledge with the left hand is art? Again
it is not enough, for as surely as the recital of a
daydream differs from the well-wrought tale, there
is a barrier between undisciplined fantasy and art.
To climb the barrier requires a right hand adept
at technique and artifice... (pp. 2-3).
But these views are not held by scientists alone. Ornstein
points out that in simple experiments many laymen indicated
that they associated the concept of left as "bad," "dark,"
"profane," and "female," while the concept right was asso-
ciated with the opposite.
Is there any empirical evidence which supports this
theory? According to Ornstein, yes. He reports on a number'
of psychosurgical experiments which appear to clearly indi-
cate that there is, in fact, this "cross-wiring" between the
cerebral hemispheres and the sides of the body. These ex-
periments also indicate that certain mental functions are
linked with one or the other of the two hemispheres.
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In one experiment, Roger Sperry, of the California
Institute of Technology, along with his associates, experi-
mentally severed the corpus callosum, the link through which
the two cerebral hemispheres communicate. Although this had
been done previously on laboratory animals, Sperry undertook
the procedure on human subjects. These subjects had severe
epilepsy and Sperry hoped that when the patients had a
siezure in one hemisphere, the other would still be avail-
to take control of the body . In many cases the proce-
dure was extremely successful.
Although in daily living these "split-brain" patients
appeared normal, Sperry and his associates developed many
subtle tests which uncovered evidence that the operation had
clearly separated the specialized functions of the two cere-
bral hemispheres.
In one test, for example, if the patient felt a pencil
(hidden from sight) in his right hand, he could verbally des-
cribe it. But if the pencil was in his left hand, he could
not describe it at all. This was due to the fact that the
left hand informs the right hemisphere which does not possess
any capability for speech. With the corpus collosum cut, the
left hemisphere, the one with verbal capability, is no longer
connected to the right hemisphere which communicates with the
left hand. Therefore, the verbal apparatus literally does
not know what is in the left hand. It was found, however,
that if the patient was offered a selection of objects--a
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key, a book, a pencil--and asked to choose the previously
given object with his left hand he could choose correctly,
although he still could not state verbally just what he was
doing (pp. 55-57).
Based on this and many other experiments, what have
we come to know about the two hemispheres and their func-
tions? First, in a pragmatic sense, we see that the left
cerebral hemisphere acts as a filter to sensory input. It
limits data and selects those things that are important. It
works like a computer and strings relevant ideas into logical
messages that are linear in nature.’ It is enhanced by the
skills of reading, writing and arithmetic because they, too,
are linear in nature. On the other hand, the right cerebral
hemisphere specializes in processing sensory information'
simultaneously. It tends to elaborate and increase the
variables that result from each stimuli. It works in diverse
and sometimes confusing ways, and has been described by some
researchers as being "intuitive.” We are just beginning to
understand these forms of "intuition" as expressions of a
different function of the mind rather than a higher or lower
form of logical integration.
We have seen now chat there exists some empirical evi-
dence which would support the notion of a "two-sided" brain,
and that one side of this brain is purported to allow for
metaphorical ways of knowing and learning. But what exactly
are these metaphorical forms of cognition like? How do they
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operate? According to Samples, there are four modes of
metaphorical thinking, and these modes parallel four levels
of analogy identified by W. J. -J. Gordon in his work on
synectics ( 1961 )
.
The first of these modes is the invent ive mode. It
parallels the level of analogy known as fantasy analogy.
Robert Samples (1975b) describes this mode in the following
way
:
... the mind creates objects, entities and
processes that have never existed. Imagery and
metaphoric relationships blend in a totally invented
mindscape of thoughts. Contexts and contents over-
lap, merge and diverge. The processes are generally
'all new' for each individual, and the results of
such mind work create products that likewise are
new in the experience of the person... (p. 23).
In other words, the metaphors created in the mind are far
ranging. Any bit of piece of information from one source may
be expanded until an entirely new entity is formed.
The second mode of metaphoric thinking is the integra-
tive mode and is parallel to the personal analogy. In this
form the person creating the metaphor or analogy "becomes"
something else. The child "becomes" a ball. He or she takes
on the characteristics of a ball and experiences the world as
a ball would. It is a process which is based on total in-
volvement, and one through which our repertorie of experience
can be vastly expanded.
Samples describes the third mode, the comparative mode,
as a mode in which, "... certain processes or entities are
compared with other processes or entities that ordinarily
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seem distant, remote or alien to the initial comparison...
(p. 22). This mode, which is parallel to the direct analogy,
is very common. It is one in which salient characteristics
are selected from one object or event and shown to be the
same as, or parallel to, the salient characteristics of
another object or event. A good example of this mode is
constituted when a heart and a city are said to be analogous.
Here the salient characteristic of' having tiny particles or
objects flow inward and outward along winding routes is iden-
tified in both entities. In the heart, blood corpuscels are
drawn into the heart and then sent flowing outward along
winding arteries. The city appears to draw automobiles into
it in the morning, and then force them out along winding
roads at night. The city, then, is seen as a heart that'
beats once a day.
The final mode, the symbolic mode, is parallel to the
symbolic level of analogy. In both the use of symbolic forms
of language is implied. The metaphors and analogies are them-
selves displaced by metaphorical and analogical connections
of thoughts to words. This of course, is the most common form
of analogy and metaphor known to us today.
Given that metaphorical modes of thinking exist, and
that they consist of four types, the question still arises,
"Does the IAE allow these modes of learning to occur?" Cer-
tainly art forms in general depend on metaphorical techniques.
Arnheim points out that metaphors are used in literature and
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and that, "There, the pairing of two images throws into re-
lief a common quality and thereby accomplishes a perceptual
abstraction without relinquishing the contexts from which
the singled out quality draws its life" (p. 62). Eisner
adds: "Through the ages art has served as a means of making
the spiritual, especially in religion, visual through the
image. When the artist takes an idea such as the divine and
transforms it into a visual metaphor, he creates not only a
specific object worthy of attention in its own right, he also
creates a form within which man's most cherished values can
be embodied" (pp. 10-11).
If art as "art" depends on metaphoric modes, is this
also true of the IAE? Does a typical IAE facilitate metaphor-
ical modes of thinking? In order to answer this question, I
would like to describe some educational activities that were
designed specifically to enhance the use of the right cerebral
hemisphere (RCH), the hemisphere connected, as you recall,
with metaphorical modes of thinking. The salient character-
istics of these activities, as described by Samples, are
significantly similar to the salient characteristics of an
IAE. Samples states:
The instructional materials were specifically
designed to legitimize student access to their own
RCH functions. The assignments were highly ambigu-
ous in order to heighten the student's role in
deciding what the assignment meant. Students were
asked to make decisions; they were asked to set up
strategies and plans based on the nature of the
initial problem. They were invited to invent
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solutions for problems posed by the materials,plans that they could take action on in their own
environments (1975b, p. 21).
Samples believes that these instructional materials and
learning materials not only created a legitamacy for the RCH,
but that they also created access routes to the use of that
hemisphere.
What were the salient characteristics of the activi-
ties? They were: (1) the assignments were highly ambiguous
and heightened the student’s role in deciding what the
assignment meant; (2) the students made decisions and made
up strategies; (3) the students invented solutions to pro-
blems posed by the materials; and (4) the students were able
to act on their plans. I believe that it is essential that
we recognize that these characteristics are all inherent in
almost all IAEs
.
To explain further, almost all IAEs are ambiguous in
nature, in that every student determines for him or herself
what the final outcome of the IAE will be. Experiencing how
you would feel while mass producing a product is not experi-
encing what the teacher would experience. As a result one
student experiences boredom, another lack of accomplishment,
but a third, pride. The teacher and the IAE allow only for
the opportunity to experience. They do not control the out-
come .
Another characteristic of the IAE that is basic to its
existence is the use of materials that bring with them their
The materials themselves present problems:own character.
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thick paint refuses to be translucent; musical tones last for
only a given duration. The students make decisions, plan
strategies and solve problems based on the assignment itself
and on the materials involved. In solving these problems and
making these decisions the students often come to understand
the metaphorical relationships between the problems posed by
the materials and the problems they face in real life.
Finally, it is important to note that there is great
value in the fact that the IAE allows students to actually
manipulate materials and take action on their plans and
strategies. I believe this allows for the concret izat ion of
many ideas, and for the juxtaposition of those ideas in a way
that makes clear the different relations between them.
One final point that I would like to make in discussing
metaphorical modes of thinking concerns the educational impli-
cations of using those modes. First of all, Samples points
out that in tests done on the effects of enhancing the use of
the RCH the results were: (1) the students' self-esteem in-
creased; (2) performance skills typically assigned to the LCH
increased at the same time; and (3) students chose to explore
greater number s of content areas and to a greater depth in
the arts, sciences and humanities (1975b, p. 21). I believe
that since these activities and materials shared so many
characteristics with the IAE, we can assume the same positive
results would be obtained with the use of the IAE.
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And finally. Samples indicates that not only are these
modes of value to students, but students clearly seemed to
prefer them when confronted with a problem. He explains,
"The first action the children consistently took was to latch
onto the problem, the equipment, the setting and all the
various and sundry components with all, the senses they could
bring to bear" (p. 18). And how did the children discuss the
problems. Samples indicates that most of their expressions
were highly metaphoric in nature. They often formed analogies
between the experience they were having and situations they
had experienced in the past. Clearly, the implications are
Thst
,
since metaphorical modes of thinking appear to be
natural to children and advantageous for them, we should do
everything we can to balance our instructional programs so
that they develop both analytic and metaphorical modes of
thinking
.
In summary, we have seen that there are two separate
modes of functioning, one analytic and the other metaphori-
cal, and that these two modes of functioning are said to be
based in the two different cerebral hemispheres. We have also
seen, from the work done by Sperry and his associates, that
there is some strong empirical evidence which supports the
existence of these two modes and the connection between them
and the cerebral hemispheres. Samples has identified that





and that these rour modes
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were parallel to four modes of analogy, fantasy
, personal ,
direct and symbolic
. Finally, we have seen that since there
were strong similarities between activities designed to
celebrate the right cerebral hemisphere and IAEs and since
those activities did, in fact, allow for metaphoric modes of
thinking to occur, we might assume that the IAE might also
facilitate the use of metaphoric modes of thinking. It is
now time to discuss the final characteristic of the IAE which
I believe facilitates the learning of concepts.
Presentational Forms of Communication
The final characteristic of the IAE that I believe
allows it to facilitate the learning of concepts is that it
allows the student to use presentational forms of communica-
tion. After describing the major alternative mode of commu-
nication that I believe can be associated with the IAE, we
will take a look at the role of communication in art in gen-
eral and then briefly examine one particular type of communi-
cation that can result directly from an IAE.
In order to understand presentational forms of communi-
cation, the concept of symbolization must be examined. In
her book Philosophy in a New Key , Susanne Langer undertakes
an examination of symbolism and its role in communication and
the arts. She feels that, "...there is a primary need in
man, which other creatures probably do not have, and which
actuates all his apparently unzoological aims .... This basic
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need, which certainly is obvious only in man, is the need to
symbolize " (pp. 40-41). This need to symbolize is apparent
m many ways and she feels many of our actions are the result
of it. She states: "As all registered experience tends to
terminate in action it is only natural that a typically human
function should require a typically human form of overt
y , and that is just what we find in the sheer expres—
sion of ideas " (p. 43).
It is important to note that Langer is not discussing
only the spoken or written word, but rather all forms of sym-
bolic communication. According to her view, symbolic commu-
nication can be broken down into two categories. In the
first category we find spoken and written language. She
points out: "...however, all language has a form which re-
quries us to strin g out our ideas even though their objects
rest one within the other... This property of verbal symbol-
ism is known as discursiveness; by reason of it, only thought
which can be arranged in this peculiar order can be spoken at
all" (p. 81). As mentioned earlier, there is another form
of symbolic communication, one which many people rarely con-
sider. Langer believes that visual forms--lines , colors,
proportions, etc. —are just as capable of articulation. How-
ever, she also beleives that the laws that goven this sort of
articulation are altogether different from the laws of syntax
that govern language. The biggest difference is that these
visual forms are not discursive. These forms are not
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perceived by viewing each of their constituents successively
as in discursive forms, but rather, simultaneously.
These forms, known as presentational forms, are not to
be considered less effective nor less natural to human sym-
bolic functioning. "The abstractions made by the ear and
eye--the forms of direct percept ion--are our most primitive
instruments of intelligence. They are genuine symbolic
material, media of understanding, by whose office we appre-
hend a world of things
,
and of events that are the history
of things" (p. 92). It is clear,. also, from the preceding
statement, that Langer is not considering only visual forms
as presentational. She also believes that music is capable
of articulating forms which language cannot. Forms that are
perceived visually but are not fixed can also be presenta-
tionaltional forms of symbolic communication. Langer states:
"... as soon as an expressive act is performed without inner
momentary compulsion it is no longer self-expressive; it is
expressive - in the logical sense... instead of completing the
natural history of a feeling, it denotes the feeling, and may
merely bring it to mind..." (p. 152).
It is these presentational forms of communication that
play an important role in the IAE. How important a role in
the IAE does communication play? To the degree that the IAE
deals with forms that are artistic, the role is essential.
Many theorists believe that the attempt to communicate is a
defining characteristic of art. Howard Gardner explains.
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Every art form involves communication on the part of one
person (or subject) to another by means of a symbolic object
that the first subject has created, and that the second is
able in some way to relate to" (1972, p. 30). He also points
out: "Indeed Tolstoy defined art as a ’human activity con-
sisting in this, that one may consciously by means of exter-
nal signs, hand on to others' feelings he has lived through
and that others are infected by these feelings and also
experience them" ( pp. 34-35).
There arises a point of confusion, however, if art is
viewed only within the context of communication from one
person to another. As Lowenfeld and Brittain have pointed
out "Art on all levels is an expression of the human spirit..
It expresses the relationship of the artist to himself and
to his environment" (1974, p. 40). Although "expression"
could be viewed as an attempt at communication, the role of
the second person is not explicitly clear in the statement.
Also, Schactel states of creative behavior: "The main moti-
vation at the root of creative experience is man's need to
relate to the world around him..." (Getzels and Jackson, 1962,
p. 114). Again communication between two people is not
clearly a part of the statement.
How can we resolve the discrepancy? The answer comes
to us from the field of gestalt therapy. Erving Polster and
Miriam Polster, in explaining the use of the term "contact"
to describe the process of becoming aware of parts of one's
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own self, state: "This kind of internal contact can occur,
however, because of the human ability to split oneself into
the observer and the observed" (1974, p. 106). Drawing on
this notion, then, we can consider arts experiences as com-
municative in nature, although internally communicative as
well as/or opposed to externally communicative.
I stated before that after describing presentational
forms of communication and discussing the role of communica—
tn art in general, we would examine briefly one parti-
cular type of communication that can result directly from an
IAE. All we need to do to accomplish this, is to combine the
two topics we have just discussed with our general descrip-
tion of the IAE. We may ask: How does a child learn some-
thing about him or herself through an alternative form of
communication and as the result of an IAE? Just one, of
many, possible answers might be: (1) given the assignment:
using clay as a medium, create a sculpture which expresses
the concept, capital punishment ; (2) the child discovers his
or her own feelings about the concept capital punishment ;
(3) through both the discursive thoughts he or she thinks
while deciding on the form the sculpture will take and through
the presentational forms that take shape as the child manipu-
lates the clay.
It appears that we have come full circle in answering
the question, What are the characteristics of the IAE that
might allow it to facilitate the learning of concepts? Vie
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have seen that the definition of the IAE used in this study
revolved around three component parts: (1) a kinesthetic
and/or emotional state; (2) that is in some way analogous
to the concept being learned; and (3) that occurs through
heightened sensory awareness on the part of the learner. We
have seen that the component parts of this definition grow
out of the writings of many authors: Lowenfeld and Brittain
speak of the integrated" experience; Eisner’s description
of the contextualist justification points out the possible
connection between the arts experience and concept forma-
tion; authors such as Jones and Lowen discuss the relation-
ship between emotional and kinesthetic states and learning;
and Ornstein and Gordon describe metaphoric and analogous
forms of learning. Finally, after examining some sample
integrated arts activities we have isolated three character-
istics which might allow the IAE to facilitate conceptual
learning. These characteristics are that it: (1) allows an
opportunity for perceptual cognition to occur; (2) allows an
opportunity for metaphorical modes of thinking to occur; and
(3) allows the learner to make use of alternative forms of
communication.
.
Where do we go next? Our next step is to bring together
all the bits and pieces of information that we have examined.
Our hope will be to connect them in such a way that they can
help us reasonably answer the question, Can the IAE facili-




1Exercise developed by consultant team working through
an in-service project under the auspices of Massachusetts
Council on The Arts.
2 Exercise developed by the author for use in an in-
service training project for the Bethlehem Public Schools,
Delmar, New York.
q Exercise developed by a participant in an in-service,
Integrated-Arts workshop given in Utica, New York, under the
auspices of Project Search, New York State Department of
Education ..
4 Ideas derived from an unpublished article entitled,
"A Conceptual Framework For the Use of the Arts as a Teach-
ing Vehicle," by Phyllis Krakauer and Frank Messina.
CHAPTER IV
A MODEL OF HOW THE IAE FACILITATES THE
LEARNING OF CONCEPTS
122
We have come, at last, to a point at which we must
touch ground. We have taken flight and have travelled over
much terrain. Part of our flight has been smooth, allowing
us to race quickly over large areas while still being able
to see clearly the formations below us. Other parts of our
flight have not been so smooth. Clouds of confusion have
sometimes made it difficult for us to see the places at which
some of the different formations we were studying were con-
nected, and how they interacted. In our travels we have
collected, and come to understand, many different ideas and
theories. But as I have said, it is now time for us to come
to ground; to see if those ideas and theories we have col-
lected will. allow us to fulfill our goal.
And what is that goal? I stated in the introduction to
this study that a problem existed. Many people have sup-
ported, based on intuitive feelings, the notion of using arts
activities to enhance conceptual learning and development.
Unfortunately, however, the use of arts activities in this
way has not been examined within the context of a systematic
understanding of the processes involved in conceptual
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learning and development, nor has it been critiqued based on
criteria from outside the realm of arts education.
I, cherefore, proposed that the purpose of this study
would be to ask the question, Should the IAE be used to
facilitate conceptual learning and development? I also indi-
cated that the first part of the study would address itself
to the issue of whether it is theoretically possible for
arts activities to facilitate conceptual learning and devel-
opment . The goal of our travels so far was to be able to
answer the question, Can the IAE facilitate the learning of
concepts? I believe we can, within a theoretical context,
now answer the question.
In Chapter II, we saw, after examining the nature of
concepts .and concept formation, that there was one theory
which gave us a context within which to evaluate the rela-
tive merits of any approach to facilitating the learning of
concepts. That construct was David Ausubel's theory of mean-
ingful learning. This theory allowed us to evaluate the
merits of different approaches by identifying the goal we
attempt to reach, i .e
.
,
meaningful learning, and the cri-
teria we must fulfill in order to attain that goal. Accord-
ing to Ausubel's theory, if meaningful learning is to occur,
we must facilitate learning that is nonarbitrary and substan-
tive. Nonarbitrariness implies that the new material that is
learned has some reasonable connection to material already in
the existing cognitive structure of the learner. Substantive
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implies that the learning is not merely the memorizing of a
verbal proposition. We also saw that Ausubel proposed two
kinds of advance organizers, expository and comparative,
which facilitated meaningful learning by increasing the
readiness of the student to learn.
In short, we now have a goal, meaningful learning, and
two criteria for achieving that goal, learning that is non-
arbitrary and learning that is substantive. We also have two
which function to facilitate our goal, expository
and comparative advance organizers. Therefore, we can evalu-
ate any approach to facilitating the learning of concepts on
the basis of the degree to which it fulfills either criteria,
nonarbitrariness or substantiveness, or functions in the role
of either form of advance organizer.
How effective is the use of the IAE in facilitating the
learning of concepts? To fit the approach more easily and
clearly to the model, we have isolated the three main charac-
teristics of the IAE that appear to allow it to facilitate
the learning of concepts. These three characteristics are:
(1) it allows an opportunity for perceptual cognition to
occur; (2) it allows an opportunity for metaphorical modes
of thinking to occur; and (3) it allows the learner to make
use of alternative forms of communication.
The task becomes one of matching characteristics to
criteria. To the degree that allowing perceptual cognition
to occur facilitates nonarbitrary and substantive learning,
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the use of the IAE facilitates the learning of concepts. To
the degree that allowing metaphorical modes of thinking to
occur facilitates nonarbitrary and substantive learning, the
use of the IAE facilitates meaningful learning. And, of
course, to the degree that allowing learners to use presen-
tational forms of communication facilitates nonarbitrary and
substantive learning, the use of the IAE again facilitates
the learning of concepts. In addition, to the extent that
perceptual cognition, the metaphorical modes of thinking and
presentational forms of communication can function in the
role of advance organizers, they, and therefore the IAE,
can be said to facilitate the learning of concepts.
The structure of this chapter will be based on the
attempt to connect each of the three characteristics to both
of the criteria. Therefore, there will be four sub-sections
In each of the first three, I will discuss one of the three
characteristics in terms of the degree to which it facili-
tates each of the two criteria. In the fourth sub-section,
I will present a model that will visually summarize the re-
lations between the three characteristics and the two cri-
teria .
Perceptual Cognition and Meaningful Learning
The first characteristic we will evaluate is based upon
the process of perceptual cognition. It was from the work of
Rudolph Arnheim (1969 ) that much of our discussion of percep-
tual cognition was drawn. The major thrust of Arnheim s
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discussion was that in perception we gather not only re-
flections of things, but actual generalizations about those
things. In other words, we are able to form concepts during
the perceptual phase of cognition. Kneiter also supported
that view, describing percepts and their ability to develop
into concepts. It is, I believe, through this process that
perceptual cognition might be able to facilitate nonarbi-
trariness
.
Arnheim describes two types of concepts, static and
dynamic. Static concepts allow one given moment in the life
of a concept to stand for the concept in its entirety. In
contrast, dynamic concepts identify the generality by which
a concept was held together but not at the expense of the
attributes of each individual exemplar of the concept.
Arnheim points out that dynamic concepts are strictly attached
to perceptual cognition since verbal expressions had to, by
nature, be static in quality. Verbalized concepts must
isolate a given instance that is representative of the con-
cept as a whole.
I believe that perceptual cognition contributes to non-
arbitrariness through the vehicle of the dynamic concept
.
Since nonarbitrariness is constituted through making reason-
able connections between new and existing material, imagine
the increased number of connections that can be made if the
combined attributes of all the instances included in the
dynamic concept are available for connection, as opposed to
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only the limited number available in the static concept. It
is true that not all of the attributes that define some of
the instances included in the dynamic concept faithfully re-
present the nature of the concept itself. It is also true,
however, that these non-representative characteristics may
trigger the making of connections that are potentially avail-
able but are not normally noticed if only the static concept
is used. The higher the number of connections available,
the higher the quality of those connections is likely to
be. In short, the dynamic concept, which is the domain of
perceptual cognition, might easily contribute to nonarbi-
trariness by bringing to bear more attributes that are
potentially connectable to the existing cognitive structure
than does the static concept.
To expand a little further on this topic, there is
another value of dynamic concepts. Arnheim points out that
the approach to knowing that is a result of the use of dynamic
concepts also keeps in front of us, at all times, "... con-
crete manifestations of the phenomena in which [we] are in-
terested." What better way to see the connections inherent
between a concept and one's own existing cognitive structure
than to be able to examine, with our own senses, a concrete
exemplar of that concept. As Flannery points out, concepts
removed from their sensory base are extremely difficult to
understand, and, "Tragic are the adjustments [learners] make




Maddenfort's discussion of experiencing on an imme-
diately sensuous basis is also germane to a discussion of
perceptual cognition and its relation to nonarbitrariness.
In the example he gave which dealt with seeing a chair "con-
ceptually, n rather than in its immediate sensuousness,
Maddenfort pointed up clearly how much of what we could know
about that chair was interferred with by our using a static
concept as a mediator of our experience with the chair.
Again, the more we can know about a particular chair the
more we can see the superordinate/ subordinate relations with-
in which it exists to other material in our cognitive struc-
ture .
Another way in which perceptual cognition might facili-
tate nonarbitrariness is through visual selectivity. Arnheim
points out how visual selectivity indicated the active intel-
ligence of perception. He also points out that as visual
selectivity obtains during the process of depth perception,
contextual _ inclusion is controlled. The differing amounts of
the contextual environment that are apprehended along with the
subject or concept itself must influence the relatability of
the concept to the learner’s existing cognitive structure.
Therefore, I believe, visual selectivity acts as a vehicle
through which perceptual cognition might facilitate the learn-
ing of concepts.
A final point concerning perceptual cognition and non-
arbitrariness involves the need for flexible perception.
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Arnheim has pointed out through his example of Copernicus
visualizing the movements of planets around a rotating base,
the need for flexible perception. This need is obviously
based in the fact that the more flexible the perception of a
concept, the more flexible the connection of that concept to
existing cognitive structures is likely to be, and therefore,
the more likely it is that the learning of that concept will
be nonarbitrary.
There appears to be little problem with connecting per-
ceptual cognition to substantive learning. It is the very
essence of perceptual cognition that it occurs during sensory
perception and before the concept enters verbal relations.
Since the essence of substantive learning is that it is learn-
ing that -is nonverbatim, or not merely the committing to
memory of verbal propositions, there can be no doubt that
perceptual cognition facilitates the substantive nature of
learning
.
In summary, I believe that it is reasonable to state
that perceptual cognition might facilitate the meeting of
both of the criteria for meaningful learning. I believe it
may facilitate, nonarbitrary learning through the vehicle of
dynamic concepts which allow for knowing particulars as well
as generalities, and through the vehicle of visual selectiv-
ity especially as it obtains during depth perception. I
also believe that perceptual cognition might facilitate sub-
stantive learning due to the fact that it is necessarily
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non-verbal in nature. I should now examine the relationship
between metaphorical modes of thinking and these two criter-
ia .
Metaphorical Modes of
Thinking and Meaningful Learning
In answering the question, Is it possible that meta-
phorical modes of thinking facilitate nonarbitrary learning?,
it must be remembered that a metaphor itself is the sub-
stituting of one object or thought for another to imply the
likeness of the two. If a metaphor is used experimentally,
i.e., to find out about potential metaphorical relations, we
not only imply possible likeness, but we discover other qual-
ities of -relation as well. It would seem then, that implicit
in the notion of metaphorical learning is the process of com-
paring new material, or material that is new in the sense
that it is being reexamined, with material that is already
known, or that we can say already exists within the cognitive
structure of the learner. Thus, metaphorical modes of think-
ing imply nonarbitrariness.
Perhaps this relation can be made even clearer if we
take a look at the two modes of metaphorical thinking that
are most commonly a part of an IAE. In the comparative mode,
the salient characteristics of one object or event are shown
to be the same as, or parallel to, the salient characteristics
131
of another object or event. We have already seen an example
in which a city is found to be analogous to a heart that
beats once a day. Already implied in the example is the
fact that one half of the analogy is new, or "newly realized,"
while the other half is considered to be already known. Let
us extend the example, however, from one of "pure metaphori-
cal relation, to one in which the type of metaphor that occurs
in the arts evolves. Arnheim has pointed out that in litera-
ture, metaphors, "... throw into relief a common quality and
thereby accomplish a perceptual abstraction without relin-
quishing the contexts from which the singled out quality draws
its life." We have seen in the previous sub-section that the
appropriate degree of contextual inclusion can have a positive
effect on facilitating nonarbitrariness. In the "artistic"
metaphor, then, we not only have a vehicle for learning which
implies nonarbitrary learning by its very nature, we also have
a vehicle in which the ability to facilitate nonarbitrariness
is enhanced. by the fact that both entities in the metaphor
come to the learner in contextually inclusive form, thereby
facilitating as many connections to existing material as
possible. To state that the learning that would take place
in this instance might be nonarbitrary would appear to be an
understatement
.
The other mode of metaphorical thinking that is common-
ly part of an IAE is the integrative mode. In this mode the
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learner "becomes" something else, and experiences the world
as that object would. Does this type of metaphorical learning
have a special connection to nonarbitrariness? I believe so.
The special connection comes from the obvious fact that the
learner does not really "become" anything else at all except
more open to perceiving the world in new ways. In this pro-
cess the learner brings to bear a new frame of reference.
But, of. course, this frame of reference is made up of cogni-
tive materials and dispositions he or she already possesses.
The learner allows cognitive material that he or she possess-
es but would not normally allow to come in contact with this
new material to do just that. For example, the experience
of rolling is usually only allowed to come into contact with
the cognitive material which the learner possesses that de-
fines the physical characteristics of his or her own body.
When the learner "becomes" a ball a new set of cognitive
material is allowed to join the process. Although it is not
based in reality, the cognitive material that defines the
learner's body as round is allowed to join the material that
normally defines the physical characteristics of the learner's
body in coming. into contact with the experience of rolling.
In short, more cognitive material takes part in the inter-
action and therefore the potential connections between new
and existing cognitive material increase dramatically. Once
again, given the nonarbitrariness that is implied in the
nature of metaphorical learning, and given that that quality
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is enhanced by the special characteristics of this mode of
metaphorical thought, it seems clear that nonarbitrary learn-
ing might easily occur in this situation.
We have seen that metaphorical modes of thinking are
tied to nonarbitrary learning by their nature. This is due
to the fact that in any metaphor there is one entity that is
"new" or "newly realized," and another that is known or
exists already in the cognitive structure of the learner. We
have also examined two of the four modes of metaphorical think-
ing, the two that are most commonly a part of an IAE. In
examples of both the comparative and integrative modes we saw
that these particular modes had special characteristics which
enhanced their already formidible ability to facilitate non-
arbitrary learning. Once again, I find myself concluding that
the characteristic in question, the fact that the IAE allows
for metaphorical modes of thinking to occur, does, in fact,
facilitate the meeting of the criteria in question, the non-
arbitrariness of learning.
The relation of this characteristic to substantive
learning is not nearly as clear in this instance as it was in
the case of perceptual cognition. Whereas perceptual cogni-
tion is nonverbatim or substantive by nature, the same is
not true of metaphorical modes of thinking. In fact, the
metaphor is most often thought of as a verbal comparison.
There are two points I would make in relating metapho-
rical modes of thinking to substantive learning. The first
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is that although the metaphor is usually thought of as a
verbal proposition, it need not necessarily be one. In an
activity that is an IAE, other media of expression are used
to express metaphorical relations as well. Visual shapes
and images can easily come to represent different ideas.
The images are then put into differing relationships with
each other. The learner perceives the metaphorical rela-
tions that evolve as visual concepts first and only translate
them into verbal propositions as a later step. The same can
be true of aural images, and kinesthetic sensations, etc. In
other words, metaphorical modes of thinking need not be ver-
bal modes of thinking.
The second point I would make is that if, in a given
instance,- the metaphorical mode of thinking involved is ver-
bal, it is not necessarily also nonsubstantive. The term
verbat im implies that a verbal proposition is that and
nothing more. It implies that the learner could not express
the same relevant ideas by the use of an equivalent symbol
or group of symbols. Therefore, if metaphorical modes of
thinking develop an idea for the learner which he or she can
then express in any number of different combinations of ver-
bal symbols the learning would be verbal but also substan-
tive .
We see that metaphorical modes of thinking do not, by
nature, facilitate substantive learning. However, based on
the fact that all metaphorical learning is not verbal, and
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the fact that all metaphorical learning that is verbal is
not always nonsubstantive, it at least appears that meta-
phorical modes of thinking do not prohibit and may possibly
facilitate substantive learning.
In the end, what can we say of the relation between
metaphorical modes of thinking and the two criteria for mean-
ingful learning? In my opinion, the characteristic in ques-
tion, that the IAE allows for metaphorical modes of thinking
to occur, might easily allow for the nonarbitrariness of
learning. As for the second criteria, however, I can only
see that the characteristic does not theoretically prohibit,
and may possibly facilitate, the substantiveness of learning.
Presentational Forms of
Communication and Meaningful Learning
The final characteristic of the IAE that we will relate
to substantive and nonarbitrary learning is that it allows
the learner to make use of presentational forms of communica-
tion. I believe that whereas perceptual cognition can be
clearly tied to both nonarbitrary and substantive learning,
and metaphorical modes of thinking can be tied to nonarbi-
trary but not necessarily to substantive learning, alterna-
tive forms of communication can be tied to substantive learn-
ing, but I am not certain of the degree to which they
facilitate nonarbitrary learning.
Presentational forms of communication are described by
Langer as non-discursive in nature, meaning that they grasp
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concepts and thoughts simultaneously and all-at-once, rather
than in the one-at-a-time fashion that verbal forms of com-
munication rely on. What does this imply about the relation
between presentational forms of communication and nonarbi-
trary learning?
The major point I would make is that since presenta-
tional forms allow for the communication of information that
is not conveyable by discursive forms of communication, the
opportunity for nonarbitrary learning is enhanced. This is
due to the fact that there are more types of information
available to serve as either new or existing cognitive mater-
ial. This is exemplified in learning that occurs as the
result of experiences with music. Music has been identified
by Langer as the form of symbolization that is most highly
presentational in nature (Langer, 1942, p. 9). Therefore,
only information carried to the learner directly through the
music itself is information that would not normally be avail-
able to the learner if he or she depended solely on discur-
sive forms of information. As in any case in which more
information is available to the learner, we could make a case
that nonarbitrariness is facilitated since more connections
between new and existing material would be potentially avail-
able. I would warn, however, that although, in the most
theoretical sense the argument may be considered valid, we are
not certain of anything that indicates to us that the type of
information transmitted to us is likely to be able to connect
to existing cognitive material. Therefore, it is possible
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that while the characteristic does not prohibit nonarbitrary
learning, it may not facilitate it either. We are not certain
of the degree to which presentational forms of communication
facilitate nonarbitrary learning.
If that is so, on what grounds do we say that presen-
tational forms of communication might allow the IAE to
facilitate conceptual learning? I believe that we can say
this on the grounds that information that is important to
the learner in forming concepts may well be conveyed through
presentational forms of communication. Learning that results
from this is, and must always be, substantive in nature. In
other words, important learning that occurs through IAEs may
be based on information that is carried through presentation-
al forms of communication, and one of the most important
characteristics of that learning is that it is always sub-
stantive in nature.
A Model of How the IAE
Facilitates the Learning of Concepts
In the final subsection of this chapter I will propose
a model of how. the IAE facilitates the learning of concepts.
It is, however, only a tentative model, one built on what I
have discovered about this process. I am sure that in the
future I may alter many features of the model, or even its
basic structure. The purpose of the model is only to sum-
marize, in visual form, the ideas which I have already
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discussed throughout this study. This seems, to me, an
appropriate form of summary, given the content of the study.
The model is comprised of five levels (see Figure 1).
The upper and lowermost levels represent the components of
the basic question to which the model, and indeed the whole
first part of this study, address themselves, Can the IAE
facilitate conceptual learning?' The top level of the model
represents the IAE itself
,
and the lowest level represents
the learning of concepts.
The second level up from the bottom of the model repre-
sents the operationalized version of the learning of concepts,
namely, meaningful learning . This form is employed because
it supplies us with criteria which we may use in evaluating
approaches which attempt to facilitate conceptual learning.
Which brings us to the third and fourth, or innermost, levels
of the model. The third level represents the criteria which
we must fulfill if we are to achieve our goal of meaningful
learning, i.e., the learning of concepts . It is comprised
of two criteria, nonarbitrariness and substantiveness. The
fourth level represents those characteristics of the IAE
which might allow us to fulfill those criteria and therefore
attain the goal of meaningful learning. The three charac-
teristics that comprise this level are represented by the
processes which they involve, perceptual cognition, meta-







Figure 1: A Model of How The







The relationships that exist between the members of the
third and fourth levels are represented by the lines drawn
from each characteristic to each criteria. Perceptual cog-
nition, it is indicated, has a positive relation to both non-
arbitrariness and substantiveness. It relates positively to
nonarbitrariness through the vehicle of dynamic concepts and
visual selectivity. It relates positively to substantiveness
by virtue of its nature, which is essentially non-verbal.
Metaphorical modes of thinking, on the other hand, are
shown to relate positively to only one of the critera. They
relate positively to nonarbitrariness because their essential
nature is reflective of a relation between new material and
already existing material. The comparative and integrative
modes are also shown to be especially well-suited to facili-
tating nonarbitrary learning. However, the relation between
metaphorical modes of thinking and substantiveness is not
necessarily so positive. Metaphorical modes of thinking do
not prohibit, but may not necessarily facilitate substantive
learning
.
Alternative forms of communication also relate differ-
ently to the two criteria. They relate positively to sub-
stantiveness, based, as in perceptual cognition, on their
nature which is essentially non-verbal. This is not true of
their relation to nonarbitrariness. It is unclear from the
material discussed in this study, to what degree alternative
forms of communication relate positively to nonarbitrariness.
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It is clear that they increase the potential numbers of con-
nections that might be made between new and existing cognitive
material. However, the nature of the information carried by
presentational forms of communication may, or may not, deter
that information from connecting with already existing cogni-
tive material.
Consequently, my answer to the question, Is it theore-
tically possible for the Integrated Arts Experience to




THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF
EDUCATION AND THE ROLE OF THE IAE:
EDUCATION AND ECSTACY
In 1968, George Leonard published a work entitled,
Education and Ecstacy
. The book was widely-read and well-
received. It stands as one of the earlier works that com-
prise the educational reform movement of the late 1960’s and
early ’70s. The book is particularly interesting because
it views education both from a sociological and anthro-
pological perspective. It discusses the role that education
plays in the development of any species.
Obviously, if Leonard successfully discusses problems
of such wide and differing scope, he must define education
in equally broad terms. He does just that when he states:
"To learn is to change. Education is a process that changes
learners" (p. 18). In other words, any process that changes
the learner, either in the short or long run, can be consi-
dered "educative." We wil] better understand the applica-
tions and implications of this definition as we look more
closely at some of Leonard's major points. However, we get
a hint of the attitude toward education that Leonard brings
to his discussion by noting what he says concerning the
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rapidly changing conditions we fac e
.
Thl f
sltuation, despite attempts at drawing
Parallels
,
cannot be viewed simply as'more o f the same. It is something entirely new,calling for entirely new responses. What is moreimportant, it seems to demand a new kind of humanbeing—one who
. is not driven by narrow competition
eager acquisition and aggression, but who spendsms -Life in the joyful pursuit of learning. Such
a human being, I. feel, will result not so muchthrough changed ideologies or economic systems asthrough changes in the process I have called 'edu-
cation.’ The idea of education as the most effec-
tive human change agent is by no means new. But I
tried to broaden and simplify education’s
definition, to expand its domain, to link it with
the new technology and to alter the relationship
between the educator and the learner. As a chief
ingredient in all this, as well as an alternative
to the old reinforcers, I have named ’ecstacy'--
joy, ananda, the ultimate delight (p. 230).
Keeping in mind Leonard’s view of education, I will
examine the degree to which the use of the IAE might enhance
our prospects of reaching some of the goals that Leonard
sets for education. To facilitate that examination, I have
identified four major goals for education that I believe
accurately reflect Leonard’s views. The goals are stated
in a form which will allow us to use them as standards by
which to evaluate the use of the IAE. Given the accepta-
bility and validity of the goals themselves, which, of
course, it is the perogative of each reader to judge, the use
of the IAE can be considered positive to the degree to which
it facilitates the attaining of each of those goals. The
four goals are: (1) Education will encourage learners to be
responsive to their environments; (2) Education will
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encourage learners to realize as much of their potential as
possible; (3) Education will discourage detachment on the
part of the learners; and (4) Education will be ecstatic.
The chapter will be divided into four sub-sections, each
dealing with one of the four goals I have identified, and
m each sub-section we will look first at Leonard's views
concerning the goals, and then at the role the use of the
IAE might play in attaining the goal.
Goal No. 1: Education Will Hake
Learners More Responsive to Their Environments
Leonard has stated: "Learning involves interaction be-
tween the learner and his environment, and its effectiveness
relates to the frequency, variety and intensity of the in-
teraction" (p. 19). He also indicates that most students
realize that the symbolic tricks they are expected to learn
have little to do with their own deeper feelings or anything
in the here and now. I believe, from these and many other
comments, that Leonard would hope that education would en-
courage learners to be responsive to their environments .
Leonard believes that much of education is geared
toward making students avoid contact with their environment.
Almost everyone who has been educated in America would pro-
bably agree with the fact that we are told we must go to
school now so that we can reap the benefits later. As
Leonard puts it: "The activity that masquerades under the
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ancient and noble name of 'education 1 actually seems to serve
as a sort of ransom to the future, a down payment toward
getting ahead' --or at least toward not falling behind" (p. 10).
Of course, the attitude in and of itself is enough to take
learners out of the here and now. They come to view each
activity, each exercise, not for what is to be felt, or seen
or tasted or experienced; they come to view it in terms of
what is to be learned, and learning is something that is
used in the future, not in the present. The goal of the
activity lies, then, not in the present, but in the future.
No wonder the small child, not yet fully enculturated and
without an inclination for delayed reward, has trouble stay-
ing with the problems of memorizing times tables.
Another way in which education usually manages to
remove the learner from the here and now is through the sub-
stitution of the word for the experience. Historian Arnold
Toynbee, in discussing the decline of Chinese and Roman
Empires, explains that one factor in the decline of those
empires was the extension of formal education from the pri-
vileged few to a wider circle. In the process, according to
Toynbee, education degenerated into formal education in book
learning and became divorced from a spontaneous apprentice-
ship for life. In fact, the art of playing with words became
a substitute for the art of living. This, of course, is
still true today. Students still endure lectures and audio-
visual displays, while they seldom have a chance to experi-
ence much that is new. Perhaps the real here and now for the
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student is that he or she will be consistently denied a
chance for sensorial experience with the objects and con-
cepts that are to be learned.
There have, of course, been attempts to alter this
relation. John Dewey, perhaps the most well-known reformer
in this area, sought to unify education and life. Dewey
recognized that education is a process, a part of life, not
a preparation for future living. Unfortunately, Dewey’s
attempts were aborted when the ideas and programs he envi-
sioned were taken to extremes by disciples who did not really
understand his intensions. However, that does not make the
valuing of present experiences for themselves invalid, and
Dewey’s ideas retain their importance for us.
It is Leonard's hope that learners will come to expe-
rience in the here and now not only those learnings that are
part of an activity structured by a "teacher," but all learn-
ings, no matter who, or what, the "teacher" is. He states:
"Ho environment can strongly affect a person unless it is
strongly interactive. To be interactive, the environment
must be responsive, that is, must provide relevant feedback
to the learner" (p. 39). But the learner can receive that
feedback at many different times and in many different ways
if only he or she is open to experiencing the environment in
the proper manner.
Leonard points out to us that there are many natural
teachers. For example, the human organism is educated by the
He states:
inexorable day-night cycle of a rotating planet.
.
.
Current research on what happens to those whojet east or west across several time zones only con-firms what many travelers have suspected since thejetliners began to fly: interaction with the ter-
restrial twenty-four-hour cycle shapes many aspects
ot our being
. into resonant cycles. Functions that
range from digestion to dreaming, from sex to sweat-ing need recycling after a quick hop from New Yorkto Teheran. We have yet to know precisely thediurnal or nocturnal patterns of hormonal and other
systems.
.
Perhaps breaking prior conditions and
longitudinal place will help us better understand
the human mechanism (p. 56 ).
Words also have their effects on us. Aldous Huxley
once estimated that seventy percent of human existence is
dominated by verbal relations. We have already seen how
authors like Maddenfort, Arnheim and Larger describe the
difference between sensuous perception and experiencing that
is mediated by verbal concepts. Leonard points out that it
is possible, if only momentarily, to. escape from language
itself. He refers us to Huxley’s experiments in "nonverbal
humanities" and indicates that they revealed the rich world
that waits for us behind the screen of words.
According to Leonard, the effects of these natural
teachers are grossly underestimated. By affecting our learn-
ing, they affect the shape of our existence, even of our-
selves. A child learns to operate in an environment. But
what if that environment changes? Leonard states: "Such
’natural developments' require interaction between the or-
ganism (baby) and the environment. If the properties of the
environment were different, if gravity, light, inertia, air.
sound, and the like were not as they are, then learning would
be different, and the resulting organism, though clothed in
a. human body, would be different indeed" (pp. 44-46)
This brings us back to Leonard’s original statement:
"Learning involves interaction between the learner and his
environment, and its effectiveness relates to the frequency,
variety and intensity of the interaction" (p. 19). We also
come to the question: To what degree does the use of the
IAE facilitate learners being responsive to their environ-
ment? We are interested in the relation between the IAE and
the responsiveness to the environment, and interaction plays
a significant part. To answer the question, however, we
need to remember that the IAE is defined as an activity which
induces in the learner an emotional and/or kinesthetic state
which is in some way analogous to the concept being taught
and which occurs through heightened sensory awareness on the
part of the learner. I believe that there are two ways in
which the IAE might facilitate learners being responsive to
their environment, both of which we have discussed in pre-
vious chapters.
What have these things to do with responsiveness to the
environment? The objects and events that the learner per-
ceives sensorially during the IAE are, first and foremost,
part of the learner’s environment. It is because these ob-
jects and events are part of the learner’s environment that
he or she is being asked to learn about them at all.
fore, as the learner takes part in an IAE he or she is already
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responding to at least part of the environment.
But, of course, what Leonard implies goes much further
than that. He is asking that the learner be constantly
aware of the environment and of the interactions he or she
has with that environment. Although I speak without the
weight of empirical evidence behind me, I believe that the
regular use of the IAE encourages that behavior in learn-
^ f ee l that every time a learner perceives and operates
cognitively on a perceptual plane, it increases the chances
that he or she will operate in that way at another time.
The more the learner can come to feel comfortable with per-
ceptual cognition, the more likely it is that he or she will
come to use it. I believe also that concomitant with the use
of perceptual cognition is a disposition to perceive larger
and. larger amounts of the environmental context as potentially
involved in any problem. As this happens the learner becomes
more and more responsive to the environment in general.
The second process by which the IAE might facilitate
learners being responsive to their environment is mentioned
by Leonard himself. It has to do with the process of inter-
action. We have seen in Chapter II how Piaget described
learning in terms of interactions between the learner and the
learned. He uses the terms, assimilat ion and accommodation
to describe, first how a learner takes in new knowledge, and
secondly, how the learner is changed by that knowledge. We
also saw in Chapter 2 that these processes were subsumed in
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Ausubel's theoretical, construct of meaningful learning
. Since
we have seen that it was reasonable to believe that the IAE
might facilitate meaningful learning, it is also reasonable
that we assume that the IAE might encourage interaction be-
tween the learner and the learned. Though I speak again
without the support of empirical evidence, I feel that this
process of interaction can be expanded to involve the envi-
ronment as a whole as the result o'f regular IAEs. Again my
belief is based on the idea that as perceptual cognition be-
comes more and more a part of the cognitive arsenal the
learner uses in attempting to understand the world, his or
her limits of environmental context expand. Therefore more
and more things in the environment are seen as applicable
to the solving of a given problem and as a result the learn-
er interacts with more and more of the environment.
In short, through increased sensory awareness and
through the process of interaction that is subsumed in the
notion of meaningful learning, the IAE does have the poten-
tial to significantly increase the probability that education
will encourage learners to be responsive to their environ-
ments.
Goal No. 2: Education Will Encourage Learners
To Realize As Much of Their Potential As Possible
I have stated before that Education and Ecstacy is
particularly interesting because it looks at education from
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both a sociological and anthropological perspective. Leonard
discusses education as it relates to the development of a
species and to the needs of society. The major thrust of
this discussion is that Leonard believes we can, and must,
realize more of our potential if we are to survive as a spe-
cies. Therefore, I believe that it is accurate to say that
Leonard hopes that education will encourage learners to
realize as much of their potential as possible
.
To understand his position, we must follow Leonard's
argument in this field very carefully. Based on his view
that to learn is to change, Leonard begins: "All behavior,
including that commonly called 'instinctive' or 'special-
specific' is learned. In the lower organisms it is learned
not so much during the life of any individual of the species
as during the life-span of the species itself" (p. 65 ).
How does learning span the lifetime of numerous gener-
ations of one species? To answer this question we must
first refamiliarize ourselves with two substances, DNA and
RNA. DNA (dexoyribonucleic acid) is contained in every
living cell, including brain cells. It contains the complex
genetic molecules that pass along the blueprints of any
species. RNA (ribonucleic acid) contains somewhat similar
molecules. These molecules serve as messengers for the DNA
informing the proteins of the body what and how to build.
But RNA, it seems, also serves another function. The RNA
molecule is a storehouse of information. It functions as if
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it were a microscopic library. Leonard summarizes
Learning involves memory, that is, the stor-
^ ? ln carnation. Man’s large, complex, yetunified centra] nervous system can store greatamounts of new information during the individual's
An^me udnd Can revamP information already stored.All the brain cells, as well as the material be-tween the cells, have their own ways of responding
as we have seen, may be traced back to thin, chain-ike molecules of RNA or DMA, which serve as tiny
rererence libraries, holding incredibly great
amounts of coded information. The DNA
,
passeddown from our ancestors
,
contains information
about the brain cell’s basic structure and compo-
sition.... The RNA serves as a messenger from the
DNA and a template upon which the protein of the
cell may build. During learning, the RNA also
helps modify the brain cell's composition so as
to change its way of behaving. It may be said that
a record of our lifetime’s learning is kept in
those tiny chainlike molecules (p. 66).
He continues:
We call species-long learning ’adaptation' or,
when the species shifts in physical form so that we
recognize it as something separate, ’evolution.' ~~K
record of these changes, this education, is kept in
the DNA, the microscopic libraries of learning that
are passed down from generation to generation.
Whether in earth worm, robin or man, the chemical
scheme, the language in the molecules, is the same
(p. 67).
We see, then, that Leonard views evolution as the edu-
cation of a species. Thusly, a species is educated when a
predator kills off members of the species with a certain
characteristic. Over time, th<rt characteristic disappears
from the species altogether, and the species can be said to
have been educated.
What does this have to do with the learning that suppo
sedly goes on in schools? According to Leonard, species edu
cation can be said to follow. the same laws of functioning
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that we follow in programmed learning. He indicates that
some species succeed in learning from their environments
while others fail for the same reason that some students
succeed in school while others fail. If the learning steps
are too great, if the environment changes too fast, then
the student cannot learn (adapt or evolve) and the species
may perish, the child fail. In an extremely stable envi-
ronment, on the other hand, the species may survive but it
may hardly change. The -same is true of course, for the
student
.
One example of this is the navigational feat accom-
plished by the green turtle of certain South Atlantic colo-
nies. Each year, the green turtle navigates 1,400 miles
without a landmark, from Brazil to Ascension Island, a tiny
dot on the open ocean. How can they do this? At least one
theory holds that Ascension is the last out-cropping of what
once was a vaster land mass. Perhaps when the green turtle
first evolved, the Great Atlantic Ridge, now sunken, humped
a thousand-mile-long spine out of the sea, making a target
nearly impossible to miss. As the land mass gradually sank
beneath the water, generation after generation of green
turtle learned finer and finer positional discrimination.
They learned in order to insure survival of the species.
They could learn because the process was gradual enough
(p. 69-70).
Have humans learned in this way? Host certainly. VJe
,
as a species, have our automatic behaviors. But compared to
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other animal families they are certainly unimpressive. No,
it is m another realm that we, as a species, have come to
excell. It is in the realm of intragenerat ional learning.
Leonard states:
.
The ancient learning of the species called
man is ^passed down in the cleverly comprehensive
code or the.DNA molecules. A key message in the
code for this species may be summarized as follows:
. Construct now an organism that will do most ofits learning during its individual lifetime.'
From this, the organism derives its very essence.
All the. other particularities that have been cited
to distinguish man from animal—upright stance,
opposable thumb, massive brain--may be viewed as a
means to this end (p. 71 ).
Given the relatively low degree of learning carried in
DMA by humans, how is it that we come to learn such similar
things? Does not learning within the lifetime imply a tre-
mendous variance in the behavior of each species member?
Leonard indicates that our present automatic responses are
passed down, not so much by DNA as by an agency that in some
ways seems equally rigid and repetitive. That agency is
society
.
Society has many subtle ways of controlling our learn-
ing. In preliterate times much of its effect was carried
through the vehicles of epics, rituals and mores. But
whether social learning is stored in song of a people or on
shelves of a library, each human individual draws upon a
learning program that goes back many centuries. Leonard
states: "In these programs may be found the 'nature' of
man. All those writers who have delineated 'human nature’
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(and note that the term itself has a pessimistic limiting
ting to it) have actually been writing about the nature of
human societies” (p. 72).
But, as the above implies, society is more than a
carrier of information. It actually sets the limits on the
kinds and quality of learning that individuals will make.
To better understand this phenomenon we must look at the
most recent epoch in the development of the human species,
the epoch referred to by Leonard as Civilization
. The agri-
cultural revolution is seen as the beginning of the epoch.
Prior to the agricultural revolution, according to Leonard,
humans were ultimate learners. The human as hunter was
totally involved with his or her environment. Humans
learned constantly, and this was facilitated by the imme-
diate feedback they received concerning their actions. A
new weapon worked or didn't work. A hunting strategy ended
in feast or hunger. Each person grew wiser as the hunters
never stopped learning (p. 73-74).
But all this changed with the agricultural revolution.
That revolution was based on the principle of delayed reward.
How difficult it must have been for the hunter to work and
plow and plant, only to wait months before reaping the bene-
fits. How was this incredible change from hunter to farmer
and later merchant, cobbler, statesman, accomplished? Accord-
ing to Leonard, it came with the first large assemblages of
people, cities. But the principle that made workers plant
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and wait was not delayed reward, but immediate punishment.
Leonard states of the educational attributes of the whip:
"And its teaching may be summed up in the demand, often en-
forced on penalty of death, that each human individual
develop only a fragment of his potential abilities. That
humans could respond even to this negative education con-
stitutes high tribute to their adaptability as learners"
(p. 76).
It was the whip, then, that built the pyramids and the
Great Wall of China. But the whip is very expensive in terms
of the man-power needed to make its presence felt. If so-
ciety was to accomplish its goals, often at the expense of
the individual, a more efficient system would have to be de-
veloped. And so, according to Leonard, society "invented"
reason
. Leonard states:
The invention of ’reason,’ for example, was
an ingenious way of internalizing the whip, for
the concept itself comes into being only as sepa-
rate from and opposed to feelings, emotions,
impulse. Too often, indeed, such terms as 'con-
science,' 'dignity,' 'stoicism,' 'heroism,' 'honor,'
or even 'glory' have constituted ultimately inde-
finable variations on a single theme: man's
endeavor to act and speak in a manner aversive to
him without the prod of external punishment. During
the entire period of Civilization, a large measure,
perhaps a majority, of an individual's education
was devoted to teaching him how to be less than he
could be and to perform this feat with the aid of
no external taskmaster whatever (p. 76).
Why did society need to gain control over people. So
that people would function as cogs in the social machine.
Certainly much has been gained in terms of technology,
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control of environment, etc., through this means. But the
price has been paid by the individual. Leonard believes that
during the period of Civilization it was societies that
learned. The conditions under which they learned imposed,
in effect, a moratorium on the full development of individual
learning (p. 78).
Which brings us back to the goal which is the focal
point of this sub-section: education will encourage learn-
ers to realize as much of their potential as possible. To
what degree does the use of the IAE facilitate the attaining
on this goal? To answer this question I would like to exa-
mine one more point that Leonard makes. He indicates that
it is precisely those people who, for whatever reason, have
operated outside Civilization’s structures who have kept
learning alive across the centuries. Leonard describes these
people as rogues and identifies four types of rogues:
(1) the ordinary rogue or rascal, the adventurer, the picaro
;
(2) the radical technologist; (3) the mystic; and (4) the
artist
.
It is, of course, the artist who concerns us here.
Leonard believes that the more highly specialized and re-
pressed a society becomes, the more it needs art as a separ-
ate category. It serves as a place that is safe for whole-
ness, for feelings and for learning. He continues:
In the meantime, the rogue-artist provides us one
of the best learning programs to be found in the




inter-play between discipline andfreedom, contending with the limitations of hismaterials yet never failing to find (if he is atrue art is ) that the materials are less limitingthan was previously thought. He reveals for usinhis way of working, what the Indian mysticSri Aurobmdo called the soul’s distrust of all
absolutes. He is compelled toward the particu-lar, the place, the moment. 'Art does not genera-lize and classify,’ writes Suzanne Langer; 'art
sets forth the individuality of forms which dis-
course, being essentially general, has to suppress.
This sense of life is always new, infinitely com-
plex, therefore infinitely variable in its possible
expressions' (p. 98).
We see, then, that Leonard recognizes the value of sen-
sory perception and experience as we have discussed it
throughout this study. He states of the artist:
The artist revives in us the senses and feelings
and aspects of being that Western Civilization, in
its pell-mell pursuit of the purely verbal-symbolic-
conceptual, has caused many of us .quite to neglect
in the educational endeavor. He shows us how to
explore the sensory universe. He maps for us the
many roads to delight (p. 98).
To what degree does the use of the IAE encourage
learners to realize as much of their potential as possible.
I believe we can say, initially, that to the degree that the
IAE facilitates artistic experiences, the IAE allows the
learner to experience all the ways of knowing that Leonard
attributes to the art ist-as-rogue . Does the IAE facilitate
artistic experiences? Although the question is the topic
of an entire study in and of itself, I believe that we can
assume of an activity which is based on sensory awareness,
which allows for manipulation of materials, and which often
calls for internal and/or external communication of
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subjective material, there is a strong probability that that
ivitiy will often facilitate artistic experiences.
I believe further, that whether an IAE is "artistic"
or not, students who are learning through perceptual cogni-
tion, metaphorical modes of thinking and presentational
modes of communication, are exercising more of their poten-
tial than are students who have not gained access to these
modes of cognitive functioning.
The aspect in which I believe the IAE plays no signi-
ficant role in encouraging learners to realize as much of
their potential as possible is volitional and societal in
nature. The IAE is an approach which gives the learner
greater access to his or her potential. However, it is the
will of society, transmitted to the student through the
teacher, that will determine whether or not the student sees
fit to realize that potential. If learners are instructed,
through any one of many subtle mechanisms, that their func-
tion is to fill a role in society and to develop only enough
of their potential to fill that role successfully, they will
not realize their full potential no matter how available it
is made to them through the IAE and other approaches. If,
on the other hand, learners are encouraged by society, again
through the teacher, to be the most fully involved learners
(changers) they can be, the IAE stands ready as a technique
that might help them in their efforts.
Goal No. 3: Education Will
Discourage Detachment on the Part of Learners
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I have spoken at length of the positive attributes of
responsiveness to the environment and full realization of
potential. It seems clear that this is what Leonard hopes
students would achieve. But if that is the hoped-for goal,
what is the present condition? What do students do now? It
is possible to describe this present condition merely in
terms of the lack of the positive attributes Leonard hopes
for: students are non-responsive to their environment;
students do not realize their full potential. Leonard, how-
ever, goes a step further. He describes the present condi-
tion as one in which students become detached; from their
environments and, more importantly, from themselves. There-
fore, I believe it is accurate to say that Leonard would
hope that education would discourage detachment on the part
of learners .
In discussing this problem, Leonard begins by pointing
out that we should be glad that schools generally fail in
their present task. The task is to teach a few tricks and
otherwise limit the student’s possibilities, narrow his or
her perceptions and bring the individual's career as a learn-
er (changer) to an end. He continues: Such a task may have
seemed necessary in the precarious fragmented society of the
past. During that period individuals as components had to
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prop up the social machine. Leonard concludes by indicating
that he believes this type of educating will no longer suf-
fice, even at the lowest level of survival. If we do not
change our educative process, he believes, the very existence
of our species will be in jeopardy. He summarizes: "It is
the basic premise of this book, however, that the highly
^-^^-^nact ive
,
regenerative, technological society now emerg-
ing will work best, indeed will require something akin to
mass genius, mass creativity, and lifelong learning" (p. 115)
And what stands in the way of that mass creativity,
etc., detachment. Detachment is the process whereby the indi
vidual losses contact with his or her own feelings, needs,
or wants. Our society has often called for this detachment
from the self in order to allow the learner to fulfill his
or her function in the social machine. One way we do that
is to substitute proficiency or skill for active experience.
Leonard states:
Concentrat ion on technical proficiency has become
one of the very best ways to avoid awareness of
self. The swordsman in a duel or the jet pilot
in a dogfight generally is more concerned with
his technique than with the survival of his own
physical person. Detachment from self reaches
an extreme in the test pilot. Facing imminent
de^.th, his interest remains focused on his flight
instruments. Millions have heard the voices of
astronauts (test pilots all), calm and mechanical
in the face of epic dangers. Courage? Yes, but
also detachment, divorce from the self (p. 123).
Another way society has managed to encourage this de-
tachment of the self is through external reward. As Leonard
puts it
,
piling up honors, whether tangible or intangible,
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has often had the effect of divorcing the student from his
or her own feelings. In this case a person's worth is
measured by things outside him or herself.
We saw in Chapter III, that many people consider the
mental process of abstraction as a withdrawal from direct
experience. Arnheim pointed out to us the danger inherent
in this view. In addition, he points out that detachment is
also a result of this withdrawal from direct experience. He
states:
The indirectness of relation leads easily
enough to a partial or complete detachment from the
objects of these activities. The salesgirl, with
the merchandise right in her hands, may "think of
it only as a means of making sales, a lawyer may
be absorbed by a purely formal play of fitting a
given case to its legal precedents; the teacher
is tempted to lose, in the transmission of textbook
data, the sense of what these data are about. This
harmful alienation occurs in people largely con-
cerned with things that stand for other things. It
is a pathological detachment (Arnheim, 1969, p. 203—
204 ) .
Whereas Arnheim discusses detachment from objects and
events and Leonard discusses detachment from the self, I be-
lieve the two are both results of the same process. That
process is the withdrawal from direct experience. We do not
directly experience either the object we look at or the feel-
ings we have. Both become mediated by verbal concepts.
And so, as we ask the question, To what degree does
the use of the IAE discourage detachment on the part of the
learner?, I believe the answer is obvious. In both Chap-
ters III and IV, we spoke of dynamic concepts, the concepts
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that Arnheim proposed as a means of cognition that did not
withdraw from direct experience. We saw how static concepts,
the counterpart of dynamic concepts, gave us learning that
was stripped of its sensorial base, and Flannery pointed
out to us the disadvantage of such "castrated" concepts. We
also saw how dynamic concepts played a role in facilitating
meaningful learning, by allowing the learner to experience
more of the particularity involved in a concept, thereby
increasing the potential connections of the new material to
existing material in the learner’s cognitive structure.
All of this can be considered a result of direct ex-
perience. Direct experience discourages detachment, on the
part of the learner, from the external world of objects and
the internal v/orld of feelings. We will see more clearly,
in Chapter VI, how the IAE can help the learner be more aware
of his or her own feelings, needs or wants. But I believe
it is reasonable to say, based on the process of perceptual
cognition in general and on dynamic concepts in particular,
that the IAE might easily discourage detachment on the part
of the learner.
Goal No. 4: Education Will Be Ecstatic
I indicated in a quotation at the beginning of this
chapter that Leonard has stated: "As a chief ingredient in
all this [a new view of education], as well as an alternative
to the old reinforcers, I have named ecstacy..."
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(parenthetical statement added) (p. 230). It seems clear
from this, and from Leonard's work in its entirety, that he
would hope that education would be ecstatic
.
Early in the work he states: "What then is the purpose,
the goal of education? A large part of the answer may well
be what men of this civilization have longest feared and most
desired: the achievement of moments of ecstacy" (p. 17 ).
Leonard believes that the "new” educators will become explicit
m the pursuit of the ecstatic moment as they lose their fear
of delight. He also believes that .at its best, its most effec-
tiveness, the moment of learning is a moment of delight. Is
this true? Does Leonard know of any information on which to
base this belief? He states:
Do discipline and mastery of technique stand in oppo-
sition to freedom self-expression and the ecstatic
moment? Most Western educators have acted as if they
did. Strange, when there exist so many models of
the marriage between the two. Take the artistic en-
deavor: the composer discovers that the soul of
creation transcends the body of form only when form
is his completely. The violinist arrives at the sub-
lime only through utter mastery of technique. The
instruments of living that are now coming into our
hands--rich, responsive and diverse--require mastery.
The process of mastery itself can be ecstatic, lead-
ing to delight that transcends mastery (p. 17-18).
Unfortunately we have not, as a society, come to see
that marriage of mastery and ecstacy. We often believe that
ecstacy is an inward-directed experience. Leonard points out:
The notion that ecstacy is mainly an inward-directed
experience testifies to our distrust of our own
society, of the outer environment we have created
for ourselves. Actually, the varieties of ecstacy
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are limitless





^Hty of . dellght in every form of learn-i g He will realize that solving an elegant
mathematical problem and making love are different
classes m the same order of things, sharing com-mon ec stacy (p. 40-41).
If this does not happen, if learning is not ecstatic, what is
the result? When joy is not present, the effectiveness of the
learning process falls until the human being is operating
hesitatingly, grudgingly, fearfully at only a tiny fraction
of his or her potential.
But what do we know of ecstacy as Leonard defines it?
Leonard himself would have us start with three negative state-
ments. First, " Ecstacy is not necessarily opposed to reason "
(p. 231). But, on the other hand, it may help us to better
understand reason by connecting it to its missing element--
emotion. Secondly, " Ecrstacy is not necessarily opposed to
order " (p. 231). It may, however, help us to achieve a more
natural order than one imposed upon us by fear and aggression.
If people are allowed to be what they can be and what they
want to be, there may evolve an order that is balanced and
natural. "Ecstacy is implicated in changing not the quantity,
but the quality of order" (p. 231). And finally, " Ecstacy is
neither immoral nor moral in itself " (p. 231). Ecstacy is a
condition. If it is fostered by people of ill-will, it can
function immorally. If, on the other hand, it is used for
human purposes, it obtains a moral quality.
And finally, we move again to the question of relation.
To what degree does the use of the IAE facilitate education
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that is ecstatic? I believe the answer to the question lies
in identifying the underlying process in ecstatic learning.
Leonard is not exceedingly clear in defining "ecstacy" and,
therefore, my view is colored by my own preconceptions. How-
ever, I believe that what Leonard describes as ecstatic learn-
ing, is similar to what I have described as intuitive knowing.
Leonard himself speaks of the moment when things become sud-
denlY clear to us. I believe what he is describing is the
"intuitive leap." If that is so, then yes, the IAE does, at
least partially, facilitate ecstatic learning. It does so
through the vehicle of metaphorical modes of thinking.
Ornstein described this experience for us when he talked about
the type of thinking that occurs in the right cerebral hemi-
sphere.
There is, however, another connection I feel obliged to
make between ecstatic learning and the IAE. I use the term
obliged
,
because to make the connection I must refer to an
idea which I feel ill-qualified to speak of. That idea is
the aesthetic experience .
The aesthetic experience has been the topic of much
discourse. Theoreticians have attempted to describe it,
analyze it, and identify it. It has proved a difficult sub-
ject. Having not studied the aesthetic experience per se, I
would feel some discomfort in stating that the aesthetic
experience
,
as it has been described by some authors, is
similar or parallel to the ecstatic moment . There are,
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however, some similar characteristics between the two, as far
as I can tell, and I feel I would be remiss in not mentioning
them.
First, as I have already mentioned, there is the intui-
tive leap. The "aha!" that I believe is a part of the ecsta-
tic moment certainly has its counter-part in the aesthetic
experience. Many authors describe the moment at which the
interplay between the materials the artist is using, and the
conscious and unconscious thought of the artist, produces a
sudden shift to a new level of understanding.
Secondly, there is the period of preparation that is
essential to both experiences. No sudden shift in knowledge
and understanding can occur without a period in which the
mind and the senses, either consciously or unconsciously,
manipulate the cognitive material prior to understanding it.
And finally, there are the integrative effects that
the experience has on the participant. Leonard alludes to
these effects throughout his work. He implies that as a
result of ecstatic moments people will function more fully,
feel better about themselves and face the difficulties of life
more effectively. Janie Rhyne, just to mention one author,
describes these same effects as the result of aesthetic expe-
riences in her work, The Gesralt Art Experience (1973).
I find it possible to connect the IAE to education that
is ecstatic. The connections I see, however, are not solidly




In evaluating the degree to which the IAE might play a
part in facilitating some of the outcomes from education that
Leonard appears to value, I formulated four goals which I
believe accurately reflect Leonard’s views, and then dis-
cussed the role of the IAE in attaining each of those goals.
I believe we are justified in believing that the IAE could
play a significant role in achieving the quality and type of
education that Leonard advocates.
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CHAPTER VI
THE ROLE OF EMOTIONAL MATERIAL IN
CONCEPTUAL LEARNING AND THE PART THE
IAE CAN PLAY: FANTASY AND FEELING IN EDUCATION
In recent yeers the terms effective end cognitive heve
come to teke on speciel importence for educetors. They heve
come to describe the two "domeins" of leerning thet teechers
ere continuelly involved with. The domeins they describe
heve come to be thought of es seperete. These domeins heve
even been described seperetely in two texonomies of objec-
tives, the now-femous Texonomy of Educetionel Objectives II:
Affective 0.9 64 ) , by Krethwohl, Bloom end Mesie, end its less-
femous predecessor, Texonomy of Educetionel Objectives I:
Cognitive (1956).
Certeinly much hes been geined by the identificetion
end seperete study of the cognitive end effective domeins.
Much confusion hes been dispelled, end the unique end indivi-
duel cherecteristics of eech domein heve been grented, et
leest elternetely, the undivided ettention of investigetors
.
There ere, however, liebilities involved in this sepere-
tion. The two domeins exist concurrently within the humen
mind, end it is only through ertificiel methods thet we sepe-
rete them. It is certeinly conceiveble thet in sepereting the
two domeins we come to investigete two helves neither of which
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contain, in their separated form, the essence of the whole.
This view, of course, is supported by the work of organismic
psychologists whose "wholistic" views hold that the laws
which govern the organism are inherent in the organism as a
whole, but are not necessarily manifest in its individual
component parts.
<3-Fe the effects of separating the cognitive and
affective domains? As I pointed out before, certain advan-
tages, mostly concerned with methodological considerations in
studying the two domains, accrue with their separation. How-
ever, certain authors agree with Charles Silberman who feels
that the artificial separation of these aspects or modes of
knowing only creates a false dichotomy between the cognitive
and affective domains and that this can only cripple the de-
velopment of thought and feeling. They believe that feelings
play an important part in conceptual behavior.
It is to this issue that we will direct our attention in
this chapter. Two questions will form the basis for the sub-
sections of the chapter. First we will deal with the question,
To what degree do emotions and feelings play a significant
role in conceptual learning? Following that we will ask the
question, To the degree that emotions can play a part in con-
ceptual learning, how can the use of the IAE facilitate their
doing so? The major work we will use at the basis for the
discussion will be Fantasy and Feeling in Education (1968), by
Richard Jones, an eminent educational psychologist.
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To What Degree Do Emotions and Feelings
Play A Significant Role in Conceptual Learning?
Richard Jones begins his discussion of this question
by describing, briefly, the Endicott Conference. This auspi-
cious conference, held in the Endicott House at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1962, scholars and
educators from many fields came together to discuss how the
leading producers of knowledge, the scholars, might take a
more active role in facilitating the work of the communica-
tors of that knowledge, the teachers. The conference en-
couraged the beginnings of many of the sophisticated "new
curricula" that were produced in the late 1960's and early
’70’s. It stands as a turning point in the progression and
production of curricula that are intellectually honest and
stimulating.
But the effects of the Endicott conference, and others
like it, have not been entirely satisfactory. The scholars
and educators involved have had great influence in the field
of education, but Jones states of that influence: "The empha
sis of this influence is on instructional materials: syllabi
texts, films, documents, exercises, etc. --as it should be.
Corresponding experimentation with new instructional methods,
which the new materials often vaguely demand but cannot them-
selves supply, has not been proceeding apace" (p. 5).
One of the most influential writers during this period
has been Jerome Bruner. Jones takes issue with Bruner s
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writings, believing them to be representative of the thought
and ideas of many of the educators and scholars who were in-
volved m formulating the new curricula. Jones believes that
it is unfortunate that Bruner has sought to found the new
educational psychology on an exclusively cognitive base. He
states: "In what follows I shall try to indicate how Bruner's
advances toward a theory of instruction, made as they have
been by half-steps, have revealed possibilities for the tak-
ing of full steps; that is for the coordination of cognitive
moves with emotional and imaginal ones" (p. 5).
Jones goes -on to describe the value he sees in the work
done by Bruner, especially how important it is that attempts
are made to make the new curricula intellectually honest and
challenging. He indicates, therefore, that he does not oppose
what Bruner has brought to pedagogy, but rather, he hopes to
bring to Bruner's ideas their due complements.
And what is it that Bruner has brought to pedagogy?
The effects can be most clearly seen in the new social studies
curriculum Bruner took part in designing and testing, a course
entitled: Man: A Course of Study. Bruner himself describes
the course thusly:
The content of the course is man: his nature
as a species, the forces that shaped and continue to
shape his humanity. Three questions recur through-
out :
What is human about human beings?
How did they get that way?
How can they be made more so?
We seek exercises and materials through which our
pupils can learn wherein man is distinctive in his
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adaptation to the world, and wherein there is dis-cernible continuity between him and his forebearers
In ^pursuit
. of our questions we proceed to
explore five subjects, each closely associated withthe evolution of man as a species, each defining at
once the dist inct iyeness of man and his potentialityfor further evolution. The five great humanizing
forces are tool making, language, social organiza-
tion, the management of man's prolonged childhood,
and
85)
man's urge to explain the world (1966, PP' 77-
And Jones states: "In order to bring these five dimensions
into the kinds of inwardly induced articulation which are
known to support some of the most lasting and buoyant of the
learning processes, materials have 'been designed which show
evidence of these humanizing forces at various points of con-
trast to modern man along the evolutionary continuum..."
(p. 13).
Does Jones find fault with this new curriculum? Cer-
tainly not. In fact he is most enthusiastic about it. What
he does say is that the standards of intellectual honesty that
will be brought to schoolrooms by a curriculum of this nature
would be unprecedented, and that if we succeeded in committing
teachers to these standards, we would be obliged to succeed
in committing them to similarly unprecedented standards of
emotional honesty as well. He points out that the new chal-
lenges would reside not only in presenting such materials to
children in ways that would not be obnoxious to them, but
also in presenting them in ways that would enlist the child-
ren's rich emotional and imaginal responses.
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It would seem, then, the next logical step is to answer
the question, How can emotional involvement aid in conceptual
learning? Before dealing directly with the question, however,
Jones Attempts to broaden his readers’ understanding of the
role emotions might play in learning. He begins by drawing
an example from a special summer school session in Newton,





A Course of Study
. In the example Jones describes
to us a film which the children view, one in which Netsilik
Eskimo hunters kill a seal in its breathing hole. The film
attempts to portray, as accurately as possible, the actual
hunt. It also portrays the scene that occurs in the family
igloo while the mother and children wait for the father to
bring home- the much needed food. In its striving for accuracy,
the movie contains many scenes for which the children are
totally unprepared. There is some nudity in the igloo, and
the breathing hole scene is especially bloody.
Jones .also shares with his readers some of the comments
that were part of the evaluation of the showing of the film
and the lesson that ensued. He quotes:
Master teacher : 'The gory parts didn’t get in the
way. I wanted them to think--not feel.’ ...
Subject Matter Specialist : ’No doubt they learned
a lot about tool use and that’s what we set out to
teach them, but I find myself thinking about all that
emotional hubub . . . wasn ’ t there an awful lot being
bypassed? ’ ...
Psychologist : Tomorrow, or next week, or next
month we’re going to want these children to exercise
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another kind of cognitive skill, to think not only
analytically and objectively, with an eye to solv-
ing the problems we pose for them, but to think
intuitively and subjectively with an eye to posing
problems for themselves. And for that we are going
to want them to indulge their imaginations, their
offbeat thoughts, a different order of cognitive
skill presuming different orders of emotional skill:
expression, sharing, use. We’ve prepared them for
that by teaching them control. So far so good.
People can't express, share, or use emotions that
they can’t control. But we’re only half-way there,
and if we forget where we helped them to leave
their emotions we shouldn't be surprised if later
they can't find the images that went with those
emotions (pp. 17 - 18).
Jones is advocating here that children be allowed to
use their imaginations while learning. If it seems unclear
how this might occur, perhaps it will help if we examine what
he says of a later lessen in Han: A Course of Study . He states:
It is intended that by comparing the Netsilik's
ways of regulating human conflict with our own
ways the children may begin to deepen their com-
prehension of their species, of what makes all
humans human.... When such objectives have proved
elusive in the past the instructional process which
sought to achieve them can usually be shown to have
lacked a crucial element: significant and believ-
able points of comparison between unfamiliar world,
as brought to the child by the instructional materi-
als, and familiar world, as brought by the child to
the instructional materials (p. 19).
In other words, he believes that the points of comparison
which are potentially most significant are sometimes not im-
mediately believable, and must first be made believable .
Sometimes children need to imagine reality in order to test
it
.
If imagination is used to make reality more "believable,
more "testable," what of emotions? Jones warns us
that there
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are two half-truths which have gained ascendancy in education,
and which tend to impede our understanding of the role emo-
tions play in learning. According to Jones, these half-truths
have become so ingrained in the thinking of curriculum design-
ers that if we do not actively seek to correct them, or rather
make them full-truths, they, "... must reduce the effective-
ness of the new social studies curricula by exactly the other
half, thus subverting the new possibilities into the same old
practicalities..." (p. 25). These two half-truths are as
follows: "(1) Emotions and fantasies can obstruct learning;
and (2) Expression of emotions and fantasies can have cathar-
tic benefits" (p. 25).
Of the first half-truth Jones states:
Now it is true that emotions and fantasies
can obstruct learning when they are uncontrolled.
Uncontrolled emotions and fantasies obstruct al-
most all aspects of learning. The other half of
this truth is that the control of emotion and fan-
tasy is substantive in one kind of learning (the
attainment or discovery of knowledge) and prepara-
tory to another kind of learning (the formation or
invention of knowledge). In respect to the latter,
however, control of emotion and imagery, while
necessary is not sufficient (pp. 25 - 26).
Or, in other words, if people are to be able to invent know-
ledge, they must be able to do more with their emotions than
control them. As we have seen in one of Jones’ earlier state-
ments, they must be able to expres s them and use them.
Which brings us to the second half-truth. Again, Jones
does not disagree with the idea that expression of emotions
and fantasies can have cathartic benefits. He does wish to
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remind us, however, that there is a second half to this half
truth, a pedagogical one. He states:
i;* construction of knowledge, as distinct fromthe attainment of it, presumes freedom and skillin the sharing and use of controlled emotion andimagery.... A child cannot, of course, learn to
share and use what he has not learned to control.Beyond the matter of control, however, the teacherhas the option of instructing the child or leavinghim or his own devices (p. 20).
And how is it that we can go about instructing the child
in the use of his or her emotions as a tool for conceptual
learning. Obviously, for Jones, the issue revolves around
imagination as well as emotion. Perhaps we need to take a
closer look at imagination in order to better understand how
both imagination and emotion can facilitate conceptual learn-
ing.
As is often the case, Jones begins his discussion with
Bruner’s work. He states of Toward a Theory of Instruction
,
that it omits much. In particular, he believes it says very
little about imagination, that aspect of the human learning
process which is so uniquely human and which very often goes
uninstructed in our schools. And what of imagination itself?
He states that our understanding of imagination should include
(1) an appreciation of its ubiquity and (2) knowledge of the
conditions that vary its availability.
As concerns the first point, Jones makes clear that
imagination is not a special gift given to some. He believes
that it is obvious that we all have imagination, but vary in
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our ability to call it forth. The ability not only varies
from person to person, but also, from situation to situation
for the same person. Jones states:
The ubiquity of imagination resides in thefact that human beings perceive the world symbol-ically. Our everyday, conscious, adult experiences
tend to obscure this fundamental feature of human
existence. The common sense of our imaginations
is rather that they come into play after perceptual
events, i.e.
,
that we perceive the world as it
unalterably is, and then, in occasional moments ofidleness or sport, alter it, as we say, in the
mind’s eye. It was Freud's most significant con-
tribution to our understanding of ourselves that
common sense misleads us in this matter, that in
fact we alter the world, change it, play with it,
make it up and over constantly... (p. 58).
Therefore, use of the imagination in learning is not only
advisable, it is essential. The reality we grasp is always
controlled by the symbolic images we create.
Jones states further, that we send our children to
school in order that they may develop their capability to con
dition their stimuli, a distinctly human capacity. What does
he mean when he refers to the capacity to condition their sti
muli? He states: "We refer to the fact that it is in [our]
first nature to perceive symbolically, to respond to [our]
responses as well as to stimuli" (p. 63). Again the impor-
tance of the imaginal process in symbolic representation is
clear. We have already seen, in Chapter III, that Arnheim’s
work with perceptual cognition adds credence to Jones' views.
And what of the conditions that vary the availability
of imagination? A.ccording to Jones, the one condition that
is most closely tied to this problem is anxiety. Jones
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describes anxiety in terms of three factors: imagination,
isolation and helplessness. He states: "When we are all of
these simultaneously
— imagining and alone and helpless--we
are in a state of anxiety" (p. 70). He indicates further
that there are three general ways, this side of insanity, to
avoid anxiety. They are to: (1) be less alone; (2) be less
helpless; (3) be less imaginative.
Although most educators would emphatically state their
objective to eschew the last of these alternatives, Jones
feels that this is usually the method used. He finds that:
"All too often, however, we find the teacher falling into
such a course by default, for lack of methods and materials
which can help the children avoid anxiety by way of being
less alone- and/or helpless with their imaginations" (p. 73).
Does this goal of reducing anxiety not hint of therapy?
Is Jones not trying to sneak therapeutic methods into the
schools? According to him, emphatically not! In response to
these questions, he asks, "What sets instruction apart from
psychotherapy, penology, pastoral guidance and other forms
of ministration to human development?" He answers: "Whether
by chance, or by design,... all forms of instruction begin by
appealing to the students' imagination. And it is notable
that they do so according to the converse of the psychothera-
peutic model..." (p. 81). He continues: "Where the therapist
comes to call forth... expectations of sharing one's images
and sometimes using them, the teacher calls forth...
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" (p . 82 ) .









Here, whereas imagination plus aloneness plus helplessness
leads to anxiety and this calls for psychotherapy, instruc-
tion, if proper, calls for an apprppriate combination of
imagination, community and mastery which leads to creative
learning
.
We see, then, that Jones is quite clear on the matter
of therapy and instruction. But if, as he states, teachers
should be interested in reducing anxiety so as to facilitate
creative learning, how can they accomplish this. Jones des-
cribes one instructional method of contrasting it with a
therapeutic. method. He states that therapists often reduce
anxiety by aiding patients in their attempts at gaining in-
sight . Insight consists of knowing one’s own images and
"... what has brought forth this or that image in the past;
what situations bring it forth now; how it has been over-
generalized, misapplied, rashly acted upon; how it can be
more aptly viewed in the future, etc." (p. 79). But instruc-
tors have another option. Insight is only one way that images
which no longer trouble a person can be put to use
(imagination + aloneness + helplessness)
instruction-K imagination + community + mastery)
The other
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way that Jones discusses is by way of out sight, the grasping,
enlivening, enhancing, discovering, making one's own this-or-
that datum in the real world—by virtue of enhancing it with
private images. In other words, people come to be less alone
and/or helpless with their imaginations if they can imbue the
world as it is grasped with personally relevant images. For
the child from Newton, Massachusetts, the realities of a world
in which. an Eskimo hunter kills young seals, cuts them and
eats them raw can become less anxiety producing if he or she
can attach to those realities personal images that give them
relevance to the past experiences of the child.
We have now seen how Jones views emotions and imagina-
tion as they are related to learning. But the crucial ques-
tion remains unanswered, and Jones is the first to admit it.
He reminds us that invoking the imagination is only the first
step in the direction of creative learning. There remains the
question, of how to cultivate and use aroused imaginations,
and their attendant emotions, in the interest of increased
mastery of subject matter. He states: "The power of emotion
to generate interest and involvement in subject matters which
would otherwise find children uninterested and uninvolved
lies in its potential for aiding the assimilation of new ideas
or remote experiences in ways that are illuminating for the
individual
.
As we look back, we see that Jones has taken it upon
himself to attempt to broaden the base of the "new educational
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psychology." He has found the work of Bruner and others ex-
citing and intellectually honest, but based only on cognitive
material
. He would hope we would come to see that emotional
and imaginal material plays an important part in conceptual
learning. He believes that by being able to not only control
emotional material but also to express it, learners can come
to use it to facilitate learning by imbuing new conceptual
material with the personal relevance and points of contact
that are essential in any learning. He would hope that some-
day
,
in the near future, conditions are created in school-
rooms which invite expression of controlled emotions for the
purpose of imbuing curricular issues with personal signifi-
cance .
How Can the Use of the IAE Facilitate the
Role Emotional Material Plays in Conceptual Learning?
We now come to the second question that we must deal
with in this chapter, To the degree that emotional material
plays a role in conceptual learning, how can the use of the
IAE facilitate its doing so? Hopefully, we have, based on
the preceding sub-section, a pretty good idea of the role
that emotional material can play in conceptual learning. It
is to the second half of the question that we now turn our
attent ion
.
Before attempting to answer the question directly, how-
ever, I would like to bring it into clearer perspective by
184
pointing out some facts about our earlier discussion in gen-
eral. At the very beginning of this chapter I pointed out
tnai: educators have recently come to separate learning and
thinking into two modes, cognitive and affective. I mentioned,
also, that there were both advantages and disadvantages in-
herent in the separation. If we look back, I believe it is
obvious that this study has been basically predicated on just
such a separation. We have asked questions concerning the
IAE and conceptual learning. In attempting to answer these
questions we have looked at learning per se in a strictly
cognitive sense. We have discussed classificatory and cate-
gorization behavior, criterial and defining attributes,
stimulus-response learning, etc., all "cognitive" notions.
Even in examining the IAE we drew from it three characteris-
tics that dealt with cognitive material.
I believe another point is important also. In looking
at the definition of the IAE we see that it is generally
divideable into three sections. The definition states that
an IAE is an activity which induces in the learner an emotion-
al and/or kinesthetic state which is in some way analogous to
the concept being taught, and which occurs through heightened
sensory awareness on the part of the learner. The three
characteristics that are most important in the definition
are: (1) an emotional and/or kinesthetic state; (2) which is
analogous, in some way, to a given concept; and (3) which is
the result of heightened sensory awareness on the part of the
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learner. In forming theoretical connections between the use
of the IAE and conceptual learning, and in connecting it with
the goals of education advocated by Leonard, we have consis-
tently used two of the three aspects of the definition. We
have tied heightened sensory awareness to perceptual cogni-
tion and presentational forms of communication, through
dynamic concepts and visual selectivity to nonarbitrariness
and substantiveness. We have also tied heightened sensory
awareness to learners who are responsive to their environments
and who are not detached from their learning. We have con-
nected the analogousness identified in the definition to
metaphorical modes of thinking, and through those modes of
nonarbitrary learning and, to some degree, to substantive
learning. As consistently as we have dealt with the second
two aspects of the definition of the IAE, we have, just as
consistently, avoided the first aspect, the emotional and/or
kinesthetic state induced through the experience.
I mentioned at the beginning of the chapter that advan-
tages accrued from separating learning into cognitive and
affective domains, and that they accrued mostly in the area
of methodological considerations in studying learning. I be-
lieve those advantages have been obtained in this study. In
fact, I believe that dealing with the role the IAE could play
in "cognitive" learning has allowed us to avoid obscuring the
potential of the IAE in this domain by continually implying
the great strength it has in the affective domain. However
,
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with many of the authors I have previously mentioned who see
the separation of learning into two domains as artificial.
It is because of this believe that I have not identified con-
ceptual learning as "cognitive" learning through this study.
More importantly, the nature of the IAE, as I have formulated
it, does not allow for such a separation. That emotional
material plays an important role in conceptual learning is
a given, as soon as one accepts the' definition of the IAE
that I have postulated. Therefore, it is in this chapter
that we finally come first, to the importance of the emotion-
al and/or kinesthetic state that is such a vital part of the
IAE, and second, to the reintegration of "cognitive" and
"affective" learning.
We can now return to Jones and our question concerning
the use of the IAE and the role of emotional material in
learning. If we condense Jones’ ideas to a brief statement
we see that emotional material plays a part in conceptual
learning when it is: (1) controlled; (2) expressed; and
(3) used. Fortunately, or unfortunately, as the case might
be, controlling emotional material is not the problem faced
by most students. They have come, through socialization and
acculturation, to be all too facile at controlling their emo-
tions .
It is in the realm of expressing those controlled emo-
tions that we first break relatively new ground for most stu-
It is also in this realm that the IAE becomes extremelydents
.
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userul as a pedagogical method. You will recall, from the
examples Jones gave us, that all material that is intellec-
tually honest has emotional concommitants
. As I have just
pointed out, the problem lies in allowing the child to be
able to express those emotional concommitants. I believe
that the IAE exists as a vehicle which can facilitate that
expression. To support this belief we need only to look at
the traditional uses of art in our society. I mentioned in
Chapter III a number of authors whose views held that art was
the expression of ideas and feelings. And we noted also that
to the degree that the IAE facilitated "artistic" experien-
ces, which, we saw, was to a relatively high degree, it also
facilitated the expression of ideas and feelings. Therefore,
we can safely assume that the use of the IAE will generally
facilitate the expression of emotions by students.
It is in the third realm that we must look very care-
fully at the nature of the IAE if we are going to accept that
it plays an important part in facilitating the role of emo-
tional material in learning. The question is. How does
emotional material, come to take on usable form? I believe
that this does not happen merely as a direct result of the
sheer expression of emotional material. For emotional mater-
ial to take on usable form it must not only be expressed, it
must be expressed in a form that is recognizable by the
learner. If it is not expressed in that form the learner will
not be able to use it to imbue conceptual material with
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personal relevance.
What part does the IAE play in this process? As in the
case of the expression of emotional material, it is when the
IAE functions as an artistic activity that it obtains the
power to have an effect on this process. It does so through
the combination of three processes, production, interpreta-
tion and contact.
The first process is inherent in the IAE when the IAE
takes on an "artistic" nature. An emotional state is induced
in learners as they create an artistic product. The medium
might be dance or drama or music, but as the learners struggle
with a problem, manipulate materials, and try to formulate a
solution to that problem, they come to experience an emotional
state
.
The next step is that they must interpret that emotional
state. It is here that the artistic product takes on added
importance. The product may be looked upon by the students
as a message sent by themselves to themselves. But it is
important to remember that it is the interpretation of the
product, not the product itself, that is important. Janie
Rhyne calls this process the Gestalt Art Experience and states:
"... we create things made from materials; in themselves they
have no particular meaning; the way we perceive them makes
them meaningful" (1973, pp. 87 - 88).
Which brings us to the third process, contact. The
term contact is drawn from the field of Gestalt Therapy.
ff
There, as Erving and Miriam Polster state: "... contact is
the awareness of, and behavior toward, the assimilable novel-
ties; and the rejection of the unassimilable novelty" (1973,
P. 101). In other words, contact is the process by which we
interact with and are changed by those elements in the envi-
ronment that are new to us, but are in some form with which
we can deal. There is a part of our psychological selves
that is known as the contact boundary
. Polster and Polster
state: "The contact boundary is the point at which one ex-
periences the 'me' in relation to that which is not ’ me ' and
through this contact, both are more clearly experienced"
(pp. 102 - 103).
The question arises, "If we are trying to gain access
to our own- emotions, are we not dealing with things that are
already ’me,' and therefore not applicable to the process of
contact?" The answer comes, again from Polster and Polster.
They point out, as I have mentioned in Chapter I'll, that: thi
kind of internal contact can occur, however, because of the
human ability to split oneself into the observer and the ob-
served. In other words, many things exist in our psychologi-
cal make-up that we are not aware of. These things are things
that are "me" but are not experienced as "me." Through cer-
tain experiences we can have contact with these things and
come to experience them as "me." Emotions, of course, fit
very neatly into this category.
In summary, then, we have learners who are producing
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artistic products. They then interpret those products as
messages from themselves to themselves. In doing so, they
are attempting to gain contact with those emotions, to come
to understand and recognize them. If they can achieve this
contact, that emotional material will take on a form that is
useable for the learner. It will take on a form in which
it can attach personal relevance to conceptual data, thus
allowing that data to become learnable. Based on the above,
I believe we can state that the IAE stands as a vehicle
through which emotional material can be expressed and used,
and therefore can play an important role in conceptual learn-
ing.
We have asked two questions in this chapter. The first
was, To what degree to emotions and feelings play a signi-
ficant role in conceptual learning? To answer the question
we looked closely at the ideas of Richard Jones as he
explained them in Fantasy and Feeling in Education
. In brief,
he states that emotional material plays,- or should play, an
important part in conceptual learning but can only do so when
emotions are controlled, expressed, and used. We then asked
the question, To the degree that emotions can play a part in
conceptual learning, how can the use of the IAE facilitate
their doing so? We found that the IAE has great potential
for helping students express and use emotional material, and
therefore can be considered to be potentially able to play a
significant role in that process.
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We saw earlier that Jones hoped to find someday that
conditions are created in schoolrooms which invite expression
of controlled emotions for the purpose of imbuing curricular
issues with personal significance. I believe that it is
clear that the IAE has the potential to play a significant





THE EFFECTS OF THE EDUCATIONAL
SYSTEM ON THE LEARNER AND THE
ROLE OF THE IAE : CRISIS IN THE CLASSROOM
In attempting to discern the relative value of the use
of the IAE, we have discussed it in relation to two major
aspects. First, we related the use of the IAE to the socio-
logical implications of education, as they have been des-
cribed by George Leonard in Education and Ecstacy . Secondly,
we discussed the use of the IAE in allowing students to deal
with emotional issues as a part of conceptual learning. Our
investigation of this area was based on the ideas of Richard
Jones as he presented them in Fantasy and Feeling in Educa-
tion . As a final step in this critique of the relative value
of the use of the IAE, we will look at the relation of the
IAE to a specific methodology; that methodology being, infor-
mal education .
In 1970, Charles E. Silberman published a work entitled,
Crisis in the Classroom . The work had special significance,
because it was actually the chairman’s report of the Carnegie
Report on the Education of Educators . Since the work is the
product of a large, funded, research project, Silberman and
his associates were able to amass a tremendous amount of in-
formation concerning not only pre-service and in-service
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teacher training, but education in general.
It is significant that the study did include a larger
perspective of education in general. According to Silberman,
the reason the study was expanded to include this larger
perspective is because he and his associates came to feel
that teacher training programs reflected our general view of
education. Therefore, to examine only teacher training
programs and ignore the broader perspective would be analo-
gous to examining the symtoms of an illness without attempt-
ing to understand the disease which caused the symptoms in
the first place.
For our purposes it is useful to divide Silberman'
s
study into three major areas, each of which will serve as a
basis upon which we can further examine the relative value
of the use of the IAE. First, in his discussion of education
in general, Silberman deals specifically, and at great length,
with the purposes of education. Secondly, in an attempt to
identify for his readers an approach which is in accord with
the purposes of education that he advocates, Silberman dis-
cusses informal education . Finally, Silberman discusses the
effects of the educational system on learners. Therefore,
this chapter will be divided into three sub-sections, each
dealing with one of the aspects of the study I have just iden-
tified. In each sub-section, Silberman' s ideas concerning
the area will be presented, and then we will discuss the
possible ways in which the use of the IAE might be related
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to these ideas. The f.irst of the sub-sections deals with the
purposes of education.
The IAE and the Purposes of Education
Silberman begins his discussion of education by point-
ing out that, whatever value or lack of value there is in our
system of education, it is mostly the product of "mindless-
ness." He feels that the system is', to a large degree,
ineffective and that it achieves ends that are most often the
opposite of what our ostensible goals for education are. He
believes, however, that this is not the result of ill-inten-
tion, or even of lack of ability. It is almost always, in
his opinion, a result of the fact that it never occurs to
most educators to ask why they are doing what they are do-ing,
or to think seriously about the purposes of consequences of
education
.
Silberman defines education as, "... the deliberate or
purposeful creation, evocation, or transmission of knowledge,
abilities, skills and values" (p. 6). The definition is
clearly one of direct intent and might appear to be in the
behaviorist tradition. Silberman himself points out, however
that he intends a broader meaning. In discussing behavioral
objectives, Silberman reminds us of a statement made by Lee J
Cronbach, of Stanford University. Cronbach points out that
the insistence on the behavioral definition of objectives is
a prescription for training, not for education. Silberman
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indicates that education can, and almost certainly does in-
clude training. In almost every field, there are skills that
have to be mastered, concepts that have to be learned. But
he also points out that the converse is not necessarily true.
Education cannot be subsumed under training. As Cronbach
points out: "The person who wants to 'specify the acts the
learner is to perform as a result of instruction' is deluding






Silberman is also concerned that whereas his definition
seems purposeful in nature, it not be confused with the popu-
lar move toward teaching the basic skills. He states: "More-
over, students need to learn far more than the basic skills.
For children who may still be in the labor force in the year
2030, nothing could be more wildly impractical than an. educa-
tion designed to prepare them for specific vocations or pro-
fessions, or to facilitate their adjustment to the world as
it is" (pp. 113 - 114). Many educators share Silberman'
s
views. Francis Chase, the former dean of the Graduate School
of Education, University of Chicago, states: "The qualities
essential to employability and productivity, are coming closer
and closer to the characteristics that have long been attribu-
ted to the educated person" (Silberman, 1970, p. 114).
But what does it mean to be an "educated" person? What
is it that one who is "educated" is like? Silberman identi-
fies four aspects for us. First, he indicates that a person
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must have the ability to educate him or herself. He states:
.
0f what does the capacity to eduoat e oneself
and that he uses that capacity to think about his
own education, which means to think about his own
nature and his place in the universe--about the
meaning of life and of knowledge and of the rela-
tions about them (p. 114).
Secondly, Silberman feels that to be educated is to,
M
... know something of the experience of beauty--if not in
the sense of creating it or discoursing about it, then at the
very least in the sense of being able to respond to it, to
respond both to the beauty of nature and to the art made by
our fellow man” (p. 115). This view has been supported by a
report by the Ontario, Canada Provincial Committee on Aims
and Objectives of Education, among many others. They write:
To find and appreciate beauty in the ordinary
and the extraordinary is the right of every child,
for the aesthetic experience is a basic need of all
men in their universal struggle to add meaning to life.
We owe to the children the freedom to explore the
full range of their senses; to appreciate subtle
differences; to be aware of beauty wherever it is
found; to see, to touch, to smell, to hear, to taste,
so that each in his own way will strive to find and
express the meaning of man and human destiny (p. 115).
Silberman believes that a third aspect of being educa-
ted has to do with effectiveness. As he defines it, to be
educated means to understand something of how to make our
intentions effective in the real world, or in other words,
understanding how to apply knowledge to the life one lives and
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the society in which one lives. He states: "The aim of
education, as Alfred North Whitehead has written, 'is the
acquisition of the art of the utilization of knowledge.' In-
deed, 'a merely well-informed man is the most useless bore
on God's earth'" (p. 115).
And finally, Silberman notes the importance of the edu-
cational experience itself. Since children spend so much time
in school, Silberman believes that the quality of that exper-
ience must be regarded as important in and of itself. He
points to the Plowden Committee and its insistence that a good
school is a community in which children live as children and
not as future adults. However, as Carleton Washburn, a giant
of the progressive movement, warned in 1925, letting children
live free, natural childlike lives may be to fail to give
them the training they will need in order to meet the problems
of later life.
This appears to bring us to the question, What should
the educative process include? But before going on to deal
with that question, perhaps it would be useful to examine the
relationship between the four aspects of being educated, as
Silberman identifies them, and the use of the IAE.
The first aspect identified by Silberman is that the
person will have both the desire and the capacity to educate
him or herself, and also to judge what is worth learning.
Throughout this study, while relating the IAE to some aspect
of a given set of criteria, principles or characteristics,
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etc., I have consistently tried to tie the IAE to that cri-
terion via one of the characteristics of the IAE that I
discussed in Chapter III. Therefore, what I would hope to
do at this point, is to connect the quality of having the
desire and capacity to educate oneself to one of the charac-
teristics of the IAE, such as perceptual cognition, metaphor-
ical modes of thinking, or presentational forms of communica-
tion. Unfortunately, as far as I cdn tell, the direct and
significant connection that we seek is not there. This is,
in my opinion, because the characteristics of the IAE that I
have identified have dealt with ways- of knowing and learning
that were facilitated by the IAE, and not with attitudes
toward knowing.
In Chapter V we discussed an instance that was parallel
to this situation, whether or not a learner would want- to de-
velop as much of his or her potential as possible. In that
instance I stated that I believe that whereas the IAE offers
a vehicle which can facilitate full realization of potential,
it is up to other forces, e.g., society, the teacher, etc.,
to foster the desire to do so. I believe the connection be-
tween the criterion and the IAE is similar in this instance.
Because of the personalized nature of perceptual cognition,
metaphorical modes of thinking and presentational forms of
communication, the learning that occurs through these forms
could conceivably be called, "the educating of oneself." How-
ever, whether learner chooses to avail him or herself of these
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forms of cognition and learning is not, as I see it, tied to
the IAE itself. It is much more a result of the attitude
toward learning that is manifested in the environment which
surrounds the learner, an environment that contains parents,
teachers, peers and the rest of society-at-large.
The situation is noticeably different, however, as con-
cerns the second criteria identified by Silberman. That
second criteria is that the student will, "... know something
of the experience of beauty." When we speak of the IAE, we
speak, by definition, of heightened sensory awareness. We
also speak of the forms of cognition, i.e., perceptual cogni-
tion, metaphorical modes of thinking, and presentational forms
of communication, that are most often used by people to under-
stand works of art. Implied in the notion of the IAE, as I
have described it, is practice in the use and understanding
of different modes of artistic expression. The question is,
Is there any connection between the IAE and the learner’s
knowing something of the experience of beauty? For me, the
answer is, If there is no connection, then it is not because
of the nature of the IAE, but rather, in the way that the IAE
has been used.
The third criterion mentioned by Silberman is that the
student will "...understand something of how to make [his or
her] intentions effective in the real world." Again I believe
that there is no direct and significant theoretical connection
between the criterion and the characteristics of the IAE.
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There is, however, one less direct connection which I
believe bears mentioning. In discussing metaphorical modes
of thinking, I mentioned an educational program that was
specifically designed to "celebrate" the functions of the
right cerebral hemisphere. One of the characteristics of
that program was that the learners got practice in directly
implementing the solutions they had formulated to the prob-
lem they encountered. I also discussed how the same charac-
teristic was true of the IAE; the IAE allows an opportunity
to directly try out solutions to problems posed by the mater-
ials involved. Although there is no direct theoretical
connection, I believe it is reasonable to assume that this
type of experience facilitates, to at least some degree, a
person’s ".knowing something of how to make their intentions
effective in the real world."
The fourth aspect of being educated that is identified
by Silberman concerns the effects of the educational experi-
ence itself. Since, as I have mentioned previously, this
issue is one of the three main areas of Silberman’ s discus-
sion, we will leave the question of the relationship between
the IAE and the effects of the educational experience and
deal with it in the third subsection of this chapter.
Now, we can return to our discussion of Silberman 's
views concerning the purposes of education. We left off with
the question, What should the educative process include? In
response to this question, Silberman states: "Education is a
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process that cannot be separated from what it is that one
learns" (p. 325). He continues: "The raeson d’etre of the
school— society’s ultimate justification for creating a
separate, formal, educational institution, and for making pro-
longed exposure to it compulsory— is the conviction (the
faith, if you will) that as Bruner also puts it, 'The conduct
of life is not independent of what it is that one knows,' nor
of how it is that one has learned what one knows’" (p. 235).
What do others have to say on the subject? In discus-
sing the purposes of education, Piaget states: "The principal
goal of education is to create men who are capable of doing
new things, not simply repeating what other generations have
done men who are creative, inventive, and discoverers, who
have minds which can be critical, can verify, and not accept
everything they are offered" (p. 219).
It is not to be forgotten that time in school is limi-
ted. In answering the question, How can limited exposure to
new material have the most impact?, Bruner states:
The dominant view among men who have engaged
in preparing and teaching new curricula is that
the answer to this question lies in giving students
an understanding of the fundamental structure of
whatever subjects we choose to teach. This is a
minimum requirement for using knowledge.... If
earlier learning is to render later learning easier,
it must do so by providing a general picture in
terms of which the relations between things en-
countered earlier and later are made as clear as
possible (1963, p. 18).
Whitehead expands on that notion in The Aims of Educa -
tion. He states: "What education has to impart, is an
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intimate sense for the power of ideas, for the beauty of
ideas, and for the structure of ideas, together with a par-
ticular body of knowledge which has peculiar reference to
the life of the being processing it" (1929, p. 36).
A final perspective concerning what the educative pro-
cess should include comes from Margaret Mead. She states:
"We are no longer dealing primarily with the vertical trans-
mission of the tried and true by the old, mature and experi-
enced teachers to the young, immature, and inexperienced
pupil. This was the system of education developed in a stable,
slowly changing culture" (Silberman, 1970, p. 30). But in a
rapidly changing world, vertical transmission of knowledge is
not sufficient. Mead continues: "What is needed, and what
we are already moving toward is the inclusion of another whole
dimension of learning; the lateral transmission, of every sen-
tient member of society, of what has just been discovered,
invented, created, manufactured or marketed" (p. 30).
What, then, is the purpose of education? According to
Silberman and others, it would appear, the purpose of educa-
tion lies in the power, the use, the production, and the
transmission of ideas. Education should instill in the
learner a realization of the power and structure of ideas.
It should instill in the learner a realization of how ideas
are used and how old ideas can be structured to make the
learning of new ideas easier. It should instill in the
learner the desire to question old ideas and create new ideas
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when the old ones are found inadequate. And further to
actively engage in transmitting those ideas while they are
still being formulated, so that they are developed to their
fullest potential by the combined genius of society.
And what is the relation of the use of the IAE to the
t<3-^- ri i-n§ of those goals? I believe the key to the answer
lies in a statement made by William James. He states:
You make a great
,
a very great mistake if you
think that psychology, being the science of the
mind’s laws, is something from which you can deduce
definite programs and schemes and methods of in-
struction for immediate classroom use. Psychology
is a science and teaching is an art; and sciences
never generate arts directly out of themselves.
An intermediary inventive mind must make the
application, by using its originality. Yet science
must be understood; it plays a major role, for it
lays down the lines within which the rules of art
must fall, laws which the follower of the art must
not transgress... Everywhere the teacher must
agree with the psychology, but need not necessar-
ily be the only kind of teaching that would so
agree (Silberman, 1970, p. 217).
Psychology is a science, and so is "education" as it is
portrayed in the statements of Silberman and the others. But
the "science of education" is transposed to the everyday
classroom, as James points out, by the artfulness of the
teacher. And it is within the realm of the art of teaching
that the IAE falls. It is, perhaps, one of the modes of
teaching that demands the most artful manipulation by the
teacher. The individuality and subjectiveness of most of the
experiences involved in the IAE demand an artful teacher.
And how are the goals of the "science of education" achieved
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through the IAE? The direct theoretical connection is not
to be found. However, the IAE stands ready as a vehicle
through which the teacher can artfully bring learners to the
levels at which they realize the power, the use, and the
nature of ideas, or at least ideas that are new to the learn-
er, can be produced and transmitted to other learners. The
connection may not be direct. That does not insure that it
is not powerful.
The IAE and Informal Education
Crisis in the Classroom appeared during the educational
reform movement of the late 1960 s and early ’70s. It is not
surprising, therefore, that a good deal of the material in
the book deals with that reform movement. It is as a response
to that movement, as an attempt to offer a positive direction
for that movement, that Silberman discusses informal educa-
tion . Before examining the relation of the use of the IAE to
the pedagogy of informal education we need to understand
informal education itself. Before attempting to do that, it
may be useful to spend just a moment understanding the reform
movement that Silberman describes and is a part of, thereby
better understanding why he proposes informal education as a
positive alternative to existing educational methodologies.
One of the earliest and most influential reports that
constituted the reform movement of the ’60s and the ’70s is
the Coleman Report. The Coleman Report was the result of a
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littie
-not iced section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
directed the U. S. Commissioner of Education to "conduct a
survey
. . . concerning the lack of availability of equal edu-
cational opportunity for individuals by reason of race, color,
religion, or national origins" (Silberman, 1970, p. 71 ).
Coleman and his associates had expected to find large dis-
Par ^'l: ^ es ^-n ’t ^ie quality of education and educational facili-
ties that were available to majority and minority students.
More importantly, Coleman and his colleagues found that dif-
ferences in school quality were not very closely related to
differences in student achievement at allj they simply did
not find the cause and effect relationship between low student
achievement and inadequate educational inputs that they ex-
pected to find. Family background of the student and his or
her fellow students seemed to have had a much more important
effect than did differences in school background in effecting
student achievement.
These findings have been supported by at least some
other studies. In a chapter entitled, ”The Constancy of the
School’s Achievement,” J. M. Stephens summarizes research
studies which indicate that academic achievement is usually
unaffected by factors such as class size, size of the school,
administrative organization of the school, amount of time
given to instruction, teacher’s ability and personality,
teaching method, homogenous or grouping and so on (p. 71).
And what of reform? Hadn't the 1950s seen a large
school reform movement? The movement had been there, but the






n G°°dlad, dean of the UCLA Graduatebchool of Education along with several colleagues
visited some 260 kindergarten-through-first-grade
’
classrooms in 100 schools in thirteen states todetermine the extent to which the reform movementhad changed the schools. He found ... that things
are much the same as they had been 20 years ago,
and in some respects not as good as they were fortyyears ago, when the last great school reform move-
ment was at its peak. 'We were unable to discern
much attention to pupil needs, attainments, or
problems as a basis for individual opportunities
to learn, he reports. ’Teaching was predominantly
telling
. and questioning by the teacher, with children
responding one by one or occasionally in chorus. In
all of this, the textbook was the most highly visible
instrument of learning and teaching.... Rarely did
we find small groups intensely in pursuit of know-
ledge: rarely did we find individual pupils at work
in self-sustaining inquiry..." (p. 159).
Nevertheless, there was a reform movement of the late
1960s and early '70s. Goodlad himself referred to that period
as the "education decade." As James E. Allen, former U. S.
Commissioner of Education stated at the time:
Never before in history have our schools en-
gaged in such widespread experimentation to meet the
new educational requirements...
Never before have so many hopeful new ap-
proaches developed in such a relatively short period.
An intense self-examination is now under way on a
national scale...
In the process, we are learning that many of
the old ways of operating our schools are not neces-
sarily the best ways. New methods of organization,
the use of new technological devices and new concepts
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of the role of the teacher provide answers that
numbers alone cannot provide (Silberman 1970
pp. 159 - 160). * ’
But something must be learned from the study done by
Goodlad and his associates. If we are to transform the schools
during the 1970s we must understand why the reform movement of
the 1950s and 60s affected such little change. Perhaps the
key issue as Silberman sees it, is again the problem of '’mind-
lessness.” Of all the major innovations of the early reforms,
only one, the ungraded primary, seems to be the result of
serious thought about the nature of childhood and learning.
As Silberman points out, most of the other innovations, such
as team teaching, instructional television, and teacher aids,
were techniques which were aimed at increasing efficiency and
which left both the content of the curriculum and the process
of instruction untouched or at least unexamined.
The experience of the National Defense Education Act
Institutes is a perfect example. The institutes grew out of
the belief that the major problem was to get teachers to know--
to really know--the subject. Unfortunately, time proved that
knowing the subject better had little or no real effect on
being able to teach it (p. 182).
Which brings us to informal education . In Section III
of the study entitled, "How the Schools Should Be Changed,"
Silberman points his readers’ attention to the English Informal
Schools. The basis of the approach, as Silberman sees it, is
that children are allowed to learn for themselves, and are
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allowed to follow their own interests. But the freedom that
accrues to the learners in this situation is not the same
freedom that became the hallmark of American progressive
schools. American progressive schools came to be places in
which students followed their interests without close observa-
tion and well-timed intervention on the part of teachers, and
this resulted in a "softness" as concerned academic rigor.
Not so in the case of the English informal schools. Silberman
states
:
With rare exceptions, the teachers and administrators
with whom I talked and whose informal classrooms I
observed were more than simply '
' here ;
' they were very
much in charge. 'It's easy to be a sweet nothing andjust say, "Oh, that’s nice," ' one London headmis-
tress remarked, ’but we are here to teach, not just
to let children discover.' The teacher ’must know
clearly what she's trying to do and how and why,'
Nora Goddard, Chief Inspector of Infant Schools in
London, insists. It is not enough to create a rich
environment, as teachers of the progressive era Were
content to do. The teacher must know when, and how,
to intervene if she is to achieve the main objective
—
as Miss Goddard defines it, ’helping children learn
how to think, to form judgements, to discriminate'
(p. 260 ).
It is when we understand the informal approach as one
of "structured environments" and "maximized opportunities"
that we are able to relate the informal approach to the IAE.
The following statement by Silberman indicates the type of
learning situation that is common in the informal approacn
and the control the teacher has over it.
The teacher does not just maximize the
occasion; he makes the occasion possible in the
first place by the kind of environment he creates





















r ° f ThS Integr*ted Day in the Primaryc ool, since we select the materials that areavailable. We are structuring all the time; thatis what teaching is.’ Indeed, the informal class-room can be termed a formal situation, in the sense
°f having form and structure... The 'formality'
of the informal classroom grows out of the factthat the teacher creates a highly structured envi-
ronment, organized around a space rather than a timeframework, and . then manages it so that it changes in
response to children's interest, activities, and
needs (p. 238).
I believe that the same is often true of the IAE.
In the IAE we also have an environment that is struc-
tured by the teacher. The teacher has already chosen the
conceptual material that is to be the basis of the lesson.
This choice, hopefully, is made on the basis of the indivi-
dual needs of the learner or learners involved in the experi-
ence. The teacher structures the experience by selecting or
limiting the choice of materials involved. As we said in our
discussion of metaphorical modes of thinking, materials play
an important part in controlling the problems that learners
struggle with in order to understand larger concepts.
The teacher structures the environment, facilitates
certain learnings, keeps track of and is responsible for meet-
ing academic standards. But it is the child who actually
determines the learning that is the result of each experience.
And it is because of this that both informal education and the
IAE have such advantages as pedagogical techniques.
The advantage obtains, I believe, because of the fact
that the learner is always the final determiner of what is or is
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not learned. Unfortunately, in formal approaches the learner
is only offered one possibility, one choice. The alterna-
trves are then only to learn or not to learn. It is no sur-
prise, therefore, that much of what is "taught" by teachers,
is not "learned" by students.
However, in both the informal approach and the IAE,
the learner is given other choices, other alternatives. with-
in the constraints set by the teacher as he or she structures
the environment, the learner is allowed to gravitate towards,
and work to attain, those learnings that are most appropriate
to him or her at that time. This can reflect itself in terms
of the particular aspects of a concept the student chooses,
consciously or unconsciously, to learn, or in the level to
which a particular concept or subconcept is learned. We have
seen in Chapter II, that the concepts learned by students in
school are usually hierarchial in nature and are often defined
by a number of criterial attributes. There are many things
to be learned in learning a concept, and these approaches allow
an opportunity for the learner’s individual learning pattern
to operate unmolested.
We have also seen in Chapter VI that there is often
both a cognitive and an emotional aspect of a given concept.
Some learners are most ready to deal, at a given time, with
the cognitive content of the concept. Other learners need
to, or are more able to, deal with the emotional impact of
the concept. Again, both the informal approach in general
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methodology, and the third with the effects of the educational
system on the learner. It is the last of these three compo-
nents to which we now turn our attention.
Silberman begins his discussion of the effects of the
educational system on the learner with the following statement:
Like Procrustes stretching his guests or cutting off their
limbs to make them fit the standard-sized bed his inn provi-
ded, educators and scholars, frequently with the best of
intentions, have operated on the assumption that children need
to be cut or stretched or otherwise ’adjusted* to fit the
schools rather than adjusting the schools to fit the children"
(p. 81). In a later comment on the subject, Silberman adds:
"Our most pressing educational problem, in short, is not how
to increase the efficiency of schools, it is how to create and
maintain a humane society. A society whose schools are inhu-
mane is not likely to be humane itself" (p. 203).
And what is school like? As Phillip Jackson points out
in Life in Classrooms (1963): that school is school no matter
where it happens. Jackson bases this thought on four condi-
tions that are almost always true of schooling. First, there
is the element of compulsion. Children are usually in school
because they have to be, most often because of state law.
Even if there is no compulsion by law, they are seldom there
of their own volition. Secondly, children not only have to
be in school, they have to be there a long time. School
usually lasts six hours a day, five days a week, thirty or
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forty weeks a year for twelve or more years. Between the ages
of five and eighteen, the child spends more time engaged in
schooling than in almost any other activity. Thirdly, school
is a collective experience. Being in school means being in a
crowd. It is seldom that most students receive the undivided
attention of their teacher. And finally, school is almost
always evaluative. The students know that their words and
deeds are being constantly evaluated, and this causes a clear
demarcation between teacher and student, teacher and learner.
The teacher and the child may be "partners in learning," but
the partnership dissolves when it comes time for the former
to evaluate, rate, and categorize the latter.
But Silberman identifies still yet another commonality
among schools. As he puts it: "The most important character-
istic schools share in common is the preoccupation with order
and control" (p. 122). He relates further:
As Herbert Kohn points out, 'the tightness
with time that exists in the elementary school has
nothing to do with the quantity that must be learned
or the children's needs. It represents the teacher's
fear of loss of control and is nothing but a weapon
used to weaken the solidarity and opposition of the
children that too many teachers unconsciously
dread ' (p . 124 )
.
And, from "An Ounce of Prevention," in Discipline in the
Classroom published by the NEA comes the following statement:
"Avoid emotion-charged topics. Discussing them may lead to
an argument so explosive that fighting can result. Until a
group has achieved enough maturity to keep itself under
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p. 134). Besides the obviously compulsive
demand for control indicated in ’the statement, it is frigh-
tening to think of its implications in terms of what we
learned from our discussion of emotional material in Chapter VI.
Of course there have been attempts to rethink the prob-
lem. Many schools, realizing the effects of living within
the system are so damaging to a child that they might undo any
good that may have been accomplished by that system, have
looked for better alternatives. The John F. Kennedy High
School in Silver Spring, Maryland states of its program's
goals: "The purpose of the program... is to provide an envi-
ronment which will focus on the individual--a climate where
student responsibility is emphasized, where conformity is" not
imposed, where learners solve problems important to them,
where interest is high, and where there is an active commit-
ment to discovery and learning" (p. 341). Similarly, the
Parkway Program, in Philadelphia is designed to, "... help
students to 'live learningly within his present life space'
and to help him expand that space" (p. 350). And in marked
contrast to the NEA publication cited earlier, comes the
following from the Murray Road Annex Program in Newton,
Massachusetts
:
The students learned to handle feelings, too,
and to view feelings as an aspect of thought. 'Feel-
ings are important at Murray Road, ' one student
remarked, in explaining how the school differed from
the regular high school. 'Even in a subject like
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math it becomes. harder and harder to separatefeelings from thinking' (p. 359). P
The question that arises for us, of course, is to what
degree can the use of the IAE be an important factor in making
the effects of the educational system positive rather than
negative? I believe we can answer the question by examining
the three descriptions of the above-mentioned programs. If
we use these programs as examples of a more humane education-
al system, then to the degree that the use of the IAE facili-
tates some of the goals they profess, the use of the IAE
facilitates a more humane educational system.
The Kennedy Program in Maryland shows dramatically, I
believe, the connection between the use of the IAE and a more
humane educational environment. The program professes as one
of its goals that it will focus on the individual. Certainly
we have seen that if nothing else the IAE is geared toward
personalized learning and personalized experiences. This is
one of the most important characteristics of the approach.
Secondly, the Kennedy Program attempts to not impose confor-
mity. Again, the personalized nature of the IAE seems to be
an especially strong agent in achieving this goal. And again
in a third goal the personalized nature of the IAE and the
learning it facilitates is important. This third goal is that
the learners will solve problems that are important to them.
Finally, the Kennedy Program hopes to facilitate an environ-
ment in which there is an active commitment to discovery and
learning. Although there is no direct link between the use
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of the IAE and these generalized qualities, I believe that it
is reasonable to assume that in a situation where learners are
learning things that are important to them, in ways that are
appropriate to them, learning and discovery will be highly
valued by those learners.
Realizing the generalized effects of the use of the IAE
is also important in understanding how it helps learners "live
beamingly" in the way the Parkway ‘Program in Philadelphia
would hope they could. I believe, again, that it is reasonable
to assume that if learners have positive experiences as con-
cerns learning while they are in school, if they come to value
and enjoy learning as process, that it is likely that they will
not, indeed could not, operate "learningly" in school and
otherwise outside of school. If the IAE can facilitate facile
learners in school, those same learners will probably deal
with all new experiences in a "learning" way. Therefore, it
seems easily possible that the IAE can facilitate students
"living learningly in their life space."
And finally we come to one of the major aspects of the
Murray Road Annex Program. Based on what we saw in Chapter
VI, I believe it will suffice to say that the IAE might well
be one of the most effective means for dealing with feelings
and emotions in the classroom. If doing this contributes to
a more humane educational environment, then the IAE certainly
can be considered an important facilitator of a humane envi-
ronment .
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In conclusion, we see that the use of the IAE is tied
intimately, through common goals and techniques, to many of
the approaches which facilitate a more humane, more positive,
educational system.
In this chapter we have seen that Silberman and others
identify three characteristics of being "educated” to which
we can connect the use of the IAE. The first characteristic
was that the learner has the desire and capacity to educate
him or herself. Although there was no direct theoretical
connection between this characteristic and the use of the IAE,
we saw that the IAE stands ready as a vehicle which can help
learners in their attempts to educate themselves if they care
to. The second characteristic was that learners will know
something of beauty. In this case the connection between the
use of the IAE and the characteristic was obvious. Finally,
the third characteristic was that learners will know something
of how to make their intentions effective in the real world.
Although the direct theoretical connection was again not evi-
dent in this instance, we saw that the use of the IAE can
facilitate this characteristic to some degree by allowing
opportunities for direct problem solving with materials.
In the second sub-section of the chapter we discussed
the relationship between the IAE and informal education .
Through that discussion we saw that the IAE is a technique
that can fit easily into the repertoire of an informal teacher
because of the commonality, in terms of approach and goals,
between informal education and the IAE.
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And finally, in .the third sub-section of the chapter we
have seen that the use of the IAE appears to be connected with
establishing a more positive educational environment. This
appears true because the use of the IAE seems to be appropri-
ate in terms of reaching some of the goals of three programs
that are somewhat exemplary in their attempts to formulate a




We have come to the end of this study. In it I have
reviewed, examined, and discussed a tremendous amount of
material. ihis study has been divided into two sections.
The first dealt primarily with the' question
,
Can the IAE
facilitate conceptual learning and development?; the second
with the question, Should the IAE be used to facilitate con-
ceptual learning and development?
In Part I we began with three questions. They were:
(I) How is any concept learned?; (2) What are the character-
istics of the IAE that might facilitate the learning of *
concepts?; and (3) How can the IAE facilitate the learning of
concepts? In general I answered the major question of this
section by using these three questions to form a syllogism.
We found that: (a) the process by which concepts are learned
can be represented by the construct called meaningful learn-
ing
,
and that meaningful learning has two criteria that must
be met if it is to obtain, nonarbitrary learning and substan-
tive learning ; (b) the IAE has three characteristics that allow
it to meet those criteria: (1) it allows an opportunity for
perceptual cognition to occur; (2) it allows an opportunity
for metaphorical modes of thinking to occur; and (3) it allows
the learner to make use of alternative modes of communication;
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therefore (c) the IAE might facilitate conceptual learning by
way of the relationship between its three characteristics and
the two criteria for meaningful learning. In short, yes, it
does seem likely that the IAE can facilitate conceptual learn-
ing.
The means I chose to use in attempting to answer the
question, Should the IAE be used to facilitate conceptual
learning?, was to examine the relationships that exist be-
tween the use of the IAE and some of the major ideas of the
educational reform movement of the late 1960s and early '70s.
It seemed that the most efficient way of identifying some of
those ideas was to choose three major works from the reform
period, each of which represented a different segment of the
educational spectrum. These works could then be used as the
focal points of our discussion and we could examine the rela-
tionships found between the ideas contained in those works
and the use of the IAE. It is up to the individual readers
to accept or reject the validity of the ideas chosen from
these works, but to the degree that the use of the IAE seemed
in accordance with the ideas, goals, and formulations found
in those works, we could state that the use of the IAE was
likely to facilitate some of the goals of the above mentioned
reform movement, and therefore there was at least some value
to its use.
The first work discussed was Education and Lcstacy by
George Leonard. This work contains views concerning
the
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sociological, as well as anthropological, aspects of educa-
tion. In examining the work we found that Leonard defined
education as change. In this sense, any activity or experi-
ence which resulted in change for the participant could be
considered educative.
In order to put Leonard’s ideas into a form that would
be easily accessible and useful for us, I postulated four
goals for education which I believe accurately reflected
Leonard’s views. The first of these goals was: Education
will encourage learners to be responsive to their environ-
mentjs. In discussing this goal we noted that two processes
involved in the IAE appeared to facilitate such responsiveness.
The first process was dynamic concepts as postulated by
Arnheim. Through this form of concept learners are more aware
not only of the generalities upon which any concept is formed,
but also of the particularities of the individual exemplars
of the concept. The second process had to do with interac-
tion. As Piaget has shown us, learners .both assimilate and
accommodate to learnings. In this process the learner changes
or responds to his or her environment. Since the IAE facili-
tates this process as it meets the criteria for meaningful
learning
,
we can also assume that it generally facilitates
learners being responsive to their environments.
The second goal for education that I formulated from
Leonard's views was that; Education will encourage learners
to realize as much of their potential as possible. In our
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discussion of this goal' we found the IAE to take a passive
role in the facilitation of learners realizing their full
potential. It appeared that the IAE was a vehicle tnrough
which learners could realize their potential. It also
appeared, however, that the use of the IAE had little to do
with the volitional factors involved in this problem. It
falls to agencies like the teacher, parents and most impor-
tantly, society as a whole to encourage the attitudes that
manifest themselves in the full realization of a learner’s
potential
.
The third goal for education discussed in this section
was that : Education will discourage detachment on the part
of learners. We saw in this discussion that the use of per-
ceptual cognition, including dynamic concepts and direct
experience, that is characteristic of the IAE can play an
important role in attaining this goal.
And finally, the fourth goal for education was: Educa^
tion will be ecstatic. Leonard is not exceedingly clear in
defining ecstatic learning. We saw, however, that there are
two factors that indicate that there might be some
relation
between the use of the IAE and ecstatic learning.
The first
of these was that ecstatic learning seems very
similar to
intuitive knowing. If this is true, then there
is a direct
relation between the use of the IAE and ecstatic
learning be-
cause the IAE often facilitates metaphorical
modes of thinking
which are clearly related to intuitive
knowing. The second
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factor that implied a
. relation between the IAE and ecstatic
learning was that it appeared that the ecstatic moment as I
believe Leonard would define it, seems exceedingly similar
to the aesthetic experience as it has been defined by many
authors. Since the aesthetic experience is often a part of
the IAE we find, again, a potential connection between the
IAE and ecstatic learning.
The second work discussed was Fantasy and Feeling in
Education by Richard Jones. This book dealt with the part of
the educational spectrum that concerns itself with emotions
and their relation to conceptual learning. Although Jones
covers much material in his book, I believe his argument can
be accurately condensed thusly: intellectual material con-
tains emotional concomitants; these emotional concomitant-s
can be used in facilitating the learning of the intellectual
material; it does so by imbuing the intellectual material
with personal relevance; but it can only do so if it is:
(1) controlled; (2) expressed; and (3) used. We saw that
controlling emotional material was not usually a problem for
learners since it is a skill that is highly valued and strin-
gently taught by society-at-large. We saw also that the IAE
appears to be a vehicle through which learners could express
and then use emotional material. As such the IAE appears to
a valuable vehicle for attaining the type of educational
process that Jones advocates.
I would also like to point out that Jones is very clear
in indicating that the use of emotional material is more
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important m one kind. of learning than in another. He states
that m the attainment or discovery of knowledge we must be
ante to control our emotions, however, in the formation and
invention of knowledge that is not sufficient. In that case
we need to express and control these emotions. Therefore,
there are certain cases in which the use of the IAE is espe-
cially useful.
Finally we come to Crisis in ~the Classroom by Charles
Silberman. This book, actually the chairman's report of
the Carnegie Report on the Education of Educators
, contains
a massive amount of material. It can be broken down, however,
into three major sections: (1) The purpose of education;
(2) Informal education; and (3) The effects of the educational
system on the learner.
In reviewing his discussion we find that, according to
Silberman, there are three purposes of education to which we
can connect, to differing degrees, the use of the IAE. The
first of these was: The person should have the desire and
ability to educate him or herself . Although the IAE appears
to be a vehicle which can help learners to do this, there
seems to be little or no reason to believe that the use of
the IAE will have a significant and direct effect on the
learner's desire to do so. The second of these purposes was:
The person should know something of the experience of beauty .
In this case the use of the IAE seemed integrally connected
with the attaining of the goal. It appeared that if there is
225
no connection between the use of the IAE and the learner know-
ing something of the experience of beauty, the reason for this
probably lies not in the nature of the IAE itself, but rather,
in the way it has been used.
The third purpose of education identified by Silberman
was that : The person will know something of how to make his
or her intentions effective in the world . The use of the IAE
seemed at least minimally connected to the attaining of the
6°al . This is due to the fact that through the IAE learners
are allowed to attempt to implement solutions to problems,
thereby giving them practice in making their intentions
effective in an at least partially, real world.
The second section of the Silberman study deals with a
specific methodology, namely, informal education . In examin-
ing the relation between informal education and the IAE, we
found that the IAE appeared to be a technique that would fit
easily into the repertoire of an "informal" teacher. This
was due to the fact that informal education and the IAE share
commonalities in terms of techniques, e.g., structured envi-
ronments, maximized opportunities and minimal but incisive
teacher intervention and goals.
The final section of the Silberman study was concerned
with the effects of the educational system on the learner.
We chose from Silberman' s work three programs that were exem-
plary in their attempts to create a more humane environment
We examined the relationship that existedin schools.
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between the use of the IAE and those programs and found that
the use of the IAE would certainly be a positive factor in
any program's attempt to create a more humane school environ-
ment .
.
have learned that the IAE is a technique. As such,
it is effective in reaching certain goals and not effective
in reaching others. It appears that the types of learning
that call for responsiveness to the' environment and the indi-
vidual objects or events that are a part of that environment
are particularly well suited for the use of the IAE. This is
due to the fact that the IAE allows 'for perceptual cognition
to occur. Any learning situation in which the learner is
called upon to make use of his or her sensorial capabilities,
or in which significant advantages would accrue if he or she
were to do so, would certainly be positively related to the
use of the IAE.
It also appears that learning situations that call for
invention rather than discovery of knowledge are particularly
well suited to the use of the IAE. Certainly invention of
knowledge is connected with intuitive knowing and metaphorical
modes of thinking. This is especially true in those cases
when there is also a high degree of emotional impact involved
with a learning. Jones has shown us both the importance of
this fact, and the role that emotions can play in learning.
I have tried to make clear how the IAE can help in facilitat-
ing that process.
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We have also seen that the IAE can be an effective
technique in helping learners experience beauty, make their
intentions effective in the real world, and in creating a
positive and humane educational environment. And finally it
can be said that
,
as in the case of informal education
, when-
ever the techniques and goals involved in a major methodology
are in accordance with the techniques and goals involved in
the use of the IAE, there will be a positive relationship
between the IAE and that methodology.
Whenever we speak of goals for education that lie beyond
the realm of any technique, goals such as encouraging learners
to realize their full potential, and giving learners the de-
sire to educate themselves, we speak necessarily, of goals
which lie beyond the realm of the IAE.
There are other instnaces in which the use of the IAE
will not be particularly effective. Although we have not
enumerated these instances per se
,
we can certainly infer
them from much of what we have said. Just as knowing the
particularities of a concept is most valuable in one instance,
understanding the general principle invovled, to the exclu-
sion of the attributes of individual exemplars, can be most
valuable in other instances. Whereas the use of the IAE cor-
relates positively to the first instance, its positive corre-
lation to the second instance is not insured. It may or may
not be an effective technique in the second instance, depend-
the other attributes of the learning situation. Theing on
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same point can be made of all the other characteristics and
goals to which we have positively connected the use of the
IAE
.
First of all, I have asked the question, Should the
IAE be used to facilitate conceptual learning? I believe the
answer is, yes. However, I believe it is also clear that the
IAE is a technique that should only be used under certain con-
ditions. Have those conditions been identified? No, they
have not. That is a function that can only be served by
thorough and careful empirical testing. I have, however,
investigated some of the theoretical areas from which those
empirical studies must derive, and have, I hope, begun to
identify some of the theoretical boundaries which will con-
stitute the parameters within which the empirical studies
must fall.
What are some of the other implications of this work?
I believe we now know that there is, or at least appears to
be, an effective means by which arts activities can become
an integral part of the repertoire of techniques used to
facilitate conceptual learning. This would indicate that we
should study this method further so that we might come to
understand it better and be able to use it more effectively.
It also implies that teachers in general should be made aware of
this technique and others like it so that they come to realize
the value arts activities might have in this area. And in addi-
tion, that teachers would come to know more about the arts
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and artistic experiences in general so that they are more
able to understand and use techniques like the IAE which
take advantage of these experiences.
Finally, and probably most important of all, I believe
that this study shows that there are other techniques avail-
able to teachers than the ones they presently use. Whether
the IAE turns out, in the end, to be an effective methodology
or not, is probably not as importaht as the fact that people
keep striving tor better and more effective ways of teaching,
ways that are not only effective in the sense that they con-
vey information more quickly and accurately, but in terms of
influencing the learner positively as a person, as a thinker,
as a human being.
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